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Foreword 
MANY helpful studies of administrative law and procedure have been brought to the light of day in recent years. Many scholars have labored in 
the vineyard, and the law review articles and monographs 
produced by them have been legion. Many public and quasi­
public groups have delved into the subject. A brief glance 
will show the extent and seriousness of the interest. 
In 1929 the British "Committee on Ministers' Powers" 
was appointed by the Lord High Chancellor and was directed 
to study delegated legislative and quasi-judicial powers in 
England. The Committee filed its notable report in 1932-a 
report regarded as a pioneer among contemporary cooperative 
studies in the field. 
Beginning in 1933 and continuing to date, the American 
Bar Association has maintained a Special Committee on Ad­
ministrative Law. This committee, confining its attention 
to the Federal administrative system, has submitted a series 
of annual reports containing a wealth of useful information. 
After years of diligent labor the committee finally prepared 
and, with the authority of the Association, sponsored before 
Congress the much-discussed Logan-Walter Bill, a measure 
which, after a stormy career, was passed by Congress, but 
died by Presidential veto. The American Bar Association has 
been active in yet another direction. In 1937 the Association 
Section on Judicial Administration established a section Com­
mittee on Administrative Agencies and Tribunals, with direc­
tion to study the administrative law of the forty-eight states 
of the Union. This Committee prepared and filed two in­
structive annual reports dealing with the subject matter under 
its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the Committee drafted a bill 
vii 
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designed to serve as a model act for use by the several states, 
to be followed by them if desired in drafting statutes concern­
ing state administrative procedures. This bill has now been 
submitted to the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws for consideration in the hope that it will 
ultimat�ly be promulgated as one of the national Conference 
Uniform Acts. 
Still another manifestation of the current interest in the 
subject appears in the recently filed report of the Attorney 
General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, a com­
mittee appointed by the Attorney General of the United 
States on request of the President. For two years prior to 
reporting, the Committee and its research staff studied in 
detail the principal Federal administrative agencies. Its 
report represents the culmination of these studies. Moreover, 
the Report is destined to accomplish a more valuable result 
than mere occupancy of shelf space in libraries. It is accom­
panied by two proposed bills embodying notable legislative 
recommendations regarding administrative procedure. The 
bills have now been introduced into the United States Senate 
where they are known as S. 674 and S. 675. S. 675 has the 
support of the entire Attorney General's committee- S. 674, 
on the other hand, was prepared and submitted by a minority 
group, but it now bears the stamp of approval of the House 
of Delegates of the American Bar Association. It purports 
to establish in legislative form a Code of Fair Standards of 
Administrative Procedure, so far as it is possible to create such 
standards by legislation. 
From this brief review of some of the principal manifesta­
tions of ferment in the field, it is apparent that administrative 
agencies and their procedures are being subjected to a vast 
amount of careful scrutiny by many well-qualified persons 
and groups. Moreover, it is by no means an overstatement 
to assert that all who have studied the subject objectively 
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have found ample room for improvement. The end has not 
yet been reached. 
In the midst of all of the ramifications of this dynamic sub­
ject, no single phase has proved of greater significance or 
interest than the power and extent of the right of the courts 
to review administrative action. No phase of administrative 
law has produced a more extensive literature. None has oc­
casioned more careful thought by members of the bench, the 
bar, and the teaching branch of the profession. This intensity 
of interest need not be deemed unusual or extraordinary, for 
judicial review is one of the essential checks and balances. 
Therefore, Mr. Uhler's monograph, comparing the his­
tory and operation of the doctrine of separation of powers in 
France with that in this country, so far as relates to judicial 
review of administrative acts, penetrates to the heart of one 
of the most significant areas of administrative law. The line 
of demarcation between the power of administration and that 
of the courts is, in the long run, determined not by immediate 
case to case necessity, but by the broad proposition that a free 
country can continue to be free in the best sense only if ad­
ministrative usurpation is adequately held in check. With 
this thought in mind, Mr. Uhler's sketch of F��ilch juristic 
history compared with our own is most timely as well as most 
illuminating. In French legal history, as he so carefully 
points out, judicial review has passed from a stage, prior to 
the Revolution, of potent judicial control over administration, 
through a stage of minimized control, into the present regime 
in which the rule of law is again generously employed in the 
protection of private rights against administrative error-first 
a high state of judicial control, then, for political reasons, a 
low state of judicial control, and now again a relatively high 
state. The pendulum swings to and fro, and in France it has 
measured three half-strokes. 
Compare French juristic history with that of this country. 
In post-Revolutionary days, fear of legislative power domi-
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nated our political thinking. Consequently, when our theory 
of government was formulated, the courts were placed on a 
parity with the legislative and executive branches in order 
that the checks and balances introduced thereby might neutral­
ize the likelihood of disastrous consequences. Today, in the 
midst of a dynamic program of world change and American! 
social reform, judicial power is being severely criticized, and! 
in many quarters efforts are being made with substantial 
measure of success to subordinate the judiciary to the ad� 
ministration, especially when legal questions arising uncle� 
current programs of social reform are involved. Courts ar� 
deemed by proponents of these efforts to stand in the way of 
needed social and political progress. Fortunately, with us this , 
has taken place without revolution. With us the pendulum :. 
has up to now swung just two half-strokes; but, if the teachings · 
of history are to be believed, in due course the pendulum 
will swing back again, just as surely as it did under the French 
Republic. The Courts will in the long run occupy a position 
of equality and independence, exemplifying the supremacy of 
the law in an orderly and balanced polity. Indeed, this must 
happen if the country is to remain free. So, in thinking of 
judicial review of administrative decisions, it is wise to regard 
it as a most important feature of the theory of checks and 
balances in our juristic and governmental scheme-a sub­
stantial part of the swinging pendulum. We must continually 
ask ourselves what is the proper degree of judicial review if 
a wise balance is to be maintaint!d. That should be our guid­
ing star. 
Mr. Uhler has given us a careful and scholarly discussion 
of judicial review under the French administrative system. 
Today judicial review in this country is in a state of flux. The 
recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in the 
case of The Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan and 
Nichols Oil Company1 leads us to anticipate a substantial re-
1310 u.s. 573· 
FOREWORD xi 
stricti on of the doctrine that has been current since r 920 con­
cerning judicial review of constitutional facts. Statutes stipu­
lating that judicial review of facts shall be precluded when 
"substantial evidence" is found to support administrative de­
cisions are being interpreted variously but with increasing re­
strictivity. Some of the legislation now before Congress seeks 
to deal with the ever-present and all-important question of 
the power of the courts with respect to administration. The 
end is not in sight. The last word has not been said. Mr. 
Uhler's comparative study comes at a peculiarly appropriate 
time. 
E. BLYTHE STASON 
Preface 
THE present study was originally inspired by the wide­spread interest in the doctrine of the separation of powers stimulated by current discussions of vital prob­
lems of administrative law. Frequent reference to this doctrine 
occurs especially in recent legal literature concerned with the 
relation between the administrative and judicial departments 
of government. Particular mention may be made of the 
attention which has been given the doctrine by the Special 
Committee on Administrative Law of the American Bar As­
sociation. However, the allusions to the doctrine in these dis­
cussions to prevalent separation of powers in the organization 
of government have not always been sufficiently discriminat­
ing. Mirabeau's warning in the constitutional debates of I 789 
in France not to invoke the formula without first carefully 
ascertaining its true meaning is as timely today as it was 
then. 
It is the object of this study to investigate the�ntent of 
the doctrine of the separation of powers with a view to es­
tablishing the nature and extent of its bearing upon the prob­
lem of review of and relief from administrative acti§ Ulti­
mately, this inquiry seeks to disclose the measure in which 
the doctrine has become a screen more or less effectively 
concealing the forces which actually determine the function 
of judicial control of administrative action. 
The plan adopted necessitates an introductory analysis of 
the doctrine of the separation of powers. In order to fix its 
meaning, Montesquieu's ideas, so often relied upon, will be 
briefly reviewed. This will be followed by an examination 
of the functional value of the doctrine, that is, the historically 
conditioned place which it came to occupy at an early date 
xiii 
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as a factor in determining the relation of the judiciary to 
the administration. Particular care has been taken to give a 
clear presentation of the political conditions preceding the 
inauguration of a representative government in France. The 
historical facts of that time are of special interest for an 
understanding of the different significance of the separation 
of powers in the France of 1 789-1 940 and in the United 
States. The full understanding of that difference in signifi­
cance, in turn, is indispensable for correct appraisal of the de­
velopments during this century and a half, as well as for 
intelligent comparison of the French and American systems 
of reviewing administrative acts. 
The phase of French public law selected for comparison 
presents many points of uncommon interest at the present 
time. The droit administratif, developed while France was 
an outstanding exponent of the doctrine of the separation of 
powers, has repeatedly been the subject of consideration from 
the viewpoint of administrative law in this country. How­
ever, it has not as yet been explored sufficiently to be capable 
of serving as a guide in the United States. The large part 
of this study dealing with the pertinent problems as they 
present themselves in French law is intended to afford a 
closer view of the droit administratif, and it is hoped that 
what has proved an extremely interesting task will indirectly 
throw fresh light on American administrative law. 
One more observation should be made at this time con­
cerning the general nature of the droit administratif. Much 
of French administrative law is embodied in a long succession 
of statutes, the first of which were enacted in 1 789. But there 
has also been an impressive body of "common law," developed 
by the three distinguished courts of the country, the Cour de 
cassation, the Conseil d'Etat, and that great umpire, the 
Tribunal des conflits. Their decisions reflect important flue-
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tuations and trends, particularly in respect to the jurisdiction 
of the ordinary courts over administrative action. Indeed, the 
phase of French public law which is the subject of the present 
discussion is almost entirely governed by rules having their 
origin in judicial decisions. 
In concluding this introduction, allusion is briefly made 
to the events which have abruptly terminated the evolution 
of what was until so recently the French administrative sys­
tem. But the destruction of institutions expressive of demo­
cratic ideas cannot impair their enduring intrinsic value. 
The author desires to acknowledge his appreciation for the 
invaluable assistance and encouragement he has received from 
Dean E. Blythe Stason and Professor Hessel E. Y ntema of 
the University of Michigan Law School. The author also 
expresses his gratitude to Professor Hobart R. Coffey, Uni:.. 
versity of Michigan Law Librarian, for his assistance in se­
curing foreign material, and to Miss Katherine Kempfer, 
Associate Editor of the Michigan Law Review, for her cooper­
ation in the preparation of the final draft of the manuscript. 
The Michigan Law Review has courteously consented to 
the republication of that part of the study which appeared 
in volume 3 7 of the Review, at page 209, under the title of 
"The Doctrine of Administrative Trespass in French Law; 
an Analogue of Due Process." 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
September, 1940 
ARMIN UHLER 
Table of Contents 
PAGE 
FOREWORD BY E. BLYTHE STASON . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vll 
... 
PREFACE . . .. . .. . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . .  Xlll 
TABLE OF FRENCH CASES .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .... XXI 
TABLE OF AMERICAN CASES ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . ... . .  XXIX 
PART I. THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARA-
TION OF POWERS . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . 
CHAPTER I. DEVELOPMENT oF THE DocTRINE oF THE 
SEPARATION oF PowERS IN FRANCE ......... . . 
A. The Doctrine of the Separation of Powers as Con-
ceived by Montesquieu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . 
B. The Historical Background of the Doctrine of the 
Separation of Powers in French Law . . . . . . .  . 
I. The King and the Parlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
2. Judicial Interference with the Executive . . . . .  
C. The Significance of the Doctrine of the Separation 
of Powers in Post-Revolutionary French Law . 
I. The Basic Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... . 
2. Evolution of the Administrative System . . .. . 
CHAPTER II . . CoMPARATIVE SIGNIFICANCE oF THE 
SEPARATION oF
. 
PowERs FOR JuRISDICTION TO 
REviEW ADMINISTRATIVE AcTs . . . . . ........ . 
PART II. THE REVIEW POWERS OF THE AD­
MINISTRATIVE COURTS IN FRANCE . . .  
CHAPTER III. REcouRSE FOR ExcEss oF PowE� . . . . .  
A. History of Annulment of Administrative Acts in 
the Conseil d'Etat . . . . . . . . . . .. . ....... . . 
XVIJ. 
I 
3 
3 
8 
8 '­
IO !--
II 
II ...__. 
29 
31 
..__ 
3I 
xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS 
r) PAGE 
/' \ (B. Substantive and Procedural Features of the Re-
course for Excess of Power ............... . 
I. Grounds for and Nature of the Appeal . .. .. . 
2. The Subject Matter of the Appeal ....... . 
CHAPTER IV. REVIEW oF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTs oN 
33 
33 
36 
THE MERITS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 
A. Theoretical Basis of Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 
I. Authoritative Acts and Acts of Management. . 39 
2. The Public Service Criterion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 
B. Judicial Interpretation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
r. The Rule of the Blanco Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
2.  Extension and Modification of the Rule of the 
Blanco Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
3· The Public Service Criterion Applied to Con-
tracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
(a) The Therond Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . so 
(b) Qualification of the Rule of the Therond 
Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
4· Later Developments-Commercial and Non­
commercial Public Service. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 
CHAPTER V. A CoMPARISON OF ADMINISTRATIVE RE-
1 VIEW AND JUDICIAL REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 I 
PART III. THE REVIEW POWERS OF THE 
ORDINARY COURTS IN FRANCE. . . . . . . 75 
CHAPTER VI. REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULA-
TIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 
A. The Question of the Legality of Regulations • . . 77 
B. The Intrinsic Nature of Regulations. . . . . . . . . . So 
C. Effects and Rationale of the Jurisdiction of the 
Ordinary Courts Over Regulatory Acts... . . . 8 4  
TABLE OF CONTENTS XIX 
PAGE 
D. The Septfonds Case Compromise . . .  ,I. • • • • • • • • 86 
E. Conclusion and Comparison. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
CHAPTER VII. JuRISDICTION OvER PuBLIC OFFI-
CERs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 
A. The Conditions at the Time of the French Revolu-
tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 
B. The Constitutional Guarantee of Administrative 
Agents of the Year VIII. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 
C. Repeal of the "Administrative Guarantee"-ln-
terpretation-Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  IOI 
D. Reaction-The Tribunal des Conflits and the 
Pelletier Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IOS 
CHAPTER VIII. FAUTE PERSONNELLE AND FAUTE DE 
SERVICE . . . . . . . 0 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • I I I 
A. Early Period-Laferriere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 'I I3 
I. Intent and Magnitude of Error . . . . . . . . . . . I I 3 
2. Negligence . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. 115 
3· Abuse of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I6 
B. Classifications of Jeze. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I 8 
I. Bad Faith-Gross Error. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I I 9 
2. Fautes Lourdes . . . . . . ... . . ... . . . . . . . . . . I20 
C. Later Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 24 
I. Duguit-Detachable and Nondetachable Er-
rors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I24 
2. Appleton-Intellectually Discernible Fault. . 125 
3· Recent Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I27 
D. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I30 
CHAPTER IX. THE DocTRINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
TRESPASS . .. :·:-:--:-:-:--:-:-:-_-··:-:·:-�--:-:·-.·:· .. -. --_-.-:
·
·:··: -.-.·:- I 33 
A. is-There an Inherent Judicial Power to Protect \...._.. 
Persons and Property Against Administrative 
Encroachments? ...................... . 133 
XX TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
B. The Trespass Concept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I37 
I. General Theoretical Considerations . . . . . . . . I 3 8 
(a) Illegality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 3 8 
{b) Usurpation of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I39 
2. Administrative Trespass Defined. . . . . . . . . . . I4I 
{a) Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I43 
(b) Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I47 
3· The Elements of Trespass Analyzed . . . . . . . . ISO 
(a) Illegality-Usurpation and Procedural 
Irregularity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 50 
{b) Invasion of Civil Liberties and Property 
Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I54 
CHAPTER X. RECENT APPLICATIONS OF THE TRES-
PASS DocTRINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 55 
A. The Action Fran�aise Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 55 
B. Administrative Execution Against Persons and 
Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I62 
I. The Rule of the Saint-Just Case . . . . . . . . . . .  I63 
2. The Saint-Just Rule and the Action Fran�aise 
Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I69 
C. A Third Element of Trespass-Extent of Inva-
Sion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I7I 
D. Voie de Fait Distinguished from Faute Person-
neUe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 
E. The Significance of the Trespass Doctrine . . . . . .  I74 
/ CHAPTER XI. CoMPARISON AND CoNCLUSIONs. . . . . . . I77 
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I9I 
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I99 
Table of French Cases 
App. = Cour d'appel 
Cass. = Cour de cassation 
C.d'Et. = Conseil d'Etat 
C.d.pre£. = Consei1 de prefecture 
Confi. = Tribunal des conflits 
Trib. sup. = Tribunal superieur 
PAGE 
Alamichel v. Ville de Vichy, ( Cass.) S. 1 926. 1 .2 1 3. . . . . . . . . 88 
Anduran [matter of] , ( C.d'Et.) D. 1925·3·43 ... 161 ,  1 62, 169  
Anduze v .  Maire de Chalabre, ( Confl.) Rec. 1 879.805 (8o6). 1 14-
Arrighi [matter of], ( C.d'Et.) Rec. 1 936.966, S. 
1 937·3·33(37) ,  noted 54 R.D.P. ( 1 937) 370.......... 83 
Bai11y v. Carques, ( Confi.) D. 1 91 8 .3. 1 (4) ........... 160, 1 72 
Baldy v. Prefet de Saone-et-Loire, ( C.d'Et.) D. 1 920.3.25 .. 16 1  
Beguin v .  Choquet, ( App. Paris) Gaz. Pal. 1 935·2.257 (258), 
mentioned 52 R.D.P. ( 1935) 8II ................... 1 28 
Benjamin [matter of] , ( C.d'Et.) D. 1 933·3·54· ........... 1 59 
Bertrand v. Rimbaud, ( Confi.) Rec. 1 874.643(644) ....... 1 1 5 
Beziat v. Societe Nord-Lumiere, ( Cass.) D. 1 937 · 1 . 1 7 (24), 
noted 54  ,R.D.P. ( 1 937) 5 1 7  ....................... 146 
Blanco v. l'Etat, ( Confi.) D. 1873·3· 1 7 (2o), S. 
1 8 73·2. 1 53( 1 54-) ............ ·"-3· 44-, 46, 52, 5 7, 58, 59  
Blanco v. Ministre des finances, ( C.d'Et.) Rec. 1 8]4.4-16. . . . 4-3 
Bouhier v. Candelier, { Confl.) Rec. x88 I .9 18(9 19)  ....... 120 
Bousquet v. Pougin, { <;onfi.) Rec. 1 878·4-7 (48) .......... liS 
Boyer et Jullian v. l'Etat, { Confl.) D. 1 931.3·33• noted 48 
R.D.P. ( 1 93 1 )  8o7.............................. 54 
Bruant ( abbe) v. Maire de Breurey-les-Faverney, ( C.d'Et.) 
s. 1 9 10.3.129( 132) ,  :b. 1 9 1 1 .3·4- 1 (4-2) ............... 144 
Carbonnel v. Sige, ( Confi.) S. 1 9 1 2.3.33· ............... 124-
Catta v.  Troquier, ( Confi.) Rec. 1881 .403 .............. 1 14-
Chailly-en-Biere, Commune de [matter of] , ( C.d'Et.) D. 
1 930·3· 1 ,  D.H. 1 929.5 1 2, noted 47 R.D.P. ( 1 930) 7 73.. 6o 
Chambre syndicale, etc. [matter of] , ( C.d'Et.), Rec. 1 9 16.243 125 
Chan Pek Chun v. Ministre de la  Marine, ( C.d'Et.) Rec. 
1931. 1 1 25 . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .... . . ..... . . .. . 160 
xxi 
xxii TABLE OF FRENCH CASES 
PAGE 
Chauveau [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) D. 1 934·3·1 (2) ,  noted 50 
R.D.P. ( 1933) 246............................... 6o 
Chemins de fer du Nord v. Vion et fils, (Confi.) D. 1 9 16.3·57 
(6o), S. I9I7·3·I (2)............................. 87 
Chiron v. Sineau, (Cass.) D.H. 1 926.8 1  .................. 1 27 
Claire v. ]arnot et Loison, (Confl.) Rec. 1 929.389. . . . . . . . . . 128  
Clouet, General [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) Rec. 1 844.493 ...... 1 36 
Colonie de la Cote-d'I voire v. Societe commerciale, etc., ( Confi.) 
D. 192 1.3. 1.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6o 
Compagnie d'assurances "le Soleil" v. l'Etat, (Confi.) Rec. 
1 9 10.446 (449) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 
Compagnie d'assurances Rhin et Moselle v. Henry, (Confi.) D. 
1 933·3·4 1 ...................................... 1 26 
Compagnie generale de navigation, etc. v. Grandperrin, (Cass.) 
D. 1 9o8. x.76. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1  
Compagnie nouvelle d'eclairage, etc. v. Guiringaud, (Cass.) D. 
1 937· 1 . 1 7, noted 54 R.D.P. ( 1937)  5 1 7  .............. 1 46 
Compagnie nouvelle des Chalets, etc. [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) 
Rec. 1902.42 ................................ 159, 1 6 1  
Corbon, Commune de, v. Vallet, (Cass.) D .  I877 . 1 .9 ( 1o) ... 1 39 
Cotte [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) Rec. 1 924.839 .......... 159, 169  
Coudert [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) S .  1 937·3·33 (36), noted 54 
R.D.P. ( 1 937)  370 ............................... 83 
Coutareau v. Gillet, (Confl.) D. 19 13·3· 130, S. 
1 9 14·3·5 1 (52) .............................. 120, 1 28  
Cumont (de) & Stofllet v. Engelhard, (C.d'Et., Confi.) D. 
1 872·3· 1 7 ( 18 )  .............................. 104, 107 
Dekeister v. Administration des postes, ( C.d'Et.) S .  I 862.2. I 39. 4 3 
Despujol [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) S. 1 930·3·4 1 ,  noted 48 R.D.P. 
( 193 1)  163 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 
Dezetree v. Maire de Meslay-le-Grenet, (Confi.) Rec. 
x883·939 ....... ·, · ............................. II7 
Dionnet et Proton v. l'Etat, (Confi.) S. 1 920.3 .47 (48) ..... 128  
Dubois [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) Rec. 1 92 1 .23 1 ............. 1 5 8  
Duez v. Fournier, (App. Douai) D .  1 936.2.5 I (53) ,  noted 53 
R.D.P. ( 1 936) 685 .............................. 1 29 
Dufeuille v. Prefet de police, (Confi.) D. 1890·3·65(66) .... 1 5 7  
Dune v. Engelhard, (C.d'Et., Confi.) D. 1 872·3· 1 7 ( 1 8) .... 1 04 
TABLE OF FRENCH CASES xxiii 
PAGE 
Durand v. Societe l'Energie electrique RhOne et Jura, ( Confi.) 
D. 1 934-·3·57 (6o)................................ 89 
Engelhard [matter of] , (Cass.) D. 1 873.1 .289 (29 1 )  ...... 104-
Favre v. Mas, (App. Lyon) D. 1904-.2.32 1 (322) .. 14-2, 14-3, 14-8 
Feutry v. Departement de l'Oise, (Confi.) S. 1 908.3.97 
(98) ................................. 4-6, 4-7, 48, 57 
Fonscolombe (de) v. Ville de Marseille, (Confi.) S .  1 909·3·4-9 
(so), Rec. 1 908.44-8.............................. 48 
Fontenas v. B . . .  , (Cass.) Gaz. Pal. 1 923.2.3 1 9  ........ 1 27  
Fournier v. Bonnefond, (App. Poitiers) D.H. 1 936.502 (503) ,  
noted 54- R.D.P. ( 1 937) 153-54 ..................... 129  
Frecon [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) D.H. 1 935. 1 83, noted 52 
R.D.P. ( 1935) 34-0 ....................... 141 ,  14-6, 153 
Fremy [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) Rec. 1 933· 1 159 · ........... 1 73 
Gaste (de) v. Hospices, etc., (Confi.) D. 1 895·3·4-5(46). 160, 1 73 
Gerome v. Gerbault, (Conti.) Rec. 1 908.501 ..... 1 20, 124-, 1 28 
Gilibert [matter of] ,,(C.d'Et.) Rec. 1 933·930 ............. x68 
Gillet v. Panier et l'Etat, (<;ontl.) S. 1 909·3·49 (50)........ 48 
Giniere [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) Rec. 1 904-.88 .............. 1 4-3 
Girodet v. Morizot, (Confi.) D. 1 908.3.57, S. 1 908.3.8 I ,  
Rec. 1 908.597 (6o3) ,  noted 25 R.D.P. ( 1 908) 
272 ................................... 1 2 1 , 1 23, 1 24-
Godart v. Cliquet, (Conti.) D. I 874·3·4 ................. 108 
Gounouilhou v. de Tracy, (Conti.) Rec. 1 877.93 1 (936) ,  S. 
1 878.2.157 ............................. 1 1 7, 1 1 8, 156 
Grosson v. Souhet, (Conti.) Rec. 1 902.644-............... 1 1 9 
Guillou v. Prefet de la Seine, (Cass.) S. 1 9 1 8- 19 19. 1 . 193 
( 1 94-) ....................................... 81 ,  83 
Hostein & Cie. [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) D. 1 901 .3.53 ..... 159, 1 6 1  
Huignard, consorts [matter of] ,  (C.d'Et.) Rec. 1 923.727  .... 158 
Immarigeon v. Perrin, (Confi.) Rec. 1 922. 185 ............ 1 28 
Joullie v. Assoc. syndic. du Canal, etc., (Confi.) S. 
x 909·3·4-9 (so) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
Labadie v. Gaillardon, (Cass.) D. 18 76.1.289 (292). 1 40, 143, 1 73 
Lacombe v. Perrier, (Confi.) D. 1 876·3·5 1 ............... 172  
xxiv TABLE OF FRENCH CASES 
PAGE 
L'Action fran�aise v. Bonnefoy-Sibour, (Confl.) D. I935·3·25 
(28), noted 53 R.D.P. (I936) 296 ................. . 
. . . . . . . . . 136, I4I, I47. ISS. I6I, I69, I70, I72, I73· I74 
Lajudie (de) v. Pomarede, (Cass.) D. I9I9. 1 .32 .......... I 59  
Lalande v. Peynaud, (Confl.) D. I899·3·93• Rec. I897.758 
( 759) ,  S. I899·3·95 · · · · · · · · · · · · . . . .  · ..... I I9, I20, I24 
Lamy v. Chemins de fer du Nord, (App. Paris) Gaz. Pal. 
1 930.1 .68.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 
Laumonnier-Carriol [matter of], (Confl.) S. I878.2.93, D. 
1878.3.13  ...................................... I I3 
Laur v. Lemonnier, (Cass.) D. I92I.I.I7 .. .......... 1 25, 1 26 
Lebel v. Bault, (Confl.) D. I892.3.I IO .............. I45, I 53 
Lefevre-Pontalis v. Cheronnet, (Cass.) S. I864.I.248. 97, IOO, IOI 
Lemaire v. Prefet du Nord, (C.d.prH.) Gaz. Pal. I937.1 .396, 
noted 54 R.D.P. (I937) 38I ........................ 130 
Mabille v. Ville de Paris, (C.d'Et.) D. I934·3·9 (I3) .. ·5 7, 58, 59  
Marquie [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) Rec. I926.383. . . . . . . . . . . . I 58 
Martin v. Ville de Marseille, ( Cass.) S .  I 9 I 8-I 9 I 9· I. 7 3 ( 7 4) . . 86 
Mascaras v. Sene et Chiche, (Confl.) Rec. I902.209, D. 
I903·3·93 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I20 
Maudiere v. Maire et commune de Nouzon, (Confl.) Rec. 
I904.252 ...................................... 1 2 1  
Mayer v. Kraencker, (Cass.) D.H. I934·398 .............. 1 28 
Melinette [matter of] , (Confl.) S. 1 933·3·97• noted 5 1  R.D.P. 
(I934) 14o ........................ s7, s8, 59, 6o, 137 
Mende, Ville de, v. Roussel, (Cass.) D. I9I0.1.266 (267) . I45, I73 
Meyere v. Rollin, (Cass.) D. I872.1.385 ......... 1 03, 1 04, 108 
Michau et Lafreney v. Boegner, prHet du Loiret, (Confl.) D. 
t89o.3.6s(67) .................................. 1 5 7  
Mignon (abbe) v. Godet, (Confl.) Rec. I9I0·442, S. 
I9I0.3.I29 (I32) ,  D. 1 9 1 1 ·3·4-I (42) ................ 144 
Ministre des Travaux publics v. Mahieu, (C.d'Et.) D.H. 1 932. 
154, S. 1 932.3.60 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  · ........... I4I 
Mohammed-ben-Belkassem [matter of] , (Confl.) Rec. I89I. 
542, D. I892.3. 125 .............................. I23 
Monpillie v. Gruet, Maire de Bordeaux, ( Cass.) D. I 92 1.  1.4 I 
(42 ) ,  S. I9I8-I9I9.2. 1 .(2) .. I I3, 1 24, I25, 1 26, I 59, I68. 1.72 
TABLE OF FRENCH CASES XXY 
PAGE 
Monsegur, Commune de, v. Lalanne, (C.d'Et.) S .  I92I·3·49 · 56 
Montlaur v.  Balmigere, Maire de Tournissan, (Conti.) Rec. 
I904.888 (89o), D. I9o6.3.58 (59) ............... I22, I72 
Navarro et Mounier [matter of] ,  (Conti.) D.H. I926.55 .... I27 
Neveux v. Administration des Pastes et Telegraphes, (Conti.) 
Rec. I884.909(9I0) .............................. I46 
Pelletier v. de Ladmirault, (Conti.) S. I874.2.28, D. 
I874·3·5 ...... I05, I08, I09, UO, II I, 1 1 2, 1 1 8, 1 25, I 56 
Penicaud [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) D.H. I929·39· ........... I59 
Perignon [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) S. I936·3·97 (98), noted 54 
R.D.P. (I937) I46.............................. 34 
Petit [matter of] , (Cass.) D. I873. 1 .390. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I05 
Piment (abbe) v. Guichard-Voillemond, Maire, (Conti.) Rec. 
I9I0.323(324), S. I9I0.3.I29( I3o), D. 
I91 1 ·3·4I . .. . . . . · . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I4I, I44, ISI 
Plet [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) S. I936·3·97 (98), noted 54 
R.D.P. I46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 
Pradines [matter of] ,  (Conti.) Rec. I875·764(765) ....... 1 1 6  
Prefet de la Haute-Garonne v. Loumagne, (Conti.) Rec. 
I897·497 (498) ................................. I20 
Raoulx v. Gallet, (Trib. sup.) D. I897.2.225 (226)........ 82 
Realmont (cure de) v. Maire de Realmont, (Conti.) S. 
I935·3·97 (98) ..................... I44, I48, I53> I73 
Regie du Syndicat intercommunal, etc. v. Same, (Cass.) D. 
I937 . 1 .I7 (2o), noted 54 R.D.P. (I937) 5I7 .......... I46 
Regnault [matter of] , (Cass.) S. I846. 1 .590... . . . . . . . . . . . IOO 
Requile v. Grignoux-Vienne, (Conti.) Rec. I879.803 
( 804) ..................................... 1 16, II7 
Rosay [matter of] , (Conti.) D.H. I933·336. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27  
Rubelles (de) v. Prefet de  I' Allier, (Conti.) Rec. I 880 .999 
( 1000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . II 4, I 2 0 
Saffroy v. Martin et Ligeron, (Conti.) Rec. I894.628, D. 
I896·3·IO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I23 
Sagot du Vauroux v. Fazuilhe, (Conti.) Rec. 1 906.803. . . . . . . 4 1  
Saint-Martin v. Gaussorgues, (Cass.) Gaz. Pal. 1 938. 1 . 1 84, 
noted 55 R.D.P. ( 1 938) 168. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130 
XXVI TABLE OF FRENCH CASES 
PAGE 
Schmitz v. Cabanel, (App. Paris) Gaz. Pal. 1 935.2.257  (258),  
mentioned 52 R.D.P. ( 1 935 ) 8 1 1  .................... 1 28 
Septfonds v. Chemins de fer du Midi, (Confl.) S. 1 923·3·49 
(so) , D. I924·3·4I ........... 81, 83, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93 
Societe des Eaux de DeauVJUe [matter of], (C.d'Et.) D. 
1 934·3· 1 (3), noted 50 R.D.P. (1933) 246, 5 1  R.D.P. 
(1934) 314 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6o 
Societe des Forces motrices d'Arrens v. Pahu, (Confl.) D. 
I934·3·57 (6o) · .... · ... . . · . . . . . · . . . . . . . . . .  · . . . . .  89 
Societe des granits, etc., v. Ville de Lille, (C.d'Et.) D. 1 916.3·35, 
s. 1917-3- 15  ........................ 52, 54, 55 ,  s6, 59 
Societe fran�aise d'industrie chimique [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) 
S. 1 916.3.1 (2) .................................. 168 
Societe immobiliere de Saint-Just v. Prefet du RhOne, (Confl.) 
D. 1903·3·4 1 (45),  S. 1 904·3· 1 7 (20) ................ . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 139· 15 1, 1 63, 1 64, 165, 167,  1 68, 169, 1 7 1  
Societe Laitiere Maggi [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) H.D. 
1 924. 1 70 ................................... 160, 1 69 
Soleillet v. Briere de Lisle, ( Confl.) Rec. 1 8 8 2. 3 7 3 ( 3 74) . . . . I I 5 
Spitz [matter of] , (C.d'Et.) Rec. 1 920.1005 ( 1 oo6) ........ 158 
Sureau v. Rigaudie, (Confl.) Rec. 1 906.196, D. 
1 907·3·102 ............................. I 16, 1 20, 1 2 7  
Suremain (de) [matter of] , (C. d'Et.) Rec. 1 907.345 (348) .. 1 68 
Syndicat des communes, etc. v. Societe Cuvelier, (Cass.) D. 
1 937· 1 .17(27), noted 54 R.D.P. (1937) 517 ....... ... 146 
Syndicat des communes, etc. v. Societe Phelan-Segur, (Cass.) 
D. 1937-L17 (25) ,  noted 54 R.D.P. (1937) 517 ........ 146 
Syndicat des Marais mouilles v. Chauveau, (C.d'Et.) D. 
1934·3·1 (2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6o 
Templier v. Commune de Sempigny, (Confl.) S. 1 928.3.1 29, 
noted 46 R.D.P. ( 1 929) 154 ...................... 56, 57  
Terrier v. Departement de  Saone-et-Loire, (C.d'Et.) D.  
1 904·3·65 ( 66)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 
Thepaz v. Mirabel, (Confl.) Gaz. Pal. 1 935·2.26 1 ......... 128  
Therond v. Ville de Montpellier, (C.d'Et.) S .  1 9 1 1 .3. 1 7  
( 19) ................................. so, 51, 52, 54 
Thiney (abbe) v. Dompnier, (Confl.) Rec. 1 9 1 6.52. . . . . . . . 144 
Thomas v. Ruaux, (Confl.) Rec. 1928.8 7 1  (872) .......... 128  
TABLE OF FRENCH CASES xxvii 
PAGE 
Tubeuf v. General du Guiny, (C.d'Et.) Rec. 1 893· 1 54 (I55) . 1 I6 
Uhel v. Le Visage, ( Confl.) Rec. 1 900.5 I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 1  
Union Villeneuvoise de conserves, etc. [matter of] , ( Confi.) 
D.H. 1 93 1 .I35 ..................... I45, I53, x6o, I73 
Usannaz-Joris v. Lefebvre du Grosriez, prefet de la Savoie, 
(Confi.) D. 1 890·3 ·65 (66) ........................ I57 
Valentin v. Haas, (Cass.) D. 1876. 1 .289 (297) . . . . . . . 0 0 . . .  I08 
Vaugeois-Heron v. Rieunier, (Cass.) D. 1 9I9. 1 .32 0 0 0 .  0 ° 0 0 0 159  
Verbanck v. Le  Beguec, (Confl.) D. 1 934·3·9 ( 13 ) ,  S. 
1 934·3·33> noted 50 R.D.P. ( I933) 620, 5 I R.D.P. 
( 1 934) 457, 458° 0 0 .  0 ° 0 0 .  0 0 0 . . . .  0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 0 .  0 0 o s8, 59 
Viette v. Dalloz, (Confl.) Rec. I877.I07 5 ( 1077)  . 0 .... . . . II5 
Vimont v. Prefet de la Marne, (Conti.) Rec. x884.58 1  (582)  0 0 Il4 
Vincent v. Fosse, (Confl.) Rec. I89o.I83, D. I891 .3.3 1 
(32) . 0 .  0 .  0 .  0 .  0 0 0 . . . . .  0 . .  0 . . . .  0 . . . . .  0 . . .  0 .  01 1 6, 1 23 
Table of American Cases 
PAGE 
Bacon v. Rutland R; Co., ( 1 9 14) 232 U. S. 1 34  .......... I79  
Bakelite Corp., Ex parte, ( 1 929) 279 U. S. 438.......... 63 
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v .  United States, ( I 936) 298 U. S. 
349 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 7 I 
Barratt's Appeal, In re, ( I 899) I 4  App. D. C. 255  ........ I8o 
Borax Consolidated v. Los Angeles, ( 1 935) 296 U. S. IO. . . .  7 I  
Borgnis v. Falk Co., ( I9 1 1 )  I47 Wis. 327 ........... 1 8 1 ,  I83 
Borreson v. Department of Public Welfare, (I 938) 368 Ill. 
425 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  63, 64 
Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, (I  890) 
1 34 U. S. 4 1 8  . ...... . .. . .. . ........... . .... 1 78, I 79 
Chin Yow v. United States, ( 1 908) 208 U. S. 8 ... . ... . .. 1 82 
Crowell v. Benson, ( I 932) 285 U. S. 22 .... 7I1 I 33, 1 8 1 ,  1 83 
Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, ( I923) 
263 U. S. 1 43 ......... . ....... . ..... . .. . .. . .... 1 78 
Elliott v. El Paso Electric Co., (C. C. A. 5th, 1 937)  88 F. (2d) 
505 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 
Ex parte-see under name of party. 
Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., ( I  930) 
28 I U. S. 464 .. . ...... . . . 33, 63, 64, 66, 1 79, I So, I 87 
Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage 
Co., ( I933) 289 U. S. 266 . ..................... . 63, 64 
Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, {I929) 280 U. S. I 9.. 70 
Foss v. City of Lansing, ( I 927)  237 Mich. 633.......... 58 
Haley v .  City of Boston, (I 906) I 9 I Mass. 29 I . . . . . . . . . . s8 
Hartwell Mills v. Rose, (C. C. A. 5th, I932) 6 I  F. (2d) 44I .. 1 32 
Hayburn's Case, (I 792) 2 Dall. ( 2 U. S.) 409 ...... 63, 66, 68 
Hodges v .  Public Service Commission, ( 1 93I) I I O W. Va. 
649 ....................................... I 791 1 8 7  
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 
( I 9 1 0) 2 I6 U. S. 538............................ 70 
xxix 
XXX TABLE OF AMERICAN CASES 
PAGE 
Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., (I923) 26I U. S. 428.. 63 
Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, (I927) 273 U. S. 70.... 9I 
Moore (George) Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, (I933 ) 289 U. S. 
373  ........................................... I32 
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., (I 8 55) 
I8 How. (59 U. S.) 272  ....................... I79, I87 
Muskrat v. United States, ( I9I I) 2 I9 U. S. 346 ......... 66, 9I 
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., ( I938) 303 U. S. 4I. . 68 
Nectow v.  City of  Cambridge, ( I928) 277  U. S. I83........ 33 
Ng Fung Ho v. White, (I922) 259 U. S. 276 ............. I82 
Norwalk Street Railway Company's Appeal, (I 897) 69 Conn. 
576 ............................................ I86 
O'Donoghue v. United States, (I933) 289 U. S. 5I6 ..... 64, I85 
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, (I920) 253 
u.s. 287 ................................ 7I, I79· I82 
Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, ( I923) 26I U. S. 290. . 37  
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
(I929) 279 u.s. 7I6............................. 63 
Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, (I935)  296 U. S. 
I76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
Palermo Land & Water Co. v. Railroad Commission of CaH-
fornia, (D. C. Cal. I9I5 ) 227  F. 708 ................. I8I 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, (I935)  293 U. S. 388........ 90 
People ex rei. Central Park, N. & E.  River R. Co. v. Willcox, 
(I9o9) I94 N. Y. 383 ............................ I82 
People ex rei. Steward v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 
(I899) I6o N. Y. 202 ............................ I86 
Piedmont & Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, ( I930) 280 
u.s. 469.............. . .......... . . . . .... . . . . .. 67 
Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., (I 92 7)  2 7 2 
U. S. 693 ....................... . ... . . ..... . .  63, I86 
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., (I908) 2II U. S. 2IO 
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · .... -33• 37, 68, I79, I8I, I86 
Proctor & Gamble Co. v. United States, (I9I2) 225 U. S. 
282 ........ . ........... . . .. . . .. . . . . . ... . .  65, 66, 67  
Public Service Commission of  Puerto Rico v .  Havemeyer, (I 936) 
296 U. S. 506 ...... . .. . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I79 
TABLE OF AMERICAN CASES xxxi 
PAGE 
Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, ( I939) 307 U. S. 
I25 ................ ... ..... ..... ... 65, 66, 67, 69, I83 
St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, ( 1 936) 298 U. S. 
38  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1  
Schechter ( A. L .  A.) Poultry Corp. v. United States, ( I  935)  
295 u. s. 495. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
Shields v. Utahidaho Central R. Co., ( 1 938) 305 U. S. 177 .. 7 1  
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., ( I907 )  204 
u.s. 426 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 
United States v. Ju Toy, ( I905) I98 U. S. 253· ..... . .. 70, 1 82 
United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., ( I  92 7 )  2 7 3 U. S. 
299 ............... ............ . .. . . ... . .  65,  66, I79 
United States v. Sherman, ( I878) 98 U. S. 565. . .. . .. . . . . . I32 
United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., ( I932) 
284 U. S. 474 .................. . .. ... . ....... . 68, I8 1 
Upshur County v. Rich, ( I89o) I35 U. S. 467 ........... I86 
Village of Saratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric Light, & 
Power Co., ( I9o8) 1 9 I  N. Y. I23 ....... . . . . . ...... . I82 
White v. Hopkins, ( C. C. A. 5th, I93 I) 5 1  F. (2d) I 59 ..... 1 3 1  
Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Assn., ( I928) 2 7 7  U. S. 2 74.. 9I  
Wood Towing Corp. v. Parker, (C. C .  A .  4th, I935)  76  F. 
(2d) 770....... . .. . . . .. . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .  7 I  
PART I 
THE DOCTRINE 
OF THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS 
"The doctrine of the three powers, when care­
fully analyzed, perhaps shows the readiness of the 
human mind to take words for things, formulas for 
arguments, and to accept a certain set of ideas without 
ever reexamining the intelligible definition which it 
has taken for an axiom." Mirabeau, in the Con­
stituent Assembly of z789 (July z6).' 
1 Quoted by Ducrocq, Cours de droit administratif, 7th ed. (1897), Vol. I, 
p. 3 9 ;  Moreau, Le reglement administratif ( 1 9oz) , p. 1 79, note 1 .  The trans­
lation of the passage in White, James, Speeches of M. de Mirabeau, the Elder, 
Pronounced in the National Assembly of France (London, 1 792.) , pp. 1 33-34, 
is slightly different. 
CHAPTER I 
Development of the Doctrine of the 
Separation of Powers in France 
A. THE IJOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
AS CONCEIVED BY MONTESQUIEU 
IN order to appraise the influence of the doctrine of the sep­aration of powers1 upon the formulation of certain con­cepts of administrative law, it is indispensable to review 
its historical evolution. Only complete awareness of the his­
toric political environment attending its reception into a given 
governmental scheme can insure the requisite definiteness of 
meaning. Abstract theory ever since Aristotle, to be sure, has 
had no difficulty in distinguishing various functions of the state, 
i. e., functions in the sense of differing forms of state activity 
1 Out of the great mass of general and topical treatments of the separation of 
powers doctrine, the following deserve especial mention in connection with the 
subject at hand: 
For an excellent general survey of the doctrine as conceived at various times 
by well-known writers of the English- and non-English-speaking world, see 
Fairlie, "The Separation of Powers," 2.1 Mich. L. Rev. (1923) 393· See also 
Ghose, Comparative Administrative Law (1919), p. 75 ff. 
For an equally noteworthy treatment of the 'Subject, primarily devoted to its 
significance in the United States, see Sharp, "The Classical American Doctrine 
of 'The Separation of Powers,'" 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. (1935) 385. See also The 
Federalist, Nos. 47, 48 and 51; Erlick, La separation des pouvoirs et la 
Convention Fidirale de 1787 (1926). 
Of primary importance for France are the pertinent chapters in Duguit, 
Traite du droit constitutionnel [2d ed., 1921-1925], and Esmein, Eliments du 
droit constitutionnel franfais et compare [7th ed., 1921]. Jacquelin, Les 
pl<incipes dominants du contentieux administratif ( 189 9) and 11 rtur, De la 
separation des pouvoirs et de la separation des fonctions de juger et d'administrer 
(1905) [first published in 13 R. D. P. (1900) 214, 470, 14 ibid. (1900) 34. 
236,436, 17 ibid. (1902) 78, 234, 439, 20 ibid. (1903) 415], are especially con­
cerned with the interpretation of the doctrine in the light of French administra­
tive law. 
Topical expositions will be found in the various treatises on administrative 
law referred to in the text and notes. See Berthilemy, Traiti ilimentaire tle 
tlroit administratif, 1 3th ed. (1933), p. 9 ff. 
3 
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designed for the accomplishment of a variety of state pur­
poses. But the doctrine of separate powers in the modern 
sense of a working mechanism is not an abstract code of law. 
Nor does this doctrine of the separation of powers spring 
from a theory of higher law comparable to the familiar con­
cept of natural law. In every instance where its offices are in­
voked, it is made to serve the practical governmental exigen­
cies of the moment. In every such instance its invocation is 
the immediate consequence of given political situations for 
which some remedy or improvement is sought. 2 And although 
the political theorists who, up to the middle of the eighteenth 
century, had concerned themselves with problems of govern­
mental powers3 may not have expressly admitted it, they 
were undoubtedly and invariably influenced by the prevail­
ing ideas and conditions of their times. 
When Montesquieu wrote his book, L'Esprit des lois, 
France was dominated by the absolutistic regime which nur­
tured the elements of the Revolution. Montesquieu's extended 
travels ultimately had brought him to England, and during 
his sojourn there he found inspiration in the institutions of that 
country.4 In Book XI of his well-known work, in the chapter 
(VI) headed "Of the Constitution of England," he says that 
liberty depends upon and can exist only if a particular prin­
ciple of government is applied, i. e., if t�e powers of govern­
ment are exercised by separate agencies. \!'he principle so ex­
pounded was novel in its emphasis upon the distribution of 
governmental powers, and in this form it was destined to at-
• See Fairlie article, 2 1  Mich. L. Rev. 393· Cf., e. g., Jellinek, Allgemeine 
Staatslehre, 3d ed. (1929),  p. 595 ff. ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 2, pp. 5 14  ff, 534 ff. 
Vol. 3, p. 29 ff. ; Duguit, Etudes de droit public ( x9o3),  Vol. 2, p. 28r. ff. ; 
Kelsen, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 2d ed. ( 1 923) ,  p. sn ff. ; Moreau, 
Le reglement administratif (x9o2) , p. 252 ; Mayer, Deutsches Verwaltungs­
recht, 2d ed. ( r 9 14),  Vol. x, p. 57, note 2 ;  Stein, Grenzen und Beziehungen 
zwischen Justiz und Verwaltung ( x 9x2) , p. 1 ff. 
8 See Fairlie article, 2 I Mich. L. Rev. 393·  
' See Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Nugent translation ( r 823 reprint of 
1 766 ed.), p. v ff. 
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tract the minds of the contemporary statesmen of the two 
liberty-seeking peoples of the United States and of France. 
The principle, as variously interpreted at the time, found its 
way into the respective constitutions of these countries}' Since 
then, uninquiring tributes and references to Montesquieu 
have been without number and are still frequent today. In­
stead of indulging in more tributes, it is proposed first to re­
examine6 objectively Montesquieu's ideas, and then to ascer­
tain the respective evils sought to be remedied by applying 
his precept. This procedure is indispensable to the correct ap­
praisal of the interpretations of the doctrine of the separation 
of powers and of its consequent effects upon the relation be­
tween administration and judiciary. 
In the examination of Montesquieu's theory, three obser­
vations are of particular significance. First, it is not open to 
serious doubt that Montesquieu, in keeping with many writ­
ers, including John Locke/ recognized only two primary -
powers of the state, the legislative and the executive. 8 An 
analysis by d' Alembert introducing Montesquieu's book 
confirms the view that then prevailing thought envisaged but 
these two governmental powers. Thus, d' Alembert says, 
"There are in the constitution of every state two sorts of 
powers, the legislative and the executive ; and this last has 
• See the French constitutions of September 3, I 79I;  sth Fructidor, year III 
(Aug. :u, 1 795) ; November 4, I 848. 
8 Without claim to originality or novel treatment. For a drastic illustration of 
the dangers lurking in hastily formulated or preconceived notions, see Professor 
Georg Jellinek's critique, "Eine neue Theorie iiber die Lehre Montesquieu's von 
den Staatsgewalten," 30 Zeitschrift fur das Privat und Ojfentliche Recht der 
Gegenwart ( 1 903)  I ff. ; and Professor Rehm's reply, ibid. 4 1 7  ff. 
7 Locke, distinguishing three powers corresponding to the legislative, execu­
tive, and federative tasks of the commonwealth, concludes that "Though • • •  
the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in 
themselves, yet they are hardly to be separated, and placed at the same time, in 
the hands of distinct persons . . . . " Locke, An Essay Concerning Civil Govern­
ment ( 1 7 7 3 ) ,  p. 7 8 ;  also in Two Treatises of Government ( 1 698) ,  p. z8o. 
8 Montesquieu, L'Esprit des lois, Book XI, chap. VI [Pourrat ed. ( I 834), 
Vol. 1, p. Z93]. For an English translation, see that of Thomas Nugent made in 
1 766 and reprinted in 1 8z3 .  
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two objects, internal affairs and foreign relations."9 This pas­
sage is particularly helpful because Montesquieu's use of 
terms is conveniently loose and has lent itself to differing 
interpretations. In the first paragraph of chapter VI 
Montesquieu himself opens with the well-known statement 
in which he distinguishes "three kinds of powers ; 10 the 
legislative power, the power to regulate the affairs depend­
ing upon the law of nations, 11 and the power to regulate 
those depending upon the civil law."12 This might seem 
to indicate that the author conceived of two powers, the 
legislative and the executive, and of three functions, one 
coinciding with the legislative and the other two falling 
under the executive power. Nevertheless, the succeed­
ing paragraph again leaves one at sea. There is no difficulty 
about the first power, but the second is described as that con­
cerned with the external matters of "peace and war, the send­
ing and receiving of ambassadors, security, prevention of 
invasions." The third power extends to the "punishing of 
- crimes, and the adjudication of the differences of individuals," 
and is called "the power to adjudicate." What has become of 
the management of internal affairs? Is administration em­
braced in the second or third? Apparently what seemed im­
portant to Montesquieu was that two powers should be 
recognized, one of which, the executive, envisaged two dis­
tinct objects. There is very little indication, if any, of an intent 
to classify the "power to adjudicate" as an independent co­
ordinate power. On the contrary, in another place in the text13 
"the three powers" forming "the fundamental structure of 
• Pourrat ed., Vol. x, p. 9 (Nugent translation, p. xx) . 
10 In the first part of the sentence the word "pouvoir" is used, while "puis­
sance li gislative" and "puissance exi cutrix'' appear after the colon. 
11 Both of these powers are termed "puissances executrices," i. e., powers "for 
the execution" of the law of nations on one hand, and of the civil law on the 
other hand. 
u Montesquieu, Book XI, chap. VI (Pourrat ed., Vol. x, p. 293) . 
38 Ibid., p. 307. 
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the government of which we have spoken" expressly refer to 
the two houses of the legislature and to the executive. And 
again, another passage14 states that "of the three powers [puis­
sances] which we have mentioned, the judicial power is some­
how nonexistent [nulle] . There are in fact but two."u; 
Secondly, what appears to be of the foremost interest to 
Montesquieu is the distribution among separate agencies of 
the functions to be exercised. This emphasis upon the differ­
entiation of agencies, which is generally recognized as orig­
inal with Montesquieu, is expressed in clear terms at the 
beginning of chapter VI. It is further accentuated in the clos­
ing chapter of the book/6 where it is said that the degree of 
liberty possible under any government is determinable ac­
cording to the distribution of the governmental "powers." 17 
The third proposition to which attention should here be di­
rected is the placing in Montesquieu's theory of the judicial 
"power." The opinion has already been expressed that ju­
dicial power was considered but one phase or branch of the 
executive, and a separate "power" only in the limited sense of 
a function to be exercised by distinct officials or agencies.18 It 
u Ibid., p. 300. 
"" The question whether two or three powers had been envisaged by 
Montesquieu was the subject of a great deal of discussion in the constitutional 
assembly of I 789. Most prevalent seems to have been the viewpoint defended 
by Ducrocq, Cours de droit administratif, 7th ed. ( I 897 ) ,  Vol. I 1  p. 3 7  ff.,, 
i. e., that there are but two powers and that the judicial "power" was part of 
the executive, because "all justice emanates from the Crown." 
Cf. Aucoc, ConfCrences sur l'administration et le droit administratif, 3d ed. 
( I 88s) ,  Vol. 11 p. 55 ff. ; Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 2, p. 5 3 8  ff. ; Berthilemy, Traiti, 
p. I I .  Cf. also the modern doctrines as to the basic legislative and adminis­
trative functions. Mayer, Vol. I ,  p. 5 7 ;  Jellinek, Allgemeine Staatslekre, 
p. ss8 ; Kelsen, p. S I I ·  See also the American authorities cited incidentally in 
Beutel, "Valuation as a Requirement of Due Process of Law in Rate Cases," 43 
Harv. L. Rev. ( I93o) I 249 at I 25 7, note 22. 
10 Montesquieu, Book XI, chap XX (Pourrat ed., Vol. I ,  p. 347 ) .  
11 "Je voudrois rechercher, dans tous les gouvernements moderes que nous 
connoissons, quelle est la distribution des trois pouvoirs, et calculer par la les 
degres de liberte dont chacun d'eux peut jouir. • • ." 
m cf. Appleton, Traiti ilimentaire du contentieux administratif (I 927),  
p.  1 8. 
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must also be noted that Montesquieu advocates that the power 
and influence of the judicial authorities be minimized/9 and 
that they be not treated as a coordinate branch of the govern-
� ment but as entirely subordinate to the legislature and the ex­
ecutive.20 It is important to bear in mind Montesquieu's con­
ception of the judicial branch of the government, for it had 
its roots in the very conditions of the times. It will be shown 
that this conception was well adapted to the objectives of the 
ensuing revolution, whose leaders it must have prompted in 
seizing upon Montesquieu's ideas for guidance. 
B. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS IN FRENCH LAW 
It is clear that in France, as in this country, the separation 
of powers had a definite function to perform when it was 
made an integral part of a new regime. The separation of 
powers was intended to make secure the achievements of a re­
cent revolution. Conseqtiently the conditions preceding the 
revolution are elementary factors in determining the true 
meaning of the doctrine and they must be recalled if the lat­
ter is to be fully understood. 
I. The King and the Parlements 
A monarchy of the absolute type, like that of prerevolu­
tionary France, combines in one person, the monarch, all 
powers re<Juisite for carrying on the functions of the state. 
However, the complexity of the affairs of the state necessi­
tates a division of labor. Thus, in the middle of the eighteenth 
century governmental power in France was vested in the king 
19 Montesquieu, Book XI, chap. VI (Pourrat ed., Vol. 1, p. 296) . 
20 Ibid., pp. 296, 3oo-3o6. Referring to impeachment of public officers, 
Montesquieu suggests (p. 306) that the lower house of the legislature "can 
be but the accuser ; but before whom shall it make its accusation? Shall it 
stoop before the ordinary courts which are its inferiors? "  
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and exercised by him nominally through his council and his 
intendants with the cooperation of the parlements. Actually, 
the latter had entered into competition with the Crown.21 The 
king, from whom all power was held to emanate, governed 
through the Conseil du roi22 (embracing four principal and 
distinct conseils) and intendants,23 to whom power was dele­
gated primarily for the administration of the royal finances 
and taxation. On the other hand, a considerable amount of 
governmental authority, coupled with political power, rested 
with the parlements. Indeed, we find that in addition to their 
judicial powers, the parlements claimed and exercised im­
portant legislative and administrative powers24 which came 
into direct conflict with governmental action originating in 
the Crown. This conflict derived from the very fact that what­
ever powers the parlements possessed were delegated ones. 
At the outset the king dispensed justice personally with the 
aid of his council, the same council that advised him in matters 
of state. It was this council from which the Parlement de Paris 
first detached itself as an independent body, while similar 
provincial parlements were later formed throughout the 
land. 25 In theory these courts continued to owe their authority 
to the Crown, which might revoke and exercise it personally 
at will. However, in time these judicial bodies began to assert 
their independence. And even though they came to use their 
n Out of the old curia regis had developed first the Parlement de Paris. Pro­
vincial Parlements were then added, all of which in turn became the highest 
courts of j ustice in the land, although they continued to participate in the ex­
ercise of legislative, and administrative functions. Esmein, Cours etimentaire 
d'histoire du droit franfais, uth ed. ( 1 9 1 2 ) ,  p. 409 ff. ; Laferriere, Traiti 
de la juridiction administrative et des recours contentieux, zd ed. ( 1 896),  
Vol. 1 ,  p. 1 39 ff. ; Hauriou, Pricis de droit administratif, 1 oth ed. ( 1 9 Z 1 ) ,  
p .  5 ff., uth ed. ( 1 9 3 3 ) ,  p .  4 ff. ; Brissaud, A History of French Public Law 
(translated by James W. Garner, The Continental Legal History Series, 1 9 1 5) ,  
p .  3 7 8  ff . 
.. Esmein, Cours ilimentaire, p. sz8 ; Brissaud, p. 3 78. 
"" Esmein, p. 658 ; Brissaud, p. 406. 
"' Esmein, p.  s8z ff. ; Brissaud, p. 43Z ff. 
111 Esmein, p. 434 ff. ; Brissaud, p. 43Z ff. 
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growing influence to obstruct the central administration, it 
had now become impossible to divest them of their powers. 
The judicial offices-parlements and inferior tribunals alike 
-in the course of time had become venal and hereditary. 
With the constantly increasing needs of the royal treasury, 
the sale of these offices had become a substantial source of rev­
enue, to the obvious detriment of royal sovereignty. In turn, 
the judicial officers found themselves compelled to "sell jus­
tice" in order to reimburse themselves and to get a return on 
their investment.26 When, under Louis XIV, reforms were 
proposed, it was found that the evil was too firmly rooted to be 
eradicated. A class of public officials had come into existence 
whose tenure would no longer yield to ex parte revocation. 
Crown and judiciary alike depended on the established sys­
tem for income. i 
2. Judicial Interference with the Executive 
The various forms of interference by the judiciary to which 
the administrative was henceforth exposed affected both the 
legislative and the administrative prerogatives of the king.27 
In the first place, under their general jurisdiction the parle­
ments could take cognizance of matters of political conse­
quence. Thus they could, and frequently did, prosecute high 
public officials for crimes imputed to them with or without 
factual foundations. Their most powerful weapon, however, 
consisted in the requirement that all acts resulting from the 
exercise of legislative power by the Crown be registered in 
parlement, i. e., "verified" after deliberations. 28 Registration 
could be refused in whole or in part, with power to make 
modifications, and by way of "remonstrance" the reasons for 
the action taken were transmitted to the king. This power of 
"" Esmein, p. 45 I ff. ; Brissaud, p. 45 8 • 
.., Esmein, p. 5 82  ff. ; Brissaud, p. 445 ff. As to the legislative powers of the 
Etats generaux, cf. Esmein, p. 539 ff. 
"" Esmein, p. 5 85 ;  BrissauJ, p. 445 ff. 
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"registration" belonged equally to the Parlement de Paris, 
to the twelve provincial parlements,29 and to the other sover­
eign courts. 
Against all these sources of friction the Crown maintained --­
the position that all governmental power, though delegated · 
to some extent, remained ultimately in the king, and this prin­
ciple was not entirely devoid of sanctions. On the theory bf 
justice retenue,S0 the king could withdraw from the courts 
(by way of evocations) controversies over which they had ac­
quired jurisdiction, in order to have them disposed of in his 
council. 31 Where legislative powers were involved, the king 
again relied on the theory that all powers of the parlements 
rested solely upon concession from him. Hence he might send 
a written command to the parlement demanding registration 
of his royal ordinance32 or, where this failed to enforce obedi­
ence, he could proceed by what was known as lit de justice,S3 
i. e., he could appear personally in the parlement and direct 
the immediate inscription of the ordinance in his presence. 
The parlements in turn had a further effective means by which 
they could obstruct the Crown if their hands had been forced 
by a lit de justice. Acting as courts, or their individual mem­
bers as judges, they might retaliate by refusing to take 
notice of or to enforce ordinances so registered against their 
will. 
C. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE SEPARATION 
OF POWERS 'IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY FRENCH LAW 
1 .  The Basic Principle 
The acute lack of synchronization of the executive and ju-
dicial machinery under the ancien regime in France had 
10 Esmein, p. 436. 
10 Esmein, p. 484 ff. ;  BrissauJ, p. 428 ff. 
11 Esmein, p. 485; BrissauJ, p. 430. 
11 Lettre de iussio-Esmein, p. 591 ; BrissauJ, p. 449• 
11 Esmein, pp. 591-592 1  BrissauJ, P· 449· 
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caused serious frictions which could not fail to have disastrous 
consequences. After the revolution had swept over France, 
the leaders of the new regime were greatly concerned with 
devising means to prevent the recurrence of similar condi­
tions. To this end they incorporated Montesquieu's theory of 
free government 34 in the legislation of 1 78 9  and in the sub­
sequent constitutions, hoping to accomplish two things: ( I )  to 
secure a new form of monarchical government in which popu­
lar sovereignty was reflected, and political liberty established, 
through a legislative body which was independent of the ex­
ecutive; ( 2) to insure a system under which the administration 
could fulfill unhampered the tasks which the revolution had 
entrusted to it. These objectives were to be attained by the 
separation of the legislative and executive powers, and by a 
differentiation of the administrative and judicial agencies. 
Thus, the doctrine of the separation of powers in France 
carries a two-fold meaning. It denotes,� the divorce of 
the two recognized powers of the legislative and executive, 
commonly referred to as separation des pouvoirs, and,�oo.d, 
the distribution of the judicial and administrative functions 
among separate agencies. This latter aspect of the doc­
trine is usually termed Ia separation des autorites administra­
tive et judiciaire or, more briefly, Ia separation des autorites.35 
It is this second meaning w�ich will be the exclusive subject 
of the following analysis, and in order to preserve the essen­
tial distinction it will be designated as "differentiation of agen­
cies."36 It was felt that the government could not effectively ) 
"' Many of the prominent· members of the Assemblee Constituante of I 789 
were familiar with Montesquieu's writings. They extolled, discussed, but also 
criticized extensively in the constitutional debates his theory of the separation 
of powers. See Ducrocq, Vol. I, p. 3 7  :ff. ;  Aucoc, Vol. I1 p. 47 :ff. ;  Jacquelin, Les 
principes, p. I 4 ;  Duguit, Traite, Vol. 2, p. S I 4  :ff. 
"" Berthilemy, Traite pp. 9 :ff., zo ff. 
88 The terminology employed in France is generally consistent in observing 
the distinction. Nevertheless there are occasional instances in which separation 
des pouvoirs is used by courts though the intended reference is to the differen-
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ii pursue its new policies if the courts were permitted to con-
I tinue to exercise any direct or indirect influence or control --­
t over administration. Montesquieu's theory, according to 
which the judicial "power," though given to a separate body 
of officials, was to be a subordinate branch of government 
without political power, lent itself admirably to the accom­
plishment of this purpose and to the dispelling of existing 
fears that the political and administrative unity of the cen­
tralized government might be disturbed by a judiciary pre­
sumed to be always reactionary. From the differentiation of 
the administrative and judicial agencies in this sense, high 
hopes were held for the efficacy of the new regime. Through 
it evils flowing from class distinctions, differences in custom, 
and even differences in nationality might be overcome. 37 
The principle · of the differentiation of agencies found ex­
pression in a series of constitutional and statutory enactments, 
all of which provide in substance that the judiciary shall not 
in any manner whatever interfere with administrative action.38 
tiation of agencies, and in translating quotations it will be necessary here 
and there to adopt the less accurate term. 
37 Laferriere, Vol. 1, pp. 1 82-8 3 ;  Jacquelin, Les principes, p. 22 ff. ; Esmein, 
Precis elimentaire de l'histoire du droit franfais de 1 789 a 1 8 14 ( 1 908) ; 
Esmein, Elements de droit constitutionnel, Vol. 1, p. 5 3 1  ff. ; Jeze, Les principes 
generaux du droit administratif, 3d ed. ( 1 925),  p. 265 ; Duguit, "The French 
\dministrative Courts," 29 Pol. Sci. Q. ( 1 9 14) 385 (translation) .  
88 Sec. III, art. 7, Law of December zz, 1 7 89 : "The administrations of the 
departments and districts shall not be hampered in the exercise of their func­
tions by any acts of the judicial power." Tit. II, art. 1 3, Law of 1 6-24 
August, 1 790:  "The judicial functions are distinct and shall forever remain 
separated from the administrative functions. The judges may not, under 
penalty of forfeiture, interfere in any manner whatsoever with the operations 
of the administrative agencies ; nor shall they summon before them adminis­
trative functionaries on account of their official functions." Tit. III, chap. V, 
art. 3, of the Constitution of Sept. 3, 1 79 1  : "The courts shall • • • not as­
sume any administrative functions or summon before them administrative officers 
on account of functions exercised by them." Law of the 1 6th Fructidor, year III 
(Sept. 2, 1 795) : "The courts are again prohibited from taking cognizance of 
all acts of the administration of whatever nature." See Laferriere, Vol. r, pp. 
1 8 1-83 ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, pp. 3 1-32 ; Appleton, p. 20 ; Duguit et Mon­
nier, Les Comtitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1 789, 
4th ed. ( 1 925) .  
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Penalties and forfeitures were provided for transgressions by 
courts and judges, 89 while administrative officials were equally 
enjoined not to encroach upon the judicial domain.40 The 
principle thus established ultimately led to the administrative 
system now in force, which is characterized by its alleged 
freedom from interference and control by the judicial branch 
of government, and which has developed its own independent 
courts. 
2. Evolution of the Administrative System 
At the outset, before administrative courts had come into 
existence, the prohibition against interference by the judicial 
·· ·-courts resulted in making the administrative hierarchy judge 
in its own cause, in the fullest sense of that expression.41 The 
individual citizen depended entirely upon the several admin­
istrative agencies for the hearing of his complaints. For obvi­
ous reasons, at this stage of development protection of the 
individual was not the main objective. Concern with adminis­
trative self-protection stood in the foreground, and only 
gradually did considerations of private interest gain momen­
tum as a force contributing to the evolution of modern ad­
ministrative law concepts. 42 
Up to I 849 the Conseil d'Etat, which was to become so 
prominently identified with the dispensation of administra­
tive justice, was but an advisory council48 of the chief execu­
.. Tit. II, art. 1 3, Law of 1 6-24 August, 1 790, supra. 
40 Tit. III, chap. IV, sec. II, art. 3, Constitution of Sept. 3, 1 79 x :  "The 
administrative functionaries .  • • may not encroach upon the domain of 
the judicial authorities." Art. 1 89, Constitution of the sth Fructidor, year III 
(Aug. 22, 1 795) :  "The administrative authorities • • • shall not interfere 
with matters of judicial competence." 
11 Laferriere, Vol. 1, pp. 1 3-14. 
41 Duguit, Les transformations tlu droit public ( 192 1) ; Hauriou, Precis, 
1oth ed., p. 874, nth ed., p. 344· 
'" Although in 1 806 the first Commission tlu contentieux was formed within 
the council for the adjudication of administrative controversies. See Appendix, 
pp. 1 6-1 8, for a detailed description of the Conseil d'Etat and other administra­
tive courts. 
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tive. The latter, on the theory of justice retenue, retained c .  
power finally to decide all administrative controversies. In 
I 849 the principle of justice dele guee was adopted with the 
creation of an administrative court (section du contentieux) 
within the Conseil d'Etat with final and exclusive jurisdiction 
in administrative matters. Still later, in I 8 52, due to changing 
political fortunes, the "court" once more lost its independence, 
justice retenue was restored, and administrative justice once 
more had its nominal source in the chief executive. 
Nevertheless, the Conseil by way of precedent gradually 
expanded its jurisdiction. By decree of November 2, I 864, 
recourse to the Conseil d'Etat against acts of administrative 
agents who had exceeded their powers was deliberately en­
couraged, with the enactment of a statute reducing to an 
almost negligible sum the costs connected with filing protests. 
While political reasons had first begotten the postulate of 
differentiation of administrative and judicial agencies, the 
necessity for a central judicial control within the administra· 
tive now made itself felt. This need was expressed by Leon 
Aucoc, an outstanding writer and member of the Conseil, in 
these words : "The government, upon which falls the respon­
sibility for the mistakes of its agents, has a great interest that 
all complaints which they may cause be brought before it ; for 
the most minute grievances, when increasing in number, may 
lead to serious discontent. There is then a sort of safety valve 
which must ever be open."44 It should be observed that the 
question whether this judicial control should be given to the 
ordinary courts was at one time a subject of dispute.45 How- ­
ever, the traditional doctrine of the differentiation of agencies, 
aided by the weighty argument of the special fitness of ad­
ministratively trained officials, caused the pendulum to swing 
46 Aucoc, xst ed. ( x 869), Vol. x ,  p. 394, quoted by Laferriere, Vol. x, p. 258 • 
.. Jacquelin, Les principes, p. 1 3 9 1  Duguit, article, 29 Pol. Sci. Q. 385 at 
39Q-391 · 
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far toward administrative courts for the adjudication of con­
troversies involving administrative acts.46 
With the enactment of the law of May 24, r 8 72, the Conseil 
d'Ihat47 became definitely established as an administrative 
court, with plenary power of adjudication delegated to it. 
Original jurisdiction has been conferred upon the court, as 
well as appellate jurisdiction in the case of decisions of the 
Conseils de prefecture48 and of other inferior administrative 
courts49 which had original jurisdiction under various statutes. 
It is an interesting fact that in the earlier stage of this de­
velopment the decisions of the highest administrative agents, 
the ministers, were exempt from the original jurisdiction of 
the Conseil d'Etat. Under the doctrine of the ministre-juge 
certain determinations of the ministers were deemed to be in 
the nature of judicial pronouncements and therefore subject 
only to appellate review in the Conseil d'Etat. Thus for some 
time, these administrative officers continued to have combined 
administrative and judicial powers, notwithstanding the ac­
complished separation of functions within the administrative 
organism. 50 
46 Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., pp. 8 7o H., 886 ;  Bannard, Le Controle furi­
dictionnel de I' administration ( r 9 34) , p. r 53 H. (Bibliotheque de l'institut 
international de droit public, No. VI) ; Esmein, Droit constitutionnel, Vol. r,  
p. 535·  
•• See Appendix, below. 
48 First established in the year VIII. 
411 Appendix, below; Lafe"iere, Vol. r,  p. 2 1 5  H. ; Berthilemy, Traite, p. 2 7 ;  
Duguit, article, 2 9  Pol. Sci. Q .  3 8 5  a t  389. 
00 Lafe"iere, Vol. r,  p. 450 H. ; Dareste, Les voies de recours contre les actes 
de la puissance puhlique ( r 9 14),  p. 54, note 2 ;  Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., pp. 
405, note r,  887, note ; Berthilemy, Traiti, pp. I I 07-I I 09· 
APPENDIX 
The most important administrative courts, under the system in force, are 
the Conseil d'Etat and the Conseils de prefecture. The former is a court of 
general jurisdiction and the latter are courts of limited jurisdiction. Waline, 
Manuel elimentaire de droit administratif (1936),  p. 5 9  H. ; Berthilemy, 
Traite, p. 1 107 H. 
The supreme administrative court is known as the Conseil d'Etat. But that 
name has a far broader significance, which it may be well to sketch briefly. (For 
a more detailed description, see Waline, pp. 5 9-7 2 ;  Berthilemy, Traite, 
pp. 1 47-1 56.) 
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The Conseil d'Etat is also the administrative advisory council of the ministers. 
In this capacity it advises the administration at the voluntary or statutory re­
quest of the latter. Although the government is generally not bound by the · 
advice of the Conseil, this must be obtained preceding the promulgation of all !.{.· regulations/required under a statute. There are a certain number of other in- J 
stances where the obligation to request the advice of the Conseil is specifically 
prescribed. On the other hand, in a few matters the law does not permit the 
administration to take action contrary to the advice of the Conseil, as for in­
stance in connection with the refusal of naturalization papers (under the special 
conditions of art. 8, Civil Code) . Furthermore, the Conseil may be called upon 
to give its advice or to prepare a draft of a statute which the administration in­
tends to introduce. However, Waline (Manuel, p. 67) regrets that the Conseil 
in fact is no longer consulted on proposed legislation. And again under specific 
statutory provisions, the Conseil hears administrative appeals from determina­
tions of inferior authorities. 
For the performance of these administrative functions the Conseil d'Etat util­
izes a large1 well-trained personnel. There are thirty conseillers en service 
ordinaire, and thirty conseillers en service extraordinaire. The latter belong to 
the various departments of the ministers and have a voice only in the delibera­
tions concerning their respective departments. The ministers themselves may 
participate in the discussions and deliberations of the affairs concerning their 
individual ministries (departments) ,  though actually they do not make use 
of that right. 
All matters coming before the Conseil (officially presided over by the "Keeper 
of the Seal," who is also the Minister of Justice, but actually presided over by 
the Vice-President) are prepared by the lower personnel, consisting of thirty­
nine maitres des requites and forty-four "auditors." The latter are subdivided 
into twenty auditors of the first class and twenty-four of the second class. 
Beginning at the bottom, the second class auditors are selected by members 
of the Conseil through competitive examinations of applicants twenty to twenty­
six years old. They must be well trained in the law and are to form the "juristic 
element" in the Conseil. (Waline, p. 61 .)  Auditors of the first class are ex­
clusively taken from among the former, not less than twenty-five nor more 
than thirty-four years of age. Three-fourths of the "masters," at least thirty 
years old, must be recruited from among the first class auditors, and the re­
mainder from administrative functionaries with at least ten years' service (thus 
forming an element of mixed origin, scholars and practitioners) .  (W aline, 
p. 6z.) The thirty "ordinary councilors" must be at least forty years old and 
must retire at seventy-five. Two-thirds of them must have been masters, and the 
remaining third preferably former high officials of the administration. They 
are nominated by the Council of Ministers. The thirty "extraordinary coun­
cilors" are active high officials (directors) and are ex officio representatives 
of their ministries in the Conseil. (Waline, p. 6z ; Berthtflemy, Traite, p. I5I .) 
The administrative work of the Conseil is assigned to the three administra­
tive sections into which it is divided according to subject matter. (See the "de­
cree" of July z4, I 934, modifying the organization of the Conseil d'Etat.) In 
some matters two of the sections may act jointly, and again, other matters 
(for example, matters of special importance, or at the request of a minister) 
may come before the plenum (Assemblie genera/e) of the Conseil. 
In addition to the administrative functions and the corresponding divisions 
of the Conseil d'Etat, it has separate j udicial functions ; the latter are given to a 
special j udicial section known as the section du contentieux. It is this administra­
tive court which is commonly and indiscriminately referred to as the Conseil 
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d'Etat. The section comprises a presiding member and twelve Conseillers d'Etat 
en service ordinaire; to these may be added four councilors from the adminis­
trative sections. Twenty-eight masters and thirty auditors serve as commissaires 
du gouvernement and rapporteurs to the eight subsections into which the section 
is divided. According to importance, the cases will be heard and decided by 
( I ) the assemblie pliniere du contentieux, i. e., the vice-president of the 
Conseil d'Etat, the president of the judicial section, the presiding members of 
the subsections, and three councilors from the administrative sections ; ( z) the 
judicial section, i. e., its president and the presiding members of the subsections ; 
(3) one of the senior subsections {five to eight in number, and each composed of 
two councilors and a master or an auditor) which specialize in routine mat­
ters (pensions, elections, fiscal affairs, etc.) ; {4) two of the subsections com­
bined. The individual subsections, having one to four members, have no power 
of decision and hence only prepare a case for judgment. A subsection, or the 
section, of its own motion or that of the vice-president, the section-president, 
or the commissaire du gouvernement, refers the case before it to the judicial 
section or the plenary assembly. 
The reorganization of I 9 34 is criticized because of the reduction of the 
judicial personnel, which is unfavorable to the expeditious handling of cases. 
Also it admits the cumulation of administrative and judicial functions in case 
of the four members which are recruited from the administrative sections. 
However, no councilor may participate in the adjudication of a matter in 
which he acted previously in an administrative capacity. 
As to tenure, the members of the Conseil d'Etat are nominated and removable 
by decree of the Council of Ministers. But actually they seem almost irremov­
able. Waline {p. 66) refers to an attempt to recall the vice-president in I 9 z4 
which the government abandoned under the pressure of public opinion. 
The Conseils de prefecture have changed in structure materially with the 
recent reforms. (Waline, p. 76.) The laws ("decrees") of September 6 and z 6, 
I 9z6, May 5, I 9 34, and July I 91 I 9 351 contributed greatly to improve their 
standing as judicial bodies. Changes in the selection and a substantial reduction 
of the administrative element in the personnel aided the purposes of their reor­
ganization. The prefects are no longer members of these tribunals, which are 
now composed of four councilors and a president, nominated by the Minister of 
the Interior. The number of these Conseils has been reduced so that there is now 
one to every three or four dipartements, instead of one for each. Since this tended 
to place the courts at a greater distance from those seeking their protection, 
the new law makes provision for a conseiller ditegue who goes from one de­
partment seat to the other to adjudicate matters of lesser importance. 
The councilors are divided into three classes. The third class is selected 
through competitive examinations of law graduates. Three-fourths of the 
second and first class members are recruited by advancements in the respective 
lower classes. 
The jurisdiction of these "inter-departmental councils of prefecture" is 
limited by statute to specific controversies ; for instance, controversies arising 
in connection with the construction, maintenance, or operation of public works, 
direct taxes, etc. 
There are a number of other administrative courts of special jurisdiction 
(Waline, p. 8o ff.) : the judicial councils for the colonies ; the court of ac­
counts, which audits and adjudicates all public accounts ; the special courts 
for Alsace-Lorraine ; the Superior Council of Public Instruction, and the Coun­
cils of Revision, determining the duty to do military service. 
CHAPTER II 
Comparative Significance of the Separation 
of Powers for Jurisdiction to Review 
Administrative Acts 
THE doctrine of the separation of powers, like govern­mental theory in general, is subject to qualification in its application. Conceivably, those who first ex­
tolled its merits hoped that they had found a solid and im­
movable foundation upon which an enduring form of govern­
ment might safely be built. But if they did so hope, they 
misjudged the texture of their precept. In fact, the doctrine 
has proved to be of extraordinary elasticity, giving way easily 
to pressure and capable of ready adaptation to political, eco­
nomic and social needs. 
In France, the absolute separation of powers, as well as its 
corollary, the attempted strict differentiation of the admin­
istrative and judicial agencies, almost at the very beginning 
were recognized as neither practical nor wholly desirable. 
Moreover, the immediate political need for differentiation 
vanished into a more and more remote past. C_ooperation, 
rather than separation, of the departments of government 
became a watchword.1 It is therefore not astonishing that 
both the process of formation and the outline of the area in 
which judicial and administrative action meet and overlap are 
of a complicated pattern. 
1 Esmein, Eliments de droit constitutionnel fran�ais et compare, 7th ed. 
( I9ZI ),  Vol. x ., pp. 467-701 Duguit, Traiti de droit constitutionnel, zd ed. 
( x9z3) 1 Vol. z, pp. 514-4Z1 Vol. 31 p. z9ff. ;  Duguit Etudes de droit pub­
lic ( 190 I ) ,  Vol. z, p. z8x  ff. ; Jeze, Les principes giniraux du droit adminis­
tratif, 3d ed. ( x 9zs),  pp. z s 7-58, z64-68, 309-x o ;  Bertkilemy, Traiti 
ilimentaire de droit administratif, 1 3th ed. ( 1933) ,  p. xs-x6. 
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The enactments of the revolutionary government embody­
ing the postulate of absolute freedom of the administrative 
agencies from interference by the courts left the administra­
tive to judge its own actions.2 At the beginning this principle 
was unaccompanied by the idea of administrative courts, but 
in the course of time "judicial"3 protection against adminis­
trative action emerged. The administration active, with a sys­
tem of appeals within its hierarchy, became distinguished from 
the juridiction administrative, i. e., the administrative courts. 
It should be observed here that the 1 938 Report of the 
Special Committee on Administrative Law of the American 
Bar Association, 4 citing Professor Bannard's treatise on the 
droit administratif, 5 does not do justice to the historical reason 
for the "spirit of hostility [of the civil courts] to administra­
tive action."6  The explanation offered in the committee's re­
port seems to rest upon a misconception. For the French sys­
tem, with now fully developed "judicial" review by special 
courts, is not apt to arouse the "jealousy of courts manned by 
judges" because "of any falling short of hearing both sides 
fully."7  
With the development of  the new system of adjudicating 
administrative controversies, and particularly under the in­
fluence of the Conseil d'Etat, the principle of differentiation 
2 Laferriere, Traite de Ia juridiction administrative et des recours conten­
tieux ( 1 896) , Vol. 1, pp. 14, 1 85. 
8 The use of the term "judicial" in connection with the administrative courts 
is necessary to distinguish the judicially conducted review by these courts from 
administrative review at the instance of the various administrative agencies them­
selves. "Judicial review" under the French system therefore denotes not only 
the reviewing function of the ordinary courts, but that of the administrative 
courts as well. However, in order to avoid confusion, "judicial review" will be 
used hereafter only in the sense in which it is understood in this country, i. e., 
review by the ordinary courts. 
' 63 Rep. A.  B. A .  ( 1938)  33 1  ff. 
1 Bannard, Precis de droit administratif (1935) ,  pp. I I o-I I (the American 
Bar Association citation to pp. 79-80 is apparently to a different edition) .  
• 63 Rep. A .  B .  A .  (1938)  331  at 341 . 
� Ibid. 
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of agencies became attenuated. The forerunners of a changing 
attitude have been dated as far back as I 8o6. 8 The memory 
of prerevolutionary conditions gradually lost its force in 
shaping policies, and this resulted directly in a relaxed inter­
pretation of the separation of powers and its corollary. Conse­
quently, the administrative determinations in some instances 
ceased to be binding upon the ordinary courts, and in several 
classes of cases cognizance of administrative acts has been 
restored to those courts. The area of administrative jurisdic­
tion contracted, and its contours became less rigid, as it came 
to be recognized that the fact that an act was administrative 
or originated with an administrative agency or had been per­
formed in the public interest was not sufficient ground to with­
draw that act completely from the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
courts. 9 Other factors must be present before the doctrine 
of differentiated agencies becomes operative and reserves the 
act for the administrative courts. 
In its outward appearance the resultant French regime ad­
ministratif differs materially from the administrative system 
that has developed in the United States. In France fear of the 
recurrence of prerevolutionary experiences caused an adop­
tion of Montesquieu's idea of the separation of powers with 
especial emphasis upon a strict differentiation of the adminis­
trative and judicial agencies. Under the fundamental law, all 
administrative action henceforth was exempt from inquiry by 
the judicial courts. In time, a separation of the judicial from 
the administrative functions took place within the administra­
tive branch of the government through the organization of 
administrative courts and the consequent distinction of the 
8 See H auriou, Precis /de droit administratif et de droit public, I oth ed. 
( I9ZI ) 1  p. 8 741 uth ed. ( I933) ,  p. 344· 
• Aucoc, Confirences sur l'administration et le droit administratif, 3d ed. 
( I88s) ,  Vol. ·l, pp. 4731 48q Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 47I  f£.; Hauriou, Precis, 
1oth ed., pp. 464-65, note 2, p. 874 ff. ; nth ed., pp. 459-60 ; Bertkilemy, 
Traiti, pp. 23, I09!)""I Io6 ; Bannard, Precis, p. 1 50 ff. ; Waline, Manuel 
ilimentaire de droit administratif ( 1936),  p. 42 ff. 
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adminis·tration active from the juridiction administrative. 
The decisions of the latter in reviewing the acts of the former, 
however, are ''administrative acts" in the sense that they can 
never be subject to attack in the ordinary courts. In other 
words, the pronouncements of both sets of courts have iden­
tical force and the same degree of finality. 
In the United States the evolution of administrative law, 
in so far as it depends upon the influence of the separation 
of powers, looks back upon a different history. At the time of 
the adoption of the Constitution, its framers were apprehen­
sive, not of past experience, but of the dangers lurking in the 
"novel experiment of popular rule on a large scale."10 In the 
-debates of the Federal Convention of r 78 7  great stress was 
laid upon the doctrine of separated powers as expounded by 
Montesquieu. But the proponents of the doctrine extolled its 
merits as a means of protection against legislative encroach­
ments upon fundamental rights of liberty and property. Thus 
the separation of powers, though derived from the same philo­
sophical source, was endowed with a meaning divergent from 
that attributed to it contemporaneously in France. Removed 
from its native environment, no difficulty was encountered 
in giving it a construction favorable to the postulate of equal 
dignity of the . three powers. The judiciary could be erected 
into a coordinate branch of government in order that it might 
- function as a check upon each of the other branches. The in­
cidental power of the ordinary courts in this country to re­
view administrative action became as necessary and inevitable 
a constitutional mandate as the principle of judicial noninter­
ference in France. 
10 See the comprehensive treatment by Malcom P. Sharp, "The Classical 
American Doctrine of 'The Separation of Powers,' " 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. ( 1 935) 
38  5;  Professor Sharp very clearly demonstrates that the main objective was to 
guard against legislative tyranny (pp. 393, 396, 397, 408, 420, 434-435) .  
See also Fuchs, "Concepts and Policies in  Anglo-American Administrative Law 
Theory," 47  Yale L.  ]. ( 1938)  538  at 541 ff. ; Report of the Special Commit­
tee on Administrative Law, 63 Rep. A.  B. A. ( 1 938)  3 3 1  at 352  ff. 
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The basic considerations, therefore, which led to the adop­
tion of Montesquieu's theory in the two countries envisaged 
the solution of widely differing political problems. In Francei 
one of the most pressing concerns was to make the adminis- 1 
trative independent of the judiciary, while this country felt \ 
the need of an independent judiciary to check legislative ex-: ; ) 
cesses.11 In each instance the adoption of the doctrine of the � .. 
separation of powers was accompanied by an interpretation j 
which fitted it to the particular demands. In France this re- 1 
sulted directly in a denial to the ordinary courts of all power , 
to interfere with administrative action. Conversely, in the • 
United States a nominally coordinated, and in fact supreme, 
judiciary was assigned a task which of necessity carried with it 
the power to scrutinize the acts of all administrative agencies.- ' 
However, comparison does not for this reason come to an ' 
impasse. In the constant flux of political conditions, the orig­
inal content of the doctrine of the separation of powers, 
both here and in France, has changed imperceptibly. 
Through the formulation of exceptions and the devising of 
distinctions it has been modified and readapted to changing 
conditions. The intended strict differentiation of the adminis- • 
trative and the judiciary in France very soon became attenu­
ated. Gradually the ordinary courts, even though only in a 
limited sense, returned to the adjudication of acts originating 
with administrative officials and agencies, as will be demon­
strated in detail later. Similarly, the rigid conception in the 
United States of three independent departments, exercising 
the functions named after the three corresponding powers, also 
had to give way to more workable compromises. Aided by 
strict interpretation, "we had carried to the extreme a system 
of judicial interference with administr/tion. Something very 
11 At the same time a strong executive was favored, not in regard to the ju­
dicial power, but to serve with the latter to counteract the power of the legis­
lature. Sharp, article, z U. Chi. L. Rev. 3 8 5· 
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like a paralysis of administration by judicial order or judicial 
review was an everyday spectacle."12 Paradoxically a situa­
tion was thus created which was closely analogous to the very 
conditions which the differentiation of agencies in France had 
been instituted to combat. A reaction proportioned to the in­
creasing needs for administrative handling of new social and 
economic problems was inevitable. In turn, the ensuing in­
crease in administrative activity has brought forth insistence 
upon a reinterpretation of the separation of powers doctrine 
in regard to administrative agencies so as to require "a segre­
gation of their judicial functions." 13 Unmistakably, divergent 
forces are constantly at work which necessitate sporadic inter­
pretative readjustments in order to balance accrued surpluses 
or deficiencies in administrative and judicial powers. These 
competitive forces are the interests of the public, on one hand, 
and private interests, concerned with the protection of per­
sonal liberty and property rights, on the other.14 In the 
United States the separation of powers in its constitutional 
setting has placed the collective interest represented by the 
administration at a disadvantage. In France the basic situa­
tion is reversed, and indeed the French courts have continued 
to reaffirm the differentiation of judicial and administrative 
agencies as originally conceived. But neither the privileged 
position of the administration in France nor the far-reaching 
powers of the constitutional courts in this country have with­
stood the pressure of certain identical political and social 
forces. Jurisdiction to review administrative acts has had to be 
lll Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 63 Rep. A. B. A. 
( 1938)  3 3 1  at 353-· 
lll Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 61  Rep. A.  B. A. 
( 1936) 720 at 725, and quotation at 7Jo: "In this situation the committee 
feels justified in looking beyond the particular turn given to the doctrine by the 
Supreme Court decisions, and in appealing to what seem to be its underlying 
implications and its natural corollaries for the sound and efficient administra­
tion of justice." 
u Fuchs, article, 47 Yale L. J. 538 at 559· 
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redefined, and it will be the object of the following chapters 
to sketch the evolution and to survey the meandering course 
of the imaginary line of demarcation separating the spheres 
of administrative and judicial action in France. 
Before proceeding to the discussion of the jurisdictional 
details themselves, it is necessary that an account be taken of 
the machinery which has been devised for the enforcement of 
the constitutional mandate of separated powers. Perhaps the 
thought of an independent mechanism for maintaining the 
differentiation of judicial and administrative authority does 
not so readily occur in the United States. The constitutional 
scheme which appointed the courts its guardians thereby sub­
jected not only legislative but also administrative acts to the 
scrutiny of those courts with respect to all constitutional in­
consistencies. The limits of their own powers in regard thereto 
are consequently self-determined. Not so in France. There 
the prohibition "to interfere in any manner" with the ad­
ministration rendered the ordinary courts wholly unfit to en­
force administrative independence. Still, a mechanism for 
safeguarding it was essential. 
The Conftit. At the outset of the new regime, the solution 
of the problem of securing the administrative against antici­
pated usurpations by the judiciary was fashioned after the 
procedure which formerly had served the Crown. The latter 
could, and often did, withdraw from the courts15 controversies 
in which it was interested. Thus, the administrative was em- -
powered by legislation to 'divest the courts of matters al­
legedly falling within the administrative jurisdiction.16 The 
power was first lodged in the executive, although at various 
times it was coupled with a requirement of concurrence by the 
111 By way of evocations, supra, chap. I, at note 3 1 .  
18 Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif et de droit public, 1 oth ed. ( 1 91 1 ) ,  
p .  8 79, uth ed. ( 1 933) ,  p .  336 ff., and bibliography there ; Berthilemy, Traite 
elimentaire de droit administratif, 1 3th ed. ( 1933) ,  p. 1 086 ff. ; Bannard, 
Precis de droit administratif ( 1935) ,  p. 1 64. 
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legislature, or of advice by the Conseil d'Etat, which later 
became the sole judge of jurisdictional conflicts.17 Further 
developments, in which abuses of this power by the govern­
ment 18 played a part, ultimately led 19 to the organization of 
a neutral agency with exclusive jurisdiction to determine such 
conflicts. 
7 The Tribunal des con flits. The Tribunal des conflits, which 
has thus been entrusted with the resolution of jurisdictional 
controversies, has the appearance of an impartial tribunal, 
being composed of judges recruited in equal numbers from 
among the members of both the administration ( Counseil 
d'Etat) and judiciary (Cour de cassation), and presided over 
by the Minister of Justice. Nevertheless, it continues to rest 
on the theory of a unilateral protection of the administration 
against the civil courts. This is evident in the fact that the 
Tribunal des conflits acts only at the instance of certain ad­
ministrative officials, the prefects. These officers alone can 
elever le conflit, i. e., resort to the Tribunal for the purpose 
of divesting � judicial court of jurisdiction. There is no cor­
responding right in favor of the judicial authorities. 20 
The unilateral right to assert a conflict of jurisdiction and 
the ensuing judicial determination of the limits of competency 
of the respective judicial or administrative agencies are the 
primary safeguards afforded by the French system for the 
principle of the differentiation of agencies. Protests by the 
17 Laferriere, Traite de la juridiction administrative et des recours conten­
tieux, 2d ed. ( I 896), Vol. I ,  pp. 2 I-2 5 ;  Aucoc, Conferences sur /'administra­
tion et le droit administratif, 3d ed. ( I 8 8 s) , Vol. I ,  p. 709 ff. ; Ducrocq, Cours 
de droit administratif, 7th ed. ( I  89 8) , Vol. 3, p. 296 ff. ; Jacquelin, Les principes 
dominants du contentieux administratif ( I  899), p. 54 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traite, 
p. I08 7 i  Laroque, "Les conflits d'attributions" 49 R. D. P. ( I 9 J 2 )  5 ;  Appleton, 
T raite e limentaire du contentieux administratif (I 9 2 7 ) ,  p. 5o ff. 
"' Infra, chap. VIII. 
19 ln I 849 and again in 1 872. 
"" Hauriou, Precis, 1 0th ed., pp. 879-88o, uth ed., pp. 336-3 7 ;  Berthilemy, 
Traite, p. 1088 .  Cf. also Duguit, Traite de droit constitutionnel, 2d ed. ( 1 923 ) ,  
Vol. 3 ,  pp. 53-58. 
SIGNIFICANCE OF SEPARATION DOCTRINE 27 
prefects concerning jurisdiction over controversies pending in 
the ordinary courts give rise to what are known as "positive 
conflicts."21 A second sanction of the differentiation of agen­
cies exists in the requirement that the highest judicial and 
administrative tribunals, i. e., the Cour de cassation and the 
Conseil d'Etat respectively, must of their own motion annul 
the acts of inferior agencies of the respective hierarchies when­
ever the acts of the one constitute encroachments upon the 
jurisdiction of the other. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal des conflits may be invoked by the parties to a suit 
for the determination of "negative conflicts." This type of 
conflict arises when both the administrative and the judicial 
courts have declined to take cognizance of a controversy.22 
In such cases the office of the Tribunal des conflits is to pro­
tect litigants against a denial of justice. In deciding in these 
circumstances to which court its "mandamus" should be ad­
dressed, the Tribunal again acts as the custodian of the differ­
entiation of agencies, the principle by which its decisions must 
be guided. Comparatively recently,23 the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal des conflits has been extended to con flits de decision. 
The enabling statute confers power upon the Tribunal to 
make an independent decision on the merits of any case in 
which an administrative and an ordinary court have rendered 
inconsistent decisions. Previously, such situations actually re­
sulted in a denial of justice. 24 
The foregoing analysis presents three aspects of the doc­
trine of the separation of powers which are of primary im-
•• Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 472 ; Berthilemy, Traite, p. Io8 8 ;  Bannard, Precis, 
p. I 62 ;  Waline, Manuel elimentaire de droit administratif { I 936) ,  p. 36 . 
.. Appleton, p. 7 9 ;  Berthilemy, Traite, p. I 096 ;  Bannard, Precis, p. I 6S ;  
Waline, Manuel, p. 40. 
08 Law of April 20, I 932. 
•• Bannard, Pricis, pp. I 66-67 ; Bannard, Le controle juridictionnel de 
!'administration ( I 934), p. I 751 note I {Bibliotheque de l'institut international 
de droit public, No. VI) ; Waline, Manuel, p. 40 ; Appleton, Supp., pp. u-I 3· 
See Matter of Rosay D. H. I 933·336. 
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portance from the viewpoint of jurisdiction to review ad­
ministrative acts. First, the historical and political atmosphere 
determining the original content of the doctrine of separate 
powers ; second, the resultant relation of the administrative 
and judicial departments of government ;  and, thirdly, the 
mechanism designed both to maintain and to adjust the con­
stitutional scheme under changing conditions. The review 
powers of the French courts will now be developed in the 
light of these factors. 
PART II 
THE REVIEW POWERS 
OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS IN RRANCE 
CHAPTER III 
Recourse for Excess of Power 
A. HISTORY OF ANNULMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS IN THE 
CONSEIL D'ETAT 
I N France the Conseil d'Etat alone has power to annul administrative acts ; 1 it alone can dispense the remedy known as the recours pour exces de pouvoir,2 which, if 
successfully prosecuted, leads to the setting aside of the ad- -­
ministrative determination of which complaint is made.3 
Among the available methods of obtaining relief from ad­
ministrative action/ this method of direct attack5 is peculiar 
to the French system. 
The fact that petitions for annulment of administrative de­
cisions come within the exclusive jurisdiction of the highest 
administrative court is significant, not only in the light of the 
doctrine of differentiated administrative and judicial agen­
cies, but also in view of the evolution of the remedy itself. 
The recours pour exces de pouvoir is not, as might be sup-
'French law commonly distinguishes four different objects with a view to 
which the administrative courts may exercise their jurisdiction : annulment 
(contentieux de l'annulation) , (2) review on the merits (contentieux de pleine 
juridiction), ( 3) interpretation of administrative acts (contentieux de l'inter­
pretation) and (4) application of penal sanctions (contentieux de la repres­
sion) . See the analysis of this classification by Professor Waline in article, 52 
R. D. P. ( 1 935) 205. 
" There is one unimportant exception under the law of May 5, 1934. See 
Waline, Manuel elimentaire de droit administratif (1 936) , p. I I4. 
• Laferriere, Traite de la juridiction administrative et des recours conten­
tieux, 2d ed. ( 1 896), Vol. 2, p. 3 9 1  ff. ; Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif, 
r oth ed. ( 1 9 2 1 ) ,  p. 420 ff. ; uth ed. ( 1 9 3 3 ) ,  p. 401 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traiti 
elimentaire de droit administratif, 1 3th ed. ( 1933) ,  p. x u6 ff. ; Bannard, Le 
controle juridictionnel de l'administration ( 1 934), p. 1 6 7  ff. (Bibliotheque de 
l'institut international de droit public, No. VI) ; Bannard, Precis de droit 
administratif ( 1 9 35) ,  p. 1 9 2 ff. ; W aline, Manuel, p. I 1 5 ff. ; Appleton, T raiti 
elimentaire du contentieux administratif ( 1 927) ,  p. 525 ff., Supp. ( 1 936) ,  
p. 8 6  ff. 
' See Dareste, Le voies de recours contre les actes de la puissance publique 
( 1 9 1 4) .  
• Dareste, p. 288  ff. 
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posed, a method of attack originally created by statute as an 
integral part of the post-revolutionary scheme of public ad­
ministration. On the contrary, it was essentially developed 
through precedent in the Conseil d'Etat, proceeding much 
like a court of equity.6 In a sense, the evolution of the remedy 
was completed in I 872 with the passage of article 9 of the 
law of May 24th of that year giving legislative sanction to 
the jurisdiction of the Conseil over petitions for annulment. 
On the other hand, there are several earlier enactments which 
had mediately influenced and contributed to the development 
of the recours.1 
Before the Revolution, the theory of justice retenue per­
mitted the chief executive to set aside acts of subordinate ad­
ministrative officers, and in doing so he often relied upon the 
advice of his council, the Conseil du roi.8 It has been observed 
in an earlier chapter that the theory of justice retenue, with 
one exception, 9 prevailed until I 8 72, and it must also be re­
membered that the Conseil d'Etat did not become an inde­
pendent court until several decades after the Revolution. 
Thus, in its capacity as an advisory body, it could in the name 
of the chief executive invalidate acts of inferior agencies which 
had exceeded their powers. During this period the Conseil 
d'Etat, as the appointed guardian of the differentiation of 
agencies, was therefore equipped with a double-edged 
weapon. Through the exercise of its jurisdiction over con­
. flicts 10 it could abate usurpations by the ordinary courts, and 
at the same time it possessed the power to annul the acts of its 
own subordinates, primarily in order to keep them within the 
limits constitutionally set to their powers.11 
• Laferriere, Vol. 1, pp. 1 7-1 8, Vol. z, p. 40:t ff. ; Bertkilemy, Traite p. 1 n6 ;  
Bonnard, Precis, p. 1 9 z  ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, nth ed., p .  406. 
• Laferriere, Vol. z, pp. 4oz-4o6. 
8 Supra, chap I, p. 9· 
• Supra, chap I, p. 1 5 .  
10 Supra, chap II, p .  z6. 
u As to technique, the Conseil d'Etat has largely paralleled the Cour de 
cassation in matters of excess of power by the judicial authorities. Laferriere, 
Vol. z, pp. 397-402. 
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Strictly speaking, annulment by the Conseil d'Etat, prior 
to its establishment as an administrative court, was not a ju­
dicial appraisal but an administrative disapproval12 by the 
highest administrative body of the determinations of inferior 
officials. The original character of the recourse for excess of 
power was that of a nonjudicial, administrative appeal, a re­
cours hierarchique.13 Even at the present time, where the 
recours is taken to a judicial body, i. e., to a modern adminis­
trative court, it still partakes of some of its former nature. 
However, it differs from the recours hierarchique14 in that it 
can lead only to the annulment, not to the reformation, of the 
act attacked. In this latter respect the recourse for excess of L. 
power is a judicial appeal as it is understood in this country.15 
B. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL FEATURES OF THE 
RECOURSE FOR EXCESS OF POWER 
I. Grounds for and Nature of the Appeal 
A recourse to the Conseil d'Etat demanding the annulment 
of an administrative determination can be validly formulated 
by anyone whose· legitimate ' interests are directly and ad­
versely affected thereby. The Conseil d'Etat, through con­
tinued extensive interpretation, has gradually broadened the 
availability of the remedy.16 The grounds upon which it may 
12 For the specific reason of excess of power. 
"' Laferriere, Vol. z, p. 4 1 3 ;  Dareste, p. 304 ff. 
" Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 446 ff. ; Dareste, p. z89 ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, Ioth ed., 
p. I o6 ff., uth ed., p. So ff. Hauriou (ibid.) further distinguishes the recours 
hierarchique from the recours gracieux. The latter is the complaint lodged with 
an authority regarding its own action, and the term emphasizes the discretion of 
that authority to reconsider its action. 
"' Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., ( I  9oS) :t i  I U. S. :t i O ;  Federal Radio 
Commission v. General Electric Co., ( I 9 30) z 8 I  U. S. 464. 
"' Waline, Manuel, p. I 2o ff. See also Laferriere, Vol. z, p. 436 ;  Hauriou, 
Precis, I oth ed., p. 436 ff., nth ed., p. 4z4 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traite, p. Io3o; 
Appleton, p. 554 ff., Supp., p. 8 7  ff. ; Bonnard, Precis, p. zo2 ff. 
Although a mere interest nominally will not support a direct attack upon 
an administrative determination in this country, some of the asserted proprietary 
rights which have sufficed for the judicial invalidation of zoning ordinances 
present a fair analogy. Cf. Nectow v, City of Cambridge, ( I 9:t8)  z77 U. S. I 8l• 
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be prosecuted are collectively designated as "excess of power" 
and are classified as :  (a) want of statutory authority (incom­
petence) ,  (b) disregard of statutory formalities (vice de 
forme),  (c) violation of rules of law (violation de la loi), 
and (d) abuse of power (detournement de pouvoir) .17 
The control over administrative acts through the power 
to annul, although judicial in form and effect, must neverthe­
less be viewed as exercised chiefly in the interests of adminis­
trative efficiency. In the hands of an administrative court it is 
not a control in the sense of a check upon the power of one 
branch of government by another. The administrative de­
partment itself finally adjudicates the validity of determina­
tions which its agents have made. If they have exceeded their 
powers, the actions of the administration active are censured 
by way of annulment.18 The dual purpose of the recourse for 
excess of power, envisaging both the promotion of adminis­
trative efficiency and the safeguarding of private interests, 
has interesting consequences. Even though the proceeding can 
be instituted only by a private party seeking protection against 
an allegedly injurious act, the annulment which may ensue 
operates erg a omnes.19 -!� proceeding is directed against the 
act itself, thus being in rem and not against a person.20 Indeed, 
the adversely affected interest which is required to support 
a recourse is not the primary concern of the administrative, 
although this prerequisite serves to eliminate from considera­
tion complaints not made in good faith.21 The relief afforded 
by an annulment is incidental. 
17 Lafe"iere, Vol. 2, p. 496 ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 448 ff., 1 2th 
ed., p. 424 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traite, p. 1 1 36 ff. ; Appleton, p. 59 1  ff., Supp., 
p. 90 ff. ; Bannard, Precis, p. 2 1 6  ff. ; Waline, Manuel, p. 140 ff. 
18 There is a marked trend to broaden the use of the recourse for excess of 
power as a means of judicial censure by the highest administrative court of 
illegal acts of the administration active. See Appleton, p. 596 ;  Alibert, note 
accompanying two decisions (Plet and Perignon) of the Conseil d'Etat re­
ported in S. 1936·3·97, condensed ii{54 R. D. P. ( 1937) 146. 
"' Laferriere, Vol. 2, pp. 568, 573 ; Hauriou, Precis, I Oth ed., p. 462 . 
.. Dareste, p. 307 ; Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p. 414, 1 2th ed., p. 394 ; 
Berthilemy, Traite, p. I 1 3  8. 
11 Berthilemy, Traite, p. I IJ I .  
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In keeping with the "impersonal" nature of annulment pro­
ceedings, an informal written protest by the party prosecuting 
the recourse is sufficient, representation by counsel is dispensed 
with, and the costs are negligible. 22 On the other hand, the 
recourse for excess of power is not available to an interested 
party to whom a concurrent remedy, a "parallel recourse," is 
open.23 Administrative appeals (recour;);,{e;;;;-;hiq;es) are 
not concurrent remedies in this sense, and therefore annul­
ment by the Conseil d'Etat and strictly administrative relief 
in respect to the same determination are not mutually ex­
clusive.24 Conversely, a recourse for excess of power may be 
had without first exhausting the administrative appeals ; or, 
as the principle is usually stated, the former remedy is open 
omisso medio. In other words, the recourse for excess of 
power may, but need not, be an appeal from a decision re­
viewing the original determination of an inferior administra­
tive agency.25 
22 Berthelemy, Traite, p. 1 1 3 8 ;  Hauriou, Precis, xoth ed., p. 414, nth ed., 
p. 394· 
"" The recours paraltele must he a complete remedy in an administrative court 
other than the Conseil d'Etat, or in a civil court; a mere possibility of collateral 
attack by way of defense to a prosecution is insufficient. In this respect there has 
also been a growing tendency to enlarge the use of the recourse for excess of 
power. The obstacle of a concurrent remedy has been minimized by requiring 
that it must afford relief at least equivalent to that flowing from annulment. 
The rule is obviously comparable to the principle by which equity may interfere 
where there is no adequate remedy at law. Waline, Manuel, pp. q6-4o. See 
also Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 474 ff. ; Dareste, p. 423 ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, xoth ed., 
p. 444 ff. ; Berthelemy, Traite, pp. 1 1 3 2-3 3 ;  Bannard, Precis, pp. 209-I I . 
.. Hauriou, Precis, 1 0th ed., p. 443, note 2 . 
.. Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 45 1 ;  Dareste, p. 3o6 ; Hauriou, Precis, nth ed., 
p. 409· 
The recourse for excess of power must be begun within two months from the 
date of actual or constructive notice of the determination sought to be annulled 
by the interested party. On the other hand, administrative appeals are not limited 
in point of time. However, the latter must be entered within the two-month 
period if the right to the former is to be preserved. In this case judicial annul­
ment may he applied for within two months after the disposition of the hierarchic 
recourse. Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 468 ; Bertnelemy, Traiti, p. I I 33 ff. ; Hauriou, 
Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 442, uth ed., p. 429 ; Waline, Manuel, p. 1 32 ff. See also the 
note by Alibert, accompanying a decision of the Conseil d'Etat of January 1 0, 
1 930, S. 1 930·3·41, 48 R. D. P. ( 193 1 )  1 63, concerning certain methods of ,� 
circumventing the two-month limit for the recours en annulation. 1f: 
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2. The Subject Matter of the Appeal 
An attack in the form of a recourse for excess of power can 
be directed only against an administrative determination or 
decision. French doctrine, insisting that administrative agen­
cies having determining powers26 must always proceed by way 
of "decisions which are susceptible of immediate execution,"27 
has developed the concept of decisions executoires.28 This 
term is but an expression of the synthetic understanding of the 
administrative process. It embraces expressed or implied find­
ings and conclusions preceding the determination,29 notice of 
which must be given to all interested parties.30 Hauriou31 in 
familiar language explains the decision executoire as ( 1 )  re­
quiring administrative agencies to deliberate before taking 
action and ( 2)  furnishing the necessary foundation for court 
review. These decisions executoires, as manifestations of the 
sovereign power by which "the administrative publicly as­
serts its right and its intention to proceed in a stated man­
ner,"32 are administrative acts par excellence. In other words, 
they are declar�!i_<:>_ns_ of policy, which, under the principle of 
differentiatecC;gencies, ar� pr-otected against any interference 
by the ordinary courts. The recourse for excess of power, es­
sentially designed for the annulment of administrative de­
terminations, thus falls peculiarly within the exclusive 
province of the administrative courts. 
28 These include the chief executive, the ministers, prefects and underprefects ; 
departmental councils and commissions ; municipal councils and the mayors. 
111 Hauriou, Precis, 1 0th ed., p. 393  ff., uth ed., p. 3 7 1  ff., and cases cited • 
.. Hauriou, ibid. ; Waline, Manuel, p. 439 ff. See also Laferriere, Vol. z, 
p. 4Z7 ff. 
•• The usual form of decision is a written order, although it may be verbal 
only and transmitted by telephone. Waline, Manuel, pp. 44o-41, and cases 
cited. 
80 Notice must be personal or by publication ; constructive notice is rarely 
deemed sufficient. Waline, Manuel, p. 1 3 1  and cases cited. 
81 Precis, 1oth ed., p. 393  ff., uth ed., p. 3 7 1  ff. 
"" Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p. 3 94· 
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It should be observed, however, that even annulment by 
the Conseil d'Etat is in a sense considered as judicial inter­
ference with administration. Recourses for excess of power 
therefore ordinarily do not operate as a supersedeas. Prompt 
administrative action must not be impeded, and only in ex­
ceptional situations in which administrative expediency and 
private interest coincide are annulment proceedings per­
mitted to stay the execution of the order attacked.33 
83 Waline, Manuel, p. 448. In time it was found that administrative officials, 
in order to escape the censure implicit in the annulment of their acts, avoided 
the formality of issuing executory orders. To safeguard against this subterfuge, 
the requirement of the decision executoire has been fortified with a double sanc­
tion. ( I )  Administrative officials taking affirmative action without observing 
the prescribed formality have been made personally liable for the consequences ; 
of the act. Hauriou, Precis, roth ed., p. 393, uth ed., p. 3 7 1, and cases cited. 
(2) If in case of action solicited by a private party the administrative agency 
disregards the application, petition or complaint, such inaction is deemed 
equivalent to an express rejection, provided it has continued over a period of 
four months. Art. 3 of the law of July 1 7-1 9, 1900 ;  see also art. 7 of the de­
cree of Nov. 2, I 864. The implied negative decision then becomes subject to re­
course for excess of power without any limitation in point of time. Laferriere, 
Vol. 2, pp. 429, 469 ; Berthelemy, p. I I2J  ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., 
p. 408 ff., 442, uth ed., p. 386 ff., 430 ; Bannard, Precis, pp. 1 89�0. The 
effect of the latter provision is particularly salutary where a hierarchic appeal 
has been taken after the expiration of the two months within which a recours 
pour exces de pouvoir might have been instituted. Except for the statute, inaction 
by the administrative agency to which the appeal has been addressed would 
leave the aggrieved party without remedy, since neither mandamus nor manda­
tory injunctions are possible under the French system. On the other hand, if the 
hierarchic superior confirms the action complained of, no new recourse lies 
to the Conseil d'Etat. However, if the order appealed from is revoked or 
modified, the disposition made constitutes a new decision which may be at­
tacked for excess of power. Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 462. 
Compare the situation in this country where the aggrieved party has a remedy 
in the federal courts if administrative relief is deliberately delayed or withheld, 
as in the case of Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Russell, ( 1 923 )  261  U. S. 290, 
making an exception to the rule of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., ( 1 908) 
2 I I U. S. 2 I O. 
CHAPTER IV 
Review of Administrative Acts on the Merits 
THE ORDINARY RECOURSE 
ATHOUGH the recourse for excess of power is an outstanding feature of the French administrative system, the most common method of obtaining relief 
from administrative action is the prosecution of an ordinary 
action against the particular agency, with inquiry by a court 
into the law and facts, and adjudication on the merits of the 
case. Unlike the former remedy, the latter has no character­
istics which automatically limit jurisdiction to the adminis­
trative courts, and only a rigid interpretation of the differ­
entiation of agencies could entirely oust the ordinary courts 
from entertaining such actions. This form of attack upon the 
acts of administrative agencies, generally known as the recours 
de pleine juridiction/ resembles closely a civil action, and it 
is therefore often referred to as the recours ordinaire.2 A mere 
interest is no longer sufficient, and the violation of a righe 
must be shown if the recourse is to be successful. Moreover, a 
judgment for the plaintiff may carry reformation of the act of 
which complaint is made, as well as indemnity or restitution. 
1 Laferriere, Traiti de la juridiction administrative et des recours conten­
tieux, 2d ed. ( I 896), Vol. I ,  p. I S  fi., Vol. 2, p. I I S  fi. ; Hauriou, Precis de 
droit administratif et de droit public, x oth ed. ( I 92 I ) ,  pp. 463 fi., 875, uth ed. 
( I 933 ) ,  pp. 458 fi., 345 ; Berthilemy, Traiti ilimentaire de droit admin­
istratif 1 3th ed. ( I 933 ) ,  p. n 2o fi. ; Bannard, Precis de droit administratif 
{ I935) ,  p. I 83 fi. ; Waline, Manuel ilimentaire de droit administratif ( I 936), 
{l. I I 3 fi• 
• Hauriou, Precis, Ioth ed., p. 464, uth ed., p. 459· 
• Berthilemy, Traiti, pp. I I 2 1-1 1 23. 
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A. THEORETICAL BASIS OF JURISDICTION 
1 .  Authoritative Acts and Acts of Management 
It was inevitable that a complex situation should have 
arisen as soon as the doctrine of exclusive administrative ad­
judication was abandoned. In other words, the recognition 
that the differentiation of agencies did not, or should not, re­
quire the indiscriminate exclusion of the ordinary courts wher­
ever action originating with an administrative agency was in­
volved, immediately called for a basis upon which j urisdiction 
could be predicated. A solution was found in construing the 
legislation of 1 790 and the year III as comtemplating nothing 
more than that the judicial courts should be barred from tak­
ing cognizance of acts performed in the exercise of delegated 
sovereign power.4 It has been said that the administrative, 
representing sovereignty, acts by commanding, regulating or 
prohibiting, as a superior would in his relations with subordi­
nates. To this extent the judicial department, itself repre­
senting sovereignty, might be the equal of the administrative 
but not its superior. 5 Acts of this type, but for the existence 
of administrative courts, could not under the French system 
be subject to "judicial" review.6 However, not all actions of 
administrative officials are of this kind. In performing their 
duties administrative officials must often resort to forms of 
action which are common to private intercourse. This is the -­
classical distinction which the French have made between au­
thoritative acts (actes de puissance publique or actes d'auto­
rite),  and acts of management ( actes de gestion) . 7 The notion 
prevailed that the ordinary courts should be left competent 
• Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 477 H. 
• Duguit, Traiti de droit constitutionnel, :zd ed. ( I 92 I ) ,  Vol. I ,  p. 441 H., · 
Vol. :z, p. 521  H. 
• Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 1 1 00. 
• Laferriere, Vol. I,  pp. 484 H. ; Berthilemy, Traiti, p. I I oo. 
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. to adjudicate controversies arising from transactions which do 
not differ from similar dealings between private individuals. 
In the case of a recourse for excess of power, the act attacked 
is always of the authoritative type. 8 On the other hand, an 
ordinary recourse may involve one or the other form of ad­
ministrative action, so that the question of jurisdiction be­
comes acute. In dealing with the question, the basic jurisdic­
tional rule, whose foremost exponent was Laferriere, 9 seemed 
clearly indicated by the classification of administrative acts 
as authoritative acts and acts of management. Accordingly 
'all actes de puissance publique should belong to the adminis­
trative courts as a matter of right, while all actes de gestion 
automatically would come within the cognizance of the ordi­
nary courts. In other words, in case of the former, jurisdiction 
can only exceptionally be given to the civil courts, while juris­
diction over the latter cannot be withdrawn from these courts 
except by statute.10 These principles have retained much of 
their fundamental importance, although later doctrine, under 
the pressure of the increase in volume and complexity of ad­
ministrative tasks, has drifted away from them in search of 
new criteria. However, the old mode of determining juris-
.__ diction has never been wholly abandoned, and even contem­
porary writers defend it rigorously as the only logical line 
of demarcation, notwithstanding divergent developments 
over a long period of time.11 
2. The Public Service Criterion 
With the modern expansion of governmental activity and 
its growing importance in the solution of social and economic 
• Hauriou, Precis, 1 0th ed., p. 87 s, uth ed., p. 344· 
• Laferriere's treatise on administrative jurisdiction continues to have great 
authority and is frequently referred to by the courts in modern times, even 
though it is out of date and does not reflect the developments since I 8g6. 
]J) Laferriere, Vol. I,  pp. 484-485 ; cf. Ducrocq, Cours de droit administratif, 
7th ed. ( I 897) ,  Vol. z, p. I O  ff. · 
n See Bertkilemy, Traiti, pp. 24-25, note I, I Ioo, note I ;  Waline, Manuel, 
P· 43· 
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problems, the concept of  service public12 became a factor 
in determining the limits of the administrative and ordinary 
jurisdictions. It was introduced in the latter part of the last 
century, and, without superseding the former line of de­
limitation, it has had a dominating influence on the interpreta­
tion of the differentiation of agencies until the most recent 
times. The public service factor modifies the older rule hyi 
claiming for the administrative jurisdiction not only all acts 
of authority13 but also all acts of management in so far as 
they are directly connected with the performance of a public : 
service.14 This reinterpretation of the principle of differenti: 
ated agencies in France runs closely parallel with the tend­
ency to enlarge administrative finality in this country, and 
the real reason must be looked for in the greater aptitude of 
an administratively trained personnel 15 to deal with technical 
administrative problems.16 
10 The term "public service," as used in France, is a collective mode of 
reference to the various governmental functions or duties to the public which 
must be performed through the administrative machinery for the maintenance 
and furtherance of public safety and security, public health and order, and pub­
lic welfare in general. Appleton, Traite elementaire du contentieux adminis­
tratif (I 9 z 7) ,  p. I I 4, gives the following concise definition : "U n service public 
est done un moyen, organise par les pouvoirs publics, de satisfaire socialement 
un besoin general par des procidis propres au droit administratif." This 
may be translated : "A public service, therefore, is a method provided by the 
state for the satisfaction of general social needs through proper administrative 
channels." Berthilemy ( Traite, p. z66) classifies the services as ( I )  essential 
services, comprising the police for the maintenance of public health and order, 
national defense, and the management of state-owned property (p. z67 ff.) ; 
( zd) optional services, supplementing nonexistent or insufficient private initia­
tive, including regulation of transportation, mining, forestry, agriculture, in­
dustry and commerce, public schools, encouragement and conservation of art 
and art treasures, social security (p. 760 ff.) . Finances (budget and taxation) 
are treated as "ways and means" under a separate heading (p. 1 029 ff.) .  
Cf. Hauriou, Pricis, 1 0th ed., pp. 25, 467 ff., uth ed., p .  64 ff. 
"' Cf. the decision of the Tribunal des conflits, in Sagot du Vauroux v. 
Fazuilhe, Rec. I9o6.8o3. 
,. Bannard, Precis, pp. 1 54-x ss. 
u See Appendix, pp. I 6-x 8, supra. 
18 Bannard, Pricis, p. 1 5 2 ;  cf. Landis, "Administrative Policies and the 
Courts," 47 Yale L. J. 5 1 9  at 529, 5 35 ;  Dickinson, Administrative Justice and 
the Supremacy of the Law ( 1 927) ,  pp. q-x 5 ;  Freund, Administrative Powers 
over Persons and Property ( I928) ,  p. n ff. 
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Since the injection of the criterion of public service into the 
jurisdictional issue in France, the guiding principles have been 
formulated thus : ( I )  The adjudication of all controversies 
arising from the performance and functioning of the public 
services must be left to the administrative courts, irrespective 
of whether the administrative acts involved are authoritative 
or managerial. ( 2)  All acts of management not connected 
with the functioning of a public service come under the juris­
diction of the ordinary courts. These rules have become sub­
ject to exceptions founded on both statute and precedent.17 
However, it is interesting to observe that the late Professor 
Hauriou/8 who often anticipated future trends, adopted a 
new terminology in the I 933 ed,ition of his treatise. Relin­
quishing public service as the pivotal factor, he distinguished 
gestion publique from gestion privee, i. e., public management 
from private management. This may well be taken to indicate 
a return to the classical juxtaposition of puissance publique 
and gestion. Or perhaps this latter distinction has always 
dominated. It would indeed be possible to say that so-called 
acts of management, through intimate connection with the 
performance of a public service, become impregnated with 
soveretgn power. 
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
I .  The Rule of the Blanco Case 
The line intended to separate the administrative from the 
judicial sphere of influence, and developed by the courts on 
the basis of the foregoing distinctions, is marked by a number 
of important decisions. 
11Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p. 875 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 1 1 00 ff. ; 
Bannard, Precis, p. 1 54 ff. ; Waline, Manuel, p. 47 ; Appleton, p. 1 14 ff., Supp., 
p. 1 6. 
18 Precis, nth ed., p. 345 ff., 1 064 ff . 
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The first milestone in the survey is the famous decision 
in the Blanco case/9 decided by the Tribunal des conflits in 
1 8 73.  Agnes Blanco, a minor, had been seriously injured by 
a wagon pushed from a government tobacco warehouse into 
the street by four employees. The father of the minor insti­
tuted an action for damages in the civil court against the four 
employees and against the state. The prefect of the district 
asserted the existence of a conflict, denying the jurisdiction 
of the civil court in a matter of responsibility of the state for 
mistakes of its agents20 in connection with a public service. 
The opinion 21 of the commissaire du gouvernement (David) 
pointed out that, up to the time of this conflict, the Conseil 
d'Etat, representing the attitude of the administrative, and the 
Cour de cassation, representing that of the judiciary, had per­
sistently and firmly adhered to contradictory views. The opin­
ion then proceeds to give a minute and excellent analysis of 
the principal issue at stake and of the applicable doctrines. It 
had been conceded by the Cour de cassation thae2 the ordi-
1" Blanco v. l'Etat, (Feb. 8, I 873)  D. I 873 ·J.2o, S. I 873.2.I 53 ; see also 
subsequent proceeding in Rec. I 874.4I6. See Laferriere, Vol. I ,  p. 68 I ;  Berthi­
lemy, Traiti, pp. 25-26, note 2, I I O I ; Bannard, Precis, p. I 5 5 i  Waline, 
Manuel, p. 45 ff. Cf. Dekeister v. Administration des postes, {C. d'Et.) S. 
I 862.2 . I J9 ·  
The court was divided on the issue involved and it required the vote of  the 
Minister of Justice to resolve it in favor of the administration. The decision 
has recently been attacked by J. Luchet in a thesis mentioned in 52 R. D. P. 
( I 935)  3 85. 
"" See chap. VIII, infra. 
21 Regardless of their importance, the decisions of the French courts are ren­
dered in an extremely concise form. It is necessary to consult carefully the 
opinions (conclusions) of the commissaires du gouvernement (government at­
torneys), which are usually incorporated in the reports of the decisions. These 
conclusions go into detailed analyses of the principles involved and, in many 
cases, the courts adopt them although they are by no means hound by them. 
The commissaires du gouvernement are maitres des requites {see chap. I, Ap­
pendix, supra) specially appointed upon recommendation of the vice-president of 
the Conseil d'Etat. It is for them to defend the viewpoint which appears to 
them as conforming most accurately to the law in force. Berthilemy, Traiti, 
p. I I I 7 .  These opinions are frequently relied on in subsequent cases and carry 
a great deal of weight, particularly if the author is a jurist of especial renown. 
02 Under the laws of Dec. 221 I 7 8 9 ;  Jan. 8, I 790 {Dec. 22, I 789) ; Aug. 
I 6-24, 1 790, tit. II, art. 1 3 ;  and Fructidor I 6, year III {Sept. 21 1 795), 
embodying the differentiation of the administrative and judicial agencies 
{supra, p. 1 3, note 38) .  
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nary civil courts were without jurisdiction over suits against 
the state in the case of damages resulting from the acts or 
omissions of administrative agencies. But the court main­
tained that in the case of damage caused by the mistakes or 
negligence of the employees of the state the civil courts were 
the proper forum. 
In the Blanco case the plaintiff insisted that the proceeding 
was governed by article I 3 84 of the Civil Code, regulating 
the liability of a master for damage caused by his servants, 
and that consequently the civil courts were competent to 
take cognizance of the matter. The state, on the other hand, 
invoked ( I )  the doctrine of differentiation of agencies, which 
reserved to the administrative courts complaints against the 
state involving its responsibility on account of the perform­
ance of a public service, and ( 2)  the laws of I 790 and the 
year III, according to which the administrative jurisdiction 
alone could "declare the state debtor." The representative 
of the state did not concede the applicability of the article 
of the Civil Code relied on by the plaintiff. After reviewing 
the origin and the development of administrative justice 
from the time of the Assemblee Constituante, he pointed out 
that the original interdiction addressed to the judiciary "de 
troubler, de quelque maniere que ce soit, les operations des 
corps administratifs" 23 was intended in the last analysis to 
deny to the judicial courts all power to adjudicate claims 
against the state whenever a public service was involved. 
Moreover, the commissaire emphasized that this was meant to 
apply not only where an action tended to cause the annulment, 
reformation, or interpretation of an administrative act by those 
courts, but also where the complaint simply called for pecu­
niary reparation for damages caused by the act. Citing Thou­
ret's report on the law of August I 6-24, I 790, and a dictum by 
the famed jurist, Henrion de Pansey, as authorities on the 
respective domains of the administrative and judiciary, the 
• Law of August I 6-z4, I 790, tit. II, art. I 3· 
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commissaire concluded that the state, as puissance publique 
charged with carrying on the various services administratijs, 
could not be subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. 
He conceded, however, that wherever the state acts as a 
private person, as owner of property or as party to a con­
tract, it is amenable to those courts. This rule, he insisted, 
applied in all cases in which a demand was made upon the 
state on account of torts committed by its agents in the per­
formance of a public service. He said: 24 
"For the state cannot-in justice or reason-be likened to 
private persons in respect to liability for acts done by its 
agents. The part played by the state in carrying out the public 
services is not voluntary but obligatory; these duties have 
been imposed upon it not for a private purpose but in the in­
terest of all. We must also consider . the enormous 
number of agents of all sorts which the extent of these serv­
ices necessitates ; as well as the manner of their appointment 
and advancement. The latter are often determined by general 
laws or regulations, rather than left to the free choice of each 
agency. Consequently, the responsibility of the 
state for the mistakes of these employees cannot be taken to 
be general or absolute ; it must vary so as to be in harmony 
with the laws and regulations governing each service, and 
with the individual requirements or nature of the employ­
ment. The judicial courts are inherently ill suited to give due 
consideration to these factors. Their appraisal 
naturally belongs to the administrative courts, which are in 
a much better position to interpret administrative laws and 
regulations, to evaluate the requirements of each service, and 
finally to reconcile the essential interest of the state with pri­
vate rights, this reconciliation being the foremost mission of 
the administrative courts." 
After some elaboration of the various points, the commissaire 
finally emphasized the irrelevance of the fact that the em­
ployees involved were ordinary laborers, and concluded : 25 
.. D. I 8 73·3·20 at 2 I :3. 
25 Ibid. at 2 I-22. 
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"What is certain is that the acts complained of are directly 
connected with an administrative public service, a circum­
stance which is the very foundation upon which the demand 
against the state rests. This is all that is necessary to bring 
the complaint within the general rule that demands upon the 
state growing out of a public service belong to the jurisdiction 
of the administrative courts ; a rule which is but the applica­
tion in practice of the doctrine of the separation of powers." 
The decision of the Tribunal des conflits affirming the 
jurisdiction of the administrative courts emphasized espe­
cially that the responsibility of the state in circumstances such 
as those before it "is neither general nor absolute," but "is 
subject to special rules varying with the requirements of the 
different services and with the necessities of reconciling the 
interests of the state with private rights."26 The Tribunal 
held that these matters can be passed upon only by the ad­
ministrative courts. 
2. Extension and Modification of the Rule of the Blanco 
Case 
The principle established in the Blanco case was applied 
only to actions against the state. Strangely enough,27 the 
civil courts were left to take cognizance of similar actions 
against districts ( departements) and municipalities. This con­
dition persisted unchanged until I 903. In that year the Con­
seil d'Etat, and in I 908 and I 909 the Tribunal des conflits, 
in decisions which are frequently quoted, extended the rule 
so as to give it general application. In the Terrier case,28 the 
Conseil d'Etat in a somewhat inconclusive manner held 
itself competent to pass on the liability of a departement . 
.. Ibid. at :.u : I .  
07 See the historical review by the government attorney in  the Feutry case, 
infra, note z9. 
28 Terrier v. Departement de Saone-et-Loire, (C. d'Et. 1 903) D. 1 904·3·65. 
See Berthelemy, Traite, pp. z6, uoz ; Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 4641 uth 
ed., p. 459 ;  Bannard, Precis, p. I S S ;  Waline, Manuel, p. 46. 
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The logical extension of the principle to all the political sub­
divisions of the state was, however, definitely brought about 
by the decision of the Tribunal des conflits in the F eutry 
case. 29 This was an action for damages against a departement 
prosecuted in the civil courts on account of the destruction 
of private property through fire caused by a lunatic who had 
escaped from an asylum. The decision in this case is partic­
ularly interesting because of the accompanying opinion of 
another outstanding authority, G. Teissier, who acted as com­
missaire du gouvernement. 30 The opinion reviews in an illu­
minating and instructive manner the doctrinal developments 
and the adjudications of the three highest courts, which cul­
minated in the firm entrenchment of the rule that the juris­
diction of the administrative courts is exclusive in all actions 
against the state or its political subdivisions on account of in­
juries resulting from the functioning of the public services. 
The rule can be stated more precisely thus : ( I )  Regardless 
of the nature of the act causing the damage, if action is 
brought against the state, a departement, colony or munici­
pality, i. e., against a body politic representing the puissance 
publique, the judicial courts have no power to determine 
either the fact or the extent of injury; ( 2) if, on the other 
hand, action is brought against an individual officer or agent, 
a distinction must be made between "administrative errors" 
and "personal errors." 31 Administrative mistakes concern-
.. Feutry v. Departement de l'Oise, S. I 9o8.3.97· See Berthelemy, Traite, 
pp. 26, I I o 2 ;  Hauriou, Precis, I oth ed., pp. 4 I 1  465, uth ed., pp. 46o, I o65 ; 
Bannard, Precis, p. I 5 5 ;  Waline, Manuel, p. 49· 
80 The report of the decision is also accompanied by an important note by 
Hauriou, S. I 9o8.3.97· Cf. the collection of the numerous notes of this author 
in Hauriou, La Jurisprudence administrative de I 892 a I 9 2 9  ( I 929) , Vol. I ,  
P ·  5 7 3  at 5 84. 
81 Fautes de service and fautes personnelles, see chap. VIII, infra ; Laferriere, 
Vol. I 1  p. 646 ff. ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 0  ff. ; Aucoc, Con/irences sur l'adminis­
tration et le droit administratif, 3d ed. ( I 8 8 5) , Vol. I 1  p. 7 5 8  ff. ; Teissier, La 
responsabilite de la puissance publique ( 1 906) , passim ; Hauriou, Precis, 1oth 
ed., p. 3 63 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traite, p. 8 2  ff. ; Appleton, p. 2 3 2  ff., Supp., 
p. 3 3  ff. ; Bannard, Precis, pp. 9 2, 99 ff. ; Waline, Manuel, p. 3 7 6  ff. 
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ing the functioning of public services are subject neither to the 
canons of the civil law nor to the scrutiny of the civil courts. 
Personal mistakes, however, are deemed to deprive the act 
in question of its administrative character altogether, thereby 
eliminating the very foundation for administrative jurisdic­
tion. 
In three contemporary cases, one of which 32 was decided 
shortly before and two33 within three months after the 
F eutry decision, the Tribunal des conflits was confronted 
with similar jurisdictional problems. Hauriou 34 extracted 
from the holding in the F eutry case and the three other 
cases the following principles : If a public service is involved 
( I )  the jurisdiction belongs to the ordinary courts provided 
the damage is due to a faute personnelle "separable from the 
exercise of official functions" ;35 ( 2) the jurisdiction is admin­
istrative36 in case of faute de service; (3 ) in the event of 
damage attributable neither to official nor to unofficial con­
duct of administrative agents, but to a public works itself, 
the administrative jurisdiction 37 must be invoked. 
The tendency to broaden the administrative jurisdiction, 
reflected in the foregoing precedents, was critically com­
mented upon by at least one of the experts in the field. Pro­
fessor Berthelemy38 at the time pointed out interestingly 
that the Conseil d'Etat, in exercising jurisdiction over con­
troversies arising from fautes de service, did not administer 
judicial relief; no violation of a right being involved, favor-
.. Gillet v. Panier et l'Etat, S. I 909-3-49. 
33 De Fonscolombe v. Ville de Marseille, and Joullie v. Assoc. Syndic. du 
Canal, both also reported in S. I 909.J.49· 
.. See S. x 9o8.3.97, Jurisprudence, Vol. x, p. 5 8 8  ff. ; 25  R. D. P. (x 9o8) 
69 1-92· 
.. Infra, chap. VIII. 
86 Conseil d'Etat. 
87 Conseil de prefecture. 
38 Traite de droit administratif, sth ed., p. 89 1 ,  disapprovingly referred to by 
Jeze in a note on the Feutry decision in 25 R. D. P. ( x 9o8) 266 at 269 ff. 
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able action by the Conseil was essentially executive in that 
it granted voluntary indemnity. This construction is not alto­
gether surprising if one considers the history of the Conseil 
d'Etat as an administrative body, and also the adminis­
trative aspects of judicial annulment, by the Conseil, of ad­
ministrative acts.39 It is arguable that in matters of state 
responsibility, arising from public service operations, the ad­
ministrative department cannot be relied upon to be suffi­
ciently impartial in granting indemnity. Furthermore, it is 
true that to require all private claims, even those against 
municipalities, to come before a single court, such as the 
Conseil d'Etat, constitutes a hardship upon claimants. 
It should be remembered, however, that the one-time 
movement which favored the ordinary courts for the adjudi­
cation of such claims, even though based on the ground that 
the claims arose from actes de gestion, was intimately con­
nected with the absence of independent administrative courts. 
As these courts were developed and improved, and as con­
fidence in their impartiality and especial familiarity with ad­
ministrative law problems grew, the general sentiment be­
came actually reversed.40 Jeze41 has gone so far as to remark 
that today, "one must take into account that in France the 
ordinary courts have little prestige and are afraid of displeas­
ing the administrative." If this is true, it must seem natural 
that claimants prefer to come before the administrative 
courts, which, although distant, have no hesitations in grant­
ing indemnity, "rather than to resort to the ordinary courts, 
[which are] nearer, but traditionally known to be reluctant 
to condemn the administrative, fearing to be accused of ob­
structing the acts of its agents." 42 Viewed in this light, the 
89 Recourse for excess of power, supra, pp. 3 1-33. 
"' Jeze, note 25 R. D. P. ( 1 908) 266 at 269 ff. 
41 Ibid., p. 2 7 2 ;  cf. Waline, Manuel, p. 300 • 
.. Jeze, p. 2 p . . 
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differentiation of agencies would seem to have succeeded far 
beyond securing the administrative against judicial inter­
ference, by enveloping the judiciary in a more or less trans­
parent veil of subservience, thereby enhancing the popularity 
of, and confidence in, administrative justice.43 However, 
statements to this effect are extreme and should be received 
with caution. It can be demonstrated44 and it is highly impor­
tant that in other respects the contrary is true. 
3·  The Public Service Criterion Applied to Contracts 
(a) The T herond Case 
The concessions to the administrative jurisdiction in con­
troversies arising from public service, beginning with actions 
against the state involving its liability for injury or damages 
to private persons, and extending gradually to the similar 
liabilities of the departements and municipalities, culmi­
nated in the decision of the Conseil d'Etat in the case of 
Thh·ond v. Ville de Montpellier.45 Although the public 
service criterion had long since become an important limita­
tion upon the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts over actes 
de gestion, it had not as yet been applied to litigation involv­
ing contracts. Despite the countless instances in which the 
agents of the government, for the accomplishment of various 
administrative purposes, must needs resort to the contractual 
form of action, the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts over 
all contract disputes with the administrative agencies re­
mained intact.46 Only where the contracting agency clearly 
acted as puissance publique, and where the contractual aspect 
of its action was purely incidental, did the administrative ju-
.. Cf. Appleton, p. 9 ff., Supp., pp. 7-8. 
" Chaps. IX and X, infra. 
46 S. 1 9 I I .J.1 7, decided in 1 9 1 0  • 
.. Jeze, comment on the Therond decision, 2.7 R, D, P. (1 91 0) 249· 
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risdiction prevail. This rule was subject only to express stat­
utory exceptions.47 
In the T herond case, for the first time, extended but logical 
use was made of the public service concept for the purpose 
of determining jurisdiction in contract cases. The city of 
Montpellier had entered into a contract with Therond for 
the capture of stray dogs and the removal of dead animals 
in the city. A dispute arose over the agreement and action 
was brought in the Conseil d'Etat. 48 Discharging the duty 
of determining its own jurisdiction, the Conseil found that 
the contract was intended for the performance of a public 
service, i. e., the protection of public health and safety, and 
that therefore the case was properly before it. With this im­
portant step in the interpretation of the differentiation of 
agencies, 49 the T herond decision seemed to terminate the 
development which was marked by the earlier cases discussed 
in this chapter. 
Retracing the entire development, we observe that at the­
initial stage all acts of the administrative were indiscrimi­
nately withdrawn from the cognizance of the ordinary courts. 
Later, acts of management were restored to the jurisdiction 
of these courts, and ultimately public service, i. e., perform­
ance of strictly governmental functions, was accepted as a 
unit of action and a basis of jurisdiction.50 The result of the 
holding in the Therond case, subjecting all contracts made 
in connection with governmental functions to administrative 
jurisdiction, was to make the special technical fitness of the 
administrative courts available for the adjudication of all 
disputes where it might be desirable. 
•• Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 5 8 7  ff. ; Berthilemy, Traiti, p. I I O I .  
48 The contract granting Therond a monopoly was held ultra vires and 
consequently rescission and restitution were awarded to Therond. 
48 Cf. Hauriou's note accompanying the Tberond decision-S. I 9I I .3.1 7 and 
Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, pp. 679 at 685 ff. See also his Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 465, 
1 2th ed., p. 460. 
00 See the comment by Jeze in 27 R. D. P. ( 1 9 1 0) 249. 
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However, it soon became obvious that the latest extension 
of the administrative jurisdiction involved a noticeable dis­
advantage in engaging the administrative court machinery 
with countless trivial matters, which unnecessarily taxed their 
limited facilities. Quite naturally, therefore, the evolution­
ary process which had its beginning in the Blanco decision 
did not terminate abruptly with the T herond case. It is 
noteworthy that only a few months after the Conseil d'Etat 
had asserted its jurisdiction over the contractual relation in 
that case, on the ground that the contract pertained to public 
service, the Tribunal des conflits, in Compagnie d'assurances 
ccze Soleil" v. l'Etat/1 signified its adherence to the older 
doctrine, expounded by Laferriere, 52 according to which juris­
diction over controversies founded on contract belongs to 
the civil courts "even if the object of the contract is the func­
tioning of a public service."53 
(b) Qualification of the Rule of the T herond Case 
The rule announced in the T herond decision, which seems 
to have been ignored by the Tribunal des conflits, was modi­
fied by the Conseil d'Etat itself when, two years later, it de­
clined to take jurisdiction in the case of Societe des granits v. 
Ville de Lille.M The plaintiff corporation there sought to 
recover a sum of money under a contract for the furnishing 
11 Rec. I 9 I 0.446 • 
.. Vol. I, pp. 5 8 7-8 8, 595· 
.. The contract in the "Le Soleil" case was not one of a private person with 
the government, but one between a city and the military for the temporary 
occupation by troops of a city-owned building. A fire occurred and the insurer 
of the premises, as subrogee of the city, filed suit against the state in the Court 
of Appeals of Paris. 
In this case the commissaire du gouvernement, whose conclusions the Tri­
bunal adopted, was the attorney general, i. e., a member of the judiciary. Jeze, 
in a critical comment, z7  R. D. P. ( I  9 I o) 468, suggests that had the commissaire 
brought the Therond decision to the attention of the Tribunal, the latter would 
have followed the principle announced by the Conseil d'Etat. 
" D. I 9 I 6.3.35 ; S. I 9 I  7·3· IS ·  See Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 1 103 ;  Bonnartl, 
Precis, p. I 56 ;  Waline, Manuel, p. 48. Cf. Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 3 9  ff. 
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of paving material to the defendant city.55 Leon Blum,56 act­
ing as commissaire du gouvernement, injected into his opinion 
a new distinction. He insisted that while precedent had over­
come the former interpretation of the principle of the dif­
ferentiation of agencies, it was not the purpose of the new 
doctrine to withdraw indiscriminately from judicial cogni­
zance all claims sounding in contract to which an administra­
tive agency is a party. He argued that even though the object 
of the contract is related to a public service, 57 the question of! 
jurisdiction should be determined by establishing whether 
the contract is an "administrative contract" or an "ordinary 
common-law contract." The government attorney said that 
a contract is administrative if it is so in form and context ; 
in other words, the contract must be one which can be made 
only by a personne publique, and which creates a definite, 
continuing relationship between the private party and the 
municipal corporation or the public. Conversely, according 
to M. Blum's definition, the contract is a private one whenever 
these conditions do not obtain, and when the contractual re­
lationship does not persist, as in the case of an executed sale 
of paving material. He concluded that the administrative 
in this case had contracted as a private party and any subse­
quent litigation, therefore, was for the determination of the 
ordinary courts. The Conseil d'Etat adopted this opinion and 
the resulting solution. 
The holding in the last case seems to be tantamount to a 
return to the old distinction between "authoritative acts" 
"" The case concerns, and is of importance in connection with, similar con­
tracts of dipartements and municipalities only. As to the state, the administrative 
jurisdiction had been £xed at an early date by statute .(Decree of June u, 1 8o6, 
art. 1 3) in regard to contracts coming within the category of supply contracts 
(marchis de fournitures) . Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 79z. ff., nth ed., p. 953 
ff. ; Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 593· 
"" Later Premier of France ( 1936-19371 1 93 8) .  
M Particularly, as in the instant case, the furnishing of material for the 
pa'\oing of streets. 
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and "acts of management" in so far as the contracts of ad­
ministrative agencies are concerned. Applied to contracts, the 
doctrine of public service, carefully developed as an expedi­
ent mode of determining the bounds of administrative juris­
diction, failed to show the supposed qualities of an open­
sesame.58 The solution adopted in the Societe des gramits 
case is in keeping with the generally pragmatic rather than 
strictly doctrinal tendencies of the Conseil d'Etat. The cri­
teria proposed by Commissaire du Gouvernement Blum for 
determining jurisdiction yield a rule sufficiently elastic to 
permit the sifting of the mass of contractual disputes and to 
guard the Conseil d'Etat against having to pass on countless 
unimportant matters.59 Nevertheless, it is equally true that 
the rule complicates the determination of jurisdiction and 
precludes the latter from being predicted with much accu­
racy, thus working hardship upon private litigants. Just when 
a contract is or is not administrative is by no means easily 
determined under all circumstances. It is evident that both 
the doctrine of the T herond case and the more flexible rule 
of the Societe des granits decision are apt to produce unde­
sirable results. 60 
This situation presents the problem of a difficult choice 
between the overcrowded docket of a high court and the 
uncertainty attending the selection of the competent forum 
by private parties dependent upon judicial interpretation 
of their contractual rights; Under circumstances such as those 
which prevail, it would seem that the interests of litigants at 
large would be best served by maintaining the quality of the 
88 The Societe des granits decision was cited and followed by the Tribunal des 
conflits in Boyer et Jullian v. l'Etat, (1930) D. 1 9 3 1 .3.33 ; 48 R. D. P. ( 1 9 3 1 )  
807. 
10 This view has been aptly illustrated by Berthilemy (Traite, p. uo4), 
who refers to the possibility of "having to settle a bill for the purchase of a bottle 
of ink or a box of pens because they were purchased to be used by a public 
school." See also ibid., p. 6 1 5  (and 1 oth ed., p. szs, note 3 ) .  
10 Jeze, in a comment in 3 I R. D. P. ( 19 14) 145, attacks the latter decision 
on the score that "the organization of the courts is designed for the convenience 
of the parties and not for that of the judges or lawyers." Ibid., p. 1 5z. 
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court's work by reducing the class of cases cognizable by the 
Conseil d'Etat, so long as additional court machinery is not 
available. 
In 1 934, by a decret-loi,61 original jurisdiction was in 
fact conferred upon the Conseils de prefecture in a number of 
matters which had been cognizable in the Conseil d'Etat. 
The statute applies to four specified types of cases, including 
contract and damage claims other than those against the 
central government.62 However, this measure is largely in­
effectual for the purpose of unburdening the Conseil d'Etat. 
It merely leads to a changed system of appeals, since the 
Conseil d'Etat is still open for the review of these same con­
troversies. 
However, the ultimate significance of the decision in the 
S ocihe des granits case lies in that it questions the adequacy 
of public service as the only criterion by which to determine 
jurisdiction over contracts, and that it stresses the necessity 
for making other distinctions. In this connection it is important 
to note the statutory solution in case of contracts made by the 
central government for supplying its public services.63 The 
statute, which expressly classifies these contracts as "adminis­
trative contracts" and subjects them to the jurisdiction of 
the Conseil d'Etat, antedates by many decades the recogni­
tion of public service as the primary factor in the determina­
tion of jurisdiction. It may well be assumed that the statute 
is declaratory of a principle, and that the making of con­
tracts of this type by the state was deemed an "act of author­
ity," in view of the importance of the marches de fourni­
tures.64 
81 Decret-loi of May 5, 1934 • 
.. See the critique of the statute in 51 R. D. P. (1 934) 3 1 8. 
83 Marches de fournitures, supra, note 55· 
••  See Berthilemy, Traite, pp. 593-94 ; Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 793, 
uth ed., p. 954· There is an apparent inconsistency in Hauriou's relating this 
instance of administrative jurisdiction to the public service concept. 1 oth ed., 
p. 876, note 1 (a) . 
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The rule of jurisdiction concerning contracts was further 
qualified in 1 928,  when the Tribunal des conflits, deciding 
the case of Templier v. Commune de Sempigny,65 adopted a 
new distinction which was not in any way related to the pub­
lic service notion. Radically departing from the former line 
of approach, the T emptier decision makes the administrative 
jurisdiction dependent upon expt.ess clauses appearing in 
the respective contracts. This not only permits a choice of 
jurisdiction in advance of litigation, but it forces adminis­
trative agencies to proceed by way of contrat administratif 
rather than by contrat judiciare, if they desire the contract 
to be subject to interpretation in the administrative courts 
exclusively. The holding seems to signify the abandonment 
of the service public criterion in favor of puissance publique 
as the primary basis of the administrative jurisdiction in the 
matter of contract. 66 This indeed had already been suggested 
by Commissaire Blum in the Societe des granits case. 67 
4· Later Developments-Commercial and Noncommercial 
Public Service 
The most recent developments concerning the jurisdiction 
of the administrative courts had their basis in the holding of 
.. s. 1928.].12.9· 
08 See the note by Hauriou accompanying the decision, summarized in 46 
R. D. P. (1 929) 1 54. Hauriou, Precis, uth ed., pp. 954-55, argues : "Conse­
quently the administration is enabled to determine the jurisdiction at will by 
inserting into, or omitting from, the contract stipulations manifesting the ex­
ercise of sovereign power." Cf. Hauriou's note accompanying the earlier de­
cision of the Conseil d'Etat in Commune de Monsegur v. Lalanne (S. 192 1 .3·49) 
where he takes issue with }eze, who insists that service public is the basic concept 
underlying all administrative law theory. 
01 As to "administrative contracts," see J eze, Les contrats administratifs 
(1927 ) ,  and by the same author "Theorie generale des contrats de !'administra­
tion," 47 R. D. P. (1930), 8z, z6o, 4261 68o ; 48 R. D. P. ( 1 9 3 1 )  701 245, 
496, 68 1 ; 49 R. D. P. ( 193 2) 244, 5 8 1 ; so R. D. P. ( 1933)  5 1 ,  371 ,  573 ; 
5 1  R. D. P. ( 1934) 70, 570; 52 R. D. P. (1 935) s, 237, 482, 7 1 2. ;  53 R. D. P. 
( 1 936) 41, 239· 
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the Tribunal des conflits in the Feutry case.68 The immedi­
ate effect of the decision was to give general validity to the 
concept of public service, initiated by the Blanco case, as a 
limitation upon administrative competence in respect to 
claims for damages against the state and its political sub­
divisions. Indirectly this resulted in a corresponding redistri­
bution of jurisdiction over contracts, although the ultimate 
solution concerning the latter is marked by a reversion to 
the older distinction of authoritative and nonauthoritative 
acts. It may be granted that the chronological sequence of 
events has been largely coincidental. Nevertheless, it was not 
until preoccupation with jurisdiction over contracts subsided, 
following the T emplier decision, that interest became focused 
again upon the jurisdictional problems arising from admin­
istrative torts and quasi-torts. Conflicting considerations gave 
impetus to varying solutions. 
In 1 934 the Conseil d'Etat, in the matter of Mabille v. 
Ville de Paris, 69 declared the juridiction administrative, rather 
than the ordinary courts, competent to pass on the liability 
of the municipality for injuries and damages resulting from 
the collision of a taxi with a truck operated by the street­
cleaning department, a public service. The particular sig­
nificance of the decision lies in the fact that it seemed to "over­
rule" a decision of the Tribunal des conflits rendered a few 
months earlier in the Melinette case.70 In that case the Tri­
bunal was divided and, contrary to the opinion of the com­
missaire du gouvernement, 71 in the face of almost identical 
facts, declared the judicial courts competent to hold the city of 
Paris liable in damages. It must be noted, however, tha:t the 
plaintiff, Mme. Melinette, within her statutory rights, had 
88 S. 1 908.3 ·97> supra, note 29. 
89 Decided February 9, I 934· D. 1934-3-9 ; see the note in 51 R. D. P. 
( 1 934) 1 3 0· 
70 (July I I , 1933)  S. 1 933-3-9 7 ;  note by Jeze, so R. D. P. ( 19 3 3) 426. 
71 Cf. the accompanying note by Alibert [analyzed 5 1  R. D. P. ( 1 934) 140] . 
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simultaneously instituted an action ex delicto against the 
driver of the city truck and an action against the 
city. The decision of the Tribunal des conflits therefore pro­
duced the desirable result that the same court could hear both 
actions, instead of subjecting the plaintiff to the inconvenience 
of having to seek relief before different tribunals. In order 
to avoid the implicit deviation from the principle of differ­
entiated agencies as previously interpreted, 72 the court re­
sorted to the expedient of distinguishing industrial or 
commercial public services 73 from other public services. 74 De­
claring the service involved to be of the first type, i. e., "con­
ducted by methods similar to those which a private industrial 
enterprise would employ,"75 the court decided the Melinette 
conflict in favor of the ordinary jurisdiction.76 
A better view of the jurisdictional situation subsequent to 
the Melinette decision may be gained from the resolution of 
the conflict77 in Verbanck v. Le Beguec/8 reported conjointly 
with the Mabille case. Apparently the alarm caused by the 
Melinette decision was not justified. In the first place, the 
contrary holding by the Conseil d'Etat in the Mabille case 
"' Jeze, so R. D. P. at 427. 
"' Bannard, Precis, pp. 1 5 6, 1 69 ;  Waline, Manuel, pp. so, 587 .  
•• A similar distinction seems to have been rejected by the opinion in the 
Blanco case. 
'lli See note by Waline, D. 1 9 34·3·9 ;  5 1  R. D. P. ( 1 934) 458. An analogy 
may be found in the American state cases holding that a municipality is subject 
to suit for damages in the civil courts if the performance of a governmental 
function is coupled with an incidental profit-Foss v. City of Lansing, ( 1927)  
2 37  Mich. 633-or i f  the public service i s  partly of a commercial character­
Haley v. City of Boston, ( 1 906) 1 9 1  Mass. 291  at 293.  
•• This sub-classification of public services furnished the basis for the criticism 
which the decision provoked. It was severely attacked in the conclusions of the 
commissaire du gouvernement upon which the Conseil d'Etat subsequently de­
cided the Mabille case, supra, note 69.  
77 The accidental death which was the cause of action came about through 
the negligent operation on a highway of a truck of the state highway depart­
ment. 
78 D. 1 934·3·9• S. I 934·J·3 3, so R. D. P. ( 1 933 )  6zo ; see particularly the 
accompanying note in Dalloz by Professor Waline, analyzed 5 1  R. D. P. ( 1934) 
458, and that by Alibert in Sirey, analyzed 51  R. D. P. ( 1 934) 457· 
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seemed to indicate that the Tribunal des conflits had not 
intended to establish a new principle ; for, ordinarily, the 
Conseil d'Etat respects rather than disregards the holdings 
of the Tribunal. In the second place, it is possible to reconcile 
the two decisions because of a differe�ce in the facts. In the 
earlier matter (Melinette) the driver had left the truck un­
guarded in the street, while in the second case ( M abille) 
at the time of the accident the employee was driving and was 
in control of the vehicle. It was, therefore, possible to con­
sider the injury in the Melinette case as having resulted not 
directly, but in a manner independent from the operation of 
a public works. In the V erbanck case, where the truck was 
again in the control of the negligent driver, the opinion sug­
gested further that "it would scarcely occur to anyone to as­
similate the bridge and highway department to a commercial 
enterprise." The Tribunal upholding the administrative 
jurisdiction borrowed language from the Blanco decision. 
One cannot read the comments elicited by the Mabille and 
V erbanck cases without the impression that considerable re­
lief was experienced over the apparent return to the estab­
lished principle of administrative competence in all matters 
pertaining to public service. 79 
Nevertheless, the spectre of the vaguely defined distinc­
tion between industrial or commercial and other public serv­
ices continued to thwart the ready determination of jurisdic­
tion. 80 The distinction actually was not a new one. Originally 
used in connection with controversies between governmental 
services and customers, it came to be progressively applied first 
to relations between these services and their . 
personnel and 
79 See the note by Alibert, S. 1934·3·33, 51 R. D. P. { 1934) 457, pointing 
out the return in the Verbanck case to the principles :first established by the 
Blanco decision and also characterizing the Mabille decision as "a return to sound 
traditions." 
80 Cf. the similar objection advanced by Jeze concerning the differentiation 
of contracts affecting a public service in Societe des granits, supra, note 6o. 
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then to relations between the services and other administrative 
agencies. Finally, the distinction caused concern when the 
Melinette decision extended its application to controversies 
between a public service and a third party.81 It was 
deemed desirable therefore to limit the term "industrial or 
commercial public service" to those services whose perform­
ance, according to their legislative design, 82 conforms to the 
methods which would be employed if they were rendered to 
the public by private enterprise. Thus indemnity cases, very 
similar to contractual disputes, if occasioned by the public serv­
ices, must be litigated in the ordinary courts whenever the man­
ner in which the administrativ� conducts its business gives rise 
only to questions of private law. 83 
The general tendency, however, is to favor the adminis­
trative courts. This is evidenced by two recent decisions of 
the Conseil d'Etat holding, for the first time, that contro­
versies between two independent contractors engaged upon 
the same public works, fall within the administrative juris­
diction of the Conseils de prefecture. The reason given was 
that even though damage to an independent contractor was 
directly caused by another contractor, it must nevertheless 
be deemed to have resulted from the execution of the public 
works upon which both were employed, i. e., from a public 
service.84 
81 See the note by Waline in D. 1934·3·9• 5 1  R. D. P. { 1 934) 459 ;  Bonnard, 
Precis, pp. r s6-s 7· In an earlier case (Colonie de la Cote d'lvoire, D. 1 92. 1 .3 . 1 )  
the commissaire du gouvernement proposed that the differentiation of agencies 
required that the administrative courts be competent only in regard to "essen­
tially administrative functions" and not to acts which are outside these 
"natural functions," even though they are in the public interest. 
82 A typical instance is the law of July 1 5, 1 845, art. 2.2., concerning the oper­
ation of railroads. See the later decision of the Conseil d'Etat of July z6, 1 92.9 
(Commune de Chailly-en-Biere, D. I 930·3 · I •  D. H. I 92.9.5 1 2., 47 R. D. P. 
(1 930) 773) ,  particularly the accompanying note (z) in Dalloz by Professor 
Appleton as to restricting the distinction in this sense. 
83 See Waline's note, D. 1 934·3·9; Waline, Manuel, p. so. 
84 Matter of Chauveau and Matter of Societe des Eaux de Deanville, (Dec. 
I 6, 1 932.) D. 1 934·3 ·1· so R. D. P. (1933) 2.46, 5 1  R. D. P. (1 934) 3 14· 
CHAPTER v 
A Comparison of Administrative Review 
and Judicial Review 
THE main object of the jurisdictional concepts whose formulation accompanied the development of French administrative law was to permit, as far as possible, 
a distribution of jurisdiction which would be not only logical, 
but workable and readily ascertained. Before the Conseil 
d'Etat had become well organized as a court of justice, ad­
ministrative adjudication was limited to actes de puissance 
publique, i. e., to acts which, because of their authoritative 
nature, clearly could not be . interfered with by the ordinary 
courts without violating the differentiation of agencies. As 
the administrative courts gained prestige, and as the modern 
demands upon the administration increased, the classic dis­
tinction between authoritative acts and simple acts of man­
agement lost some of its usefulness. It had to be realized that 
although some of the administrative business often paralleled 
and closely resembled private business, these acts of adminis­
trative agencies in many instances were inseparably connected 
with and indispensable to the performance of essential gov­
ernmental functions. If the ordinary courts were permitted 
to take cognizance of such acts, they might, without difficulty, 
obstruct administrative action in the sense of the constitu­
tional prohibition. Thus service publique came to supplement 
puissance publique. Both the narrower sphere of administra­
tive jurisdiction over actes de puissance public and the larger 
area covered by all acts pertaining to public service were sus­
ceptible of fairly clear definition. But watchfulness on the part 
of both courts and legal critics has prevented the rigor mortis 
of a fixed line of demarcation. Conflicting considerations 
61  
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forced the maintenance of flexibility. In response, subclassifica­
tions, such as the distinction of administrative from ordinary 
contracts and the distinction of commercial or industrial serv­
ices from all other public services, emerged. 
Viewed in the light of the separation of powers, the rela­
tionship between administrative and judiciary in France is 
unique. After the establishment of administrative courts, there 
has been no problem of judicial review in the Anglo-American 
sense. Review and relief administered by courts are guaran­
teed, and the sole question which arises is concerned with the 
allocation of jurisdiction to two independent sets of courts. 
On the other hand, the actual distribution of jurisdiction 
between the administrative and the ordinary courts in France 
reveals ideas and preoccupations quite familiar to the Ameri­
can lawyer. So far as the administrative courts are concerned 
today, any tendency to enlarge1 their competence usually ex­
presses the desire of making, or rather keeping, the expert­
ness and special training of a carefully selected personnel2 
available in all matters which are essentially and intrinsically 
administrative. The French system offers few obstacles in this 
respect, and it has been relatively simple to formulate con­
cepts which have satisfied this general trend. 
The corresponding situation which presents itself in this 
country seems on the surface to be radically different. In 
truth, however, this is only a first impression caused by the 
basic constitutional arrangement. As has been pointed out 
earlier/ one of the immediate objects of the adoption of the 
separation of powers was to create a strong judiciary. It was 
1 Admittedly, the word "enlarge" is not entirely accurate in this connection. 
The jurisdiction of the French administrative courts, with their inherent power 
over all administrative acts, is theoretically not susceptible of enlargement. 
However, the term "administrative" has required reinterpretation from time 
to time with corresponding shrinkages or enlargements in the actual scope of 
administrative jurisdiction. 
• Supra, chap. I, Appendix. 
" Chap. II, p. zz. 
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inevitable that judicial power should be defined broadly since 
interference with either legislative or administrative action, -
whenever necessary under the Constitution, was intended. In 
order, therefore, to elicit the facts which are pertinent to the 
present comparison, the question must be asked, "What have 
the courts of the United States done? ", while the inquiry as to 
the French system was, "What may the ordinary courts do? "  J. 
Separation of Powers 
Interpreting the constitutional separation of powers, the 
United States Supreme Court at an early date, in connection 
with Rayburn's Case/ rejected a congressional assignment 
to the federal judiciary of "duties" not "properly j udicial."5 
In a consistent line of subsequent decisions the court perpetu­
ated the rule that the constitutional courts cannot exercise ad­
ministrative functions. 6 Thus in the recent case of Federal 
Radio Commission v. General Electric Co.7 the Supreme 
Court held that § 1 6  of the Radio Act of 1 9278  conferred 
upon the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia "purely­
administrative" powers in directing it to "hear, review and 
' ( I 792) 2 Dall. (2 U. S.) 409 . 
• The act of March 23, I 792, I Stat. L. 243, imposed upon the federal circuit 
courts the duty of passing upon petitions of persons who wished to be put on the 
pension list of the United States. The determinations of the courts were made 
subject to revision by Congress and by executive officers. The judges of the 
circuit courts for Pennsylvania, New York and North Carolina had expressed 
opinions against the validity of such legislation. See Rayburn's Case, ( I 792) 
2 Dall. (2 U. S.) 409 at 4Io, note. 
• Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., ( I930) 2 8 I  U. S. 464 
[cf. Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., ( I933) 
289 U. S .  266 at 276-277] ; Postum Cereal Co. v .  California Fig Nut Co., 
( I 927) 272 U. S. 693 ;  Ex parte Bakelite Corp., (I 929) 279 U. S. 438  at 449 ; 
Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., (I923) 26I U. S. 428 at 444 ; see the 
dissenting opinion in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
( I929) 279 U. S. 7 I 6. Cf. Borreson v. Department of Public Welfare, ( I938) 
368 Ill. 425, noted 3 7  Mich. L .  Rev. (I 939) 639. 
7 ( I9 30) 28I u.s. 464. 
• 44 Stat. L. u69, providing for the granting of and renewal of licenses 
to radio stations (italics added in quotation) .  
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determine" appeals from the Federal Radio Commission, and 
to "alter, or revise the decisions appealed from and to enter 
such judgment as to it may seem just." Consequently, the Su­
preme Court could not review the judgments of the court of 
appeals without assuming to perform an "essentially adminis­
trative function." The Radio Act was then amended9 by limit­
ing the review powers of the court of appeals to "questions of 
law." Passing on the amended statute/0 the Supreme Court 
decided that the "limitation manifestly demands judicial, as 
-- distinguished from administrative, review.'m Hence the de­
cision of the court of appeals had become susceptible of re­
vision by the highest constitutional court. 
This development is of interest for the present purpose. 
For to the extent of the established doctrine, the constitu­
tional courts cannot, no more than can the judicial courts of 
France, participate in determining purely administrative ques­
tions, 12 although the American courts by the same constitu­
tional principle may exercise a large amount of control over 
the acts by which administrative policies are carried into effect. 
On the other hand, it is necessary to take into account the type 
8 (1 930) 46 Stat. L. 844 ; now superseded by the Communications Act of 
1 934, 48 Stat. L. 1 064, 47  U. S. C. ( 1 934) , § 1 5 1  et seq. 
10 Federal Radio Commission v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., ( 1933)  
289 U. S .  266 at 276. 
u So far as the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia is concerned, 
Congress may confer administrative (as well as legislative) functions upon the 
court, since it is a legislative and not a constitutional (Art. III) court. See 
Katz, "Federal Legislative Courts," 43 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1930) 8 94. 
The subsequent action of the Supreme Court, holding that the courts of the 
District of Columbia have a dual status as legislative (Art. I) and constitutional 
(Art. III) courts did not deprive those courts of the power to exercise other 
than judicial functions. O'Donoghue v. United States, ( 1933)  289 U. S. 5 1 6  at 
s so-5 5 1 .  But compare the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hughes, ibid. 
at 5 5 1 .  
:Ill The situation under the several state constitutions is not so clear. In  many 
instances state courts exercise statutory review functions which would be con­
demned under the doctrine of Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric 
Co., supra, note 7· But compare the extreme case of Borreson v. Department 
of Public Welfare, supra, note 6, where the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated 
an assignment of "executive functions" to the judiciary. 
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of acts which under the rule have been held to involve only 
non-judicial questions. Past interpretations of the term "ad­
ministrative" reveal considerable judicial temperament. 
There has been much emphasis upon the relative directness or 
indirectness of affectation of vested rights as a criterion. Other 
important considerations for holding acts administrative, and 
therefore not subject to judicial revision, have thereby be­
come obscured. This has been particularly evident in the so­
called "negative order" doctrine, which has recently received 
disapproving analysis by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the case 
of Rochester Telephone Corporation v. United States.13 The 
doctrine, whose origin is associated with Procter & Gamble 
Co. v. United States, 14 the Supreme Court's interpretation 
of the review provisions of the act of Congress creating the 
Commerce Court, 15 requires that administrative orders to be 
reviewable must be a:ffirmative.16 One of the chief illustrations 
of the doctrine discussed in the opinion is the familiar decision 
in United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co.17 There the 
final valuation of railroad property was held not to present a 
justiciable question because the order under the Valuation 
Ace8 was made solely for the purpose of information to be in­
corporated into the records of the Interstate Commerce Com-
18 (I 939) 307 U. S. 1 25. See "A Redefinition of Judicial Review of Ad­
ministrative Orders," 48 Yale L. J. ( I 939) 1 25 7 ;  see also 38  Mich. L. Rev. 
(I 940) 682.  
" (I 9 1 2 )  225 u. s. 282. 
"' ( I 9 Io) 36  Stat. L. 539, later § 207 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, I9I I, 
36 Stat. L. I 08 7  at I I48, and as amended now 28  U. S. C. ( I934),  § 4I 
(27, 2 8 ) .  
18 Three groups of orders which are not affirmative are distinguished and 
illustrated : ( I )  orders which do not have the effect of forbidding or com­
pelling conduct without further action by the administrative body; (2) orders 
denying exemption from a statutory command ; (3) orders declining to forbid 
or compel conduct by a third person. Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United 
States, ( I 939) 307 U. S. 1 25 at 1 29-I 30. 
17 ( I 927) 273 u. s. 299· 
18 Sec. I 9a of the Act to Regulate Commerce of Feb. 4, I 8 87, 24 Stat. L. 3 79, 
as amended ; now 49 1?'· S. C. ( I 934),  § I 9a. 
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mission. The order was not made with a view to immediate 
further action, as for the establishment of rates of transporta­
tion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, quoting language from the 
opinion, 19 explains the nonreviewability of the order in the 
Los Angeles case by the absence of a "case or controversy'' in 
the sense of Article III, section 2 of the United States Consti­
tution, as elaborated in the Muskrat case.20 It is believed, how­
ever, that the clue is furnished by the separation of powers 
doctrine and the reasoning which connects Rayburn's Case 
with Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co. The 
valuation function, taken as an example, particularly if wholly 
disconnected from further action, such as rate-making, is so 
peculiarly administrative in a technical sense that "judicial 
abstention"21 seems no more than the realization of a logical 
division of work.22 Thus "the impelling consideration" which 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter feels actually underlies the decision 
in the Procter & Gamble case must apply with equal force 
to the Los Angeles case. The passage quoted by him/3 as well 
"' Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, ( 1939)  307 U. S. 1 25 at 
I Jo-I J 1, quoting from United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., ( 1 927) 273  
U. S. 299  a t  309-3 1 0 :  "The so-called order here complained of i s  one which 
does not command the carrier to do, or to refrain from doing, anything; which 
does not grant or withhold any authority, privilege or license ; which does not 
extend or abridge any power or facility ; which does not subject the carrier 
to any liability, civil or criminal ; which does not change the carrier's existing 
or future status or condition ; which does not determine any right or obligation." 
"" Muskrat v. United States, ( 1 9 1 1 )  2 1 9  U. S. 346. 
21 307 U. S. 1 25 at 1 3 1 .  
"" In fact, Mr. Justice Frankfurter also classifies Rayburn's Case with the 
Muskrat case. However, it seems quite clear that the constitutional background 
of Rayburn's Case is the separation of powers, while that of the Muskrat case is 
the narrower principle of § 2 of Art. III of the Constitution. 
28 307 U. S. 1 37, note q ., quoting from Procter & Gamble Co. v. United 
States, ( 1 9 1 2) 225 U. S. 282  at 296-297 :  "· • •  we have learned of no in­
stance where it was held or even seriously asserted, that as to subjects which in 
their nature were administrative and within the competency of the Commission 
to decide, there was power in a court, by an exercise of original action, to enforce 
its conceptions as to the meaning of the act to regulate commerce by dealing 
directly with the subject irrespective of any prior affirmative command or ac­
tion by the Interstate Commerce Commission. On the contrary, by a long line of 
decisions, whereby applications to enforce orders of the Commission were con-
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 67 
as other parts of the opinion in the Procter & Gamble case, 
clearly recognizes the importance of leaving all purely ad­
ministrative matters to be dealt with by technical experts. 
This aspect of nonreviewability has many times been empha­
sized.24 
The orders of nonjudicial tribunals, however, much more 
frequently are not strictly confined to the disposition of tech­
nical administrative matters. In many instances they are 
coupled with the simultaneous creation of rights and duties, 
and it is at this juncture that, under the American administra­
tive system, they are deemed to lose their constitutional im­
munity and to fall within the area of reviewability in the 
courts. Unhampered by any recognized implications of the 
separation of powers, the courts have only their own dis­
cretion to guide them in the circumscription of their review 
functions. But once an administrative order has been classi­
fied as not strictly administrative and therefore reviewable,26 
it becomes all the more important that the benefits of primary 
expert administrative determination should be retained. Ac-
sidered and disposed of or where requests to restrain the enforcement of such 
orders were passed upon, it appears by the reasoning indulged in that it was never 
considered that there was power in the courts as an original question without 
previous affirmative action by the Commission to deal with what might be 
termed in a broad sense the administrative features of the act to regulate com­
merce by determining as an original question that there had been a compliance 
or non-compliance with the provisions of the act." 
"' "A Redefinition of Judicial Review of Administrative Orders," 48 
Yale L. J. ( 1 939) 1 257 at 1 2 5 8 ;  Cooper, "Administrative Justice and the 
Role of Discretion," 47 Yale L. J. ( 1 938) 577  at 6oo; Landis, The Adminis­
trative Process ( 1 938) ,  p. 14z ff. ; Dickinson, Administrative Justice and the 
Supremacy of the Law ( 1 9z7) ,  pp. 6 1 ,  7 1-7z, Z33-z35, Z54· 
"' Compare the "Classification of Judicial Functions Exercised by Federal 
Administrative Agencies," attempted by the Special Committee on Adminis­
trative Law of the American Bar Association, 6 1  Rep. A. B. A. ( 1 936) 7zo 
at 745· Observe that licensing is quite commonly thought to be administrative, 
while the revocation of a license is deemed a judicial act, leaving considerable 
doubt as to the nature of the renewal of licenses, particularly when renewal is 
denied for the concealed purpose of revocation. Cf. Piedmont & Northern 
Ry. Co. v. United States, ( 1 930) z8o U. S. 469, and the critique of this de­
cision in the opinion of Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, ( 1 939) 
307  U. S. us at 1 33 1  note. 
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tually the federal courts have responded to this demand by 
devising rules of self-limitation. 
Prior Resort and Exhaustion 
Two doctrines are commonly resorted to for the purpose 
of marking off certain areas within which administrative ac­
tivity enjoys a limited amount of autonomy. The first of these 
devices26 requires that a complaining party, before invoking 
the courts, must await the action of the competent administra­
tive tribunal27 or must exhaust all the administrative remedies 
available against any action which has already been taken.28 
That the predominant purpose of the rule is to give due play 
to administrative expertness appears clearly from its applica­
tions, as well as from the exceptions to its application.29 Con­
cerning the former, the ground of cornity30 and the argument 
.. The doctrine has been variously referred to as "exhaustion of adminis­
trative remedies," "prior resort to administrative action," or "primary juris­
diction" doctrine. 
"" See, for instance, Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 
( 1 907) 204 U. S. 426 ; United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship 
Co., ( 1 932) 284 U. S. 474 ; see also the recent decision in Myers v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corp., ( 1 938) 303 U. S. 4 1  at 50-52. 
28 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., ( 1 9o8) 2 1 1  U. S. 2 1 0. The distinction 
between tire principle of primary jurisdiction and that of exhaustion of rem­
edies is real, although it is commonly disregarded. The former has reference to 
situations in which original administrative action has not as yet been taken. 
It is therefore possible that the contemplated act is of the purely administrative 
type so as to come within the rule of Hayburn's Case and to escape judicial 
revision entirely. Thus, by applying the prior resort doctrine, the court merely 
indicates that under the circumstances the anticipated administrative act neces­
sarily will involve a justiciable issue. In other words, the courts have found 
the separation of powers doctrine inadequate, if not inconvenient, in cases 
where mixed administrative and justiciable questions are involved. On tire 
other hand, exhaustion of remedies envisages the possibility of hierarchic re­
view of primary administrative action and the doctrine emphasizes the desir­
ability of giving precedence to administrative review over judicial review . 
.. For detailed discussions, see "Administrative Action as a Prerequisite of 
Judicial Relief," 35 Col. L. Rev. (1935) 2301 and Berger, "Exhaustion of 
Administrative Remedies," 48 Yale L. J. { 1939)  9 8 1 ;  see also Kirchwey, 
"The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Judicial Enforcement of the 
Act to Regulate Commerce," 14 Col. L. Rev. { 1 9 14) 2 1 1 .  
80 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., ( 1 908) 2 I I  U. S .  2 1  o. 
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that the administrative remedy is analogous to one at law 
which, if adequate, bars equity,31 are more in the nature of 
judicial reconciliations of the prior resort and exhaustion doc­
trines with prevailing notions of judicial power and pro­
cedure. Nevertheless, the courts have to some extent been 
activated by a desire to keep their dockets clear of a great mass 
of tedious litigation. On the other hand, the exceptions to the 
requirement of prior resort and exhaustion have been formu­
lated with regard to the absence of technical questions and to 
the actual or relative nonavailability of administrative re­
lief.32 
Administrative Finality 
The second rule which is designed to insure respect for 
the competence of administrative agents is embodied in the 
doctrine of administrative finality.33 Accordingly, "even 
when [under the exhaustion doctrine] resort to the courts 
can be had to review a Commission's order, the range of issues 
open to review is narrow. Only questions affecting constitu­
tional power, statutory authority and the basic prerequisites 
of proof can be raised. If these legal tests are satisfied, the 
Commission's order becomes incontestable."34 The practical 
applications of the rule, however, lack the symmetrical 
beauty implicit in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's terse statement. 
Questions of constitutional power, as well as of statutory au­
thority, not infrequently depend upon fact determinations ; 
and it is familiar doctrine in American administrative law that 
"jurisdictional facts" and "constitutional facts" cannot be 
81 Elliott v. El Paso Electric Co., (C. C. A. sth, 1 937)  8 8  F. (2d) sos . 
.. For detailed discussion, see "Administrative Action as a Prerequisite of 
Judicial Relief," 35 Col. L. Re'V. ( 1 935) 230 at 233-240; and Berger, "Ex­
haustion of Administrative Remedies," 48 Yale L. J. ( 1 939) 9 8 1 .  
81 Dickinson, Administrati'Ve Justice, chap. III, p .  3 9  ff. 
" Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, ( 1 939) 307 U. S. us 
at 1 39-140. See chap. XI, infra. 
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conclusively determined by administrative agencies.85 This 
is so even though the facts to be established may clearly call 
for the expert knowledge of appointed administrative spe­
cialists. 
Briefly stated,S6 whenever the jurisdiction of an admiflistra­
tive body depends upon the existence of specific facts, a court 
reviewing an administrative determination must reach its own 
conclusions as to the existence of those facts.37 It is neverthe­
less true that if the latter are "jurisdictional" only in a statu­
tory sense, the statute itself may make the findings of the 
administrative agency conclusive. 38 Conversely, if the pres-
- ence of particular facts is made necessary to the validity of an 
administrative act by the constitution, 89 then the fact de­
termination must always be reviewable by the courts. Admin­
istrative finality is thus subject to limitations whose extent is 
largely within the discretion of those courts. 
The field actually reserved for administrative fact finding 
is indicated by the judicial expressions of respect for adminis­
trative expertness. In regard to findings of "jurisdictional 
facts," looking to statutory authority only, the courts have 
inclined towards admitting the conclusiveness of such findings 
or have limited their inquiry to the reasonableness of the find­
ings.40 On the contrary, judicial scrutiny of "constitutional 
85 Dickinson, Administrative Justice, p. 309 ff. ; Dickinson, "Crowell v. 
Benson : Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of 
'Constitutional Fact,' " 8o U. Pa. L. Rev. ( 1932) 1 055 .  
"" Professor Dickinson's article in 8o U.  Pa. L. Rev. 1 055 (note 35, supra) 
should be consulted for a complete treatment of the subject. 
87 See, for instance, Federal Trade Commission v. Klesner, ( 1 929) 280 U. S. 
1 9 ;  Interstate Commerce Commission v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., ( 1 9 10) 
2 1 6  U. S. 5 3 8 ;  cf. United States v. Ju Toy, ( 1 905) 1 9 8  U. S. 253 ; Freund, 
Administrative Powers over Persons and Property ( 1 92 8 ) ,  p. 29 1 ; Dickinson, 
Administrative Justice, p. 29 2. 
88 Dickinson, article, So U. Pa. L. Rev. 1055 at 1 059, 1 063. 
89 This does not involve the constitutionality of the enabling statute as such, 
but the constitutional propriety of its application to a given situation. 
Dickinson, article, 8o U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 055 at 1068.  
'" Dickinson, Administrative Justice, pp. 3 1 0-3 1 2 ;  article, 8o U. Pa. L. Rev. 
1 055  at 1 067. Professor Dickinson points out the relation between the method 
of review (certiorari as compared with collateral damage suits) and its scope. 
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facts" is more pronounced. In the now classic Ben A von case, 41 
which was concerned with confiscation as a question of due 
process, the United States Supreme Court indicated that where 
constitutional issues are involved the court must form an in­
dependent judgment from the record made before the ad­
ministrative agency.42 Finally, Crowell v. Benson/3 equally 
well known because of its enigmatic potentialities, went still 
further, requiring a trial de novo "for the final determination 
of the existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of the 
constitutional rights of the citizen depend."44 Thus the courts, 
although they have refrained from doing so extensively/5 
may in their discretion subordinate administrative finality 
whenever such "fundamental or jurisdictional facts"46 are 
Ill lSSUe. 
41 Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, ( 192o) 253  U. S. 287. 
42 See also St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, ( 1 936) 298  U. S. 3 8, 
and Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. United States, ( 1936) 298 U. S. 349• 
'" ( 1 932)  285  U. S. 22, Dickinson, article, 8o U. Pa. L. Rev. I OS5. See 
also Wood Towing Corp. v. Parker, (C. C. A. 4th, 1 935) 76 F. (2d) 770, 
and Borax Consolidated v. Los Angeles, ( 1 935) 296 U. S. 1 0 ;  cf. Shields v. 
Utah Idaho Central R. Co., ( 1 938)  305 U. S. 1 77, noted in 39 Col. L. Rev. 
( 1 939) 693· 
.. Crowell v. Benson, ( 1 932)  285 U. S. 2.2. at 56. The full passage is as 
follows : "In relation to these basic facts, the question is not the ordinary 
one as to the propriety of provision for administrative determinations. Nor 
have we simply the question of due process in relation to notice and hearing. 
It is rather a question of the appropriate maintenance of the Federal judicial 
power in requiring the observance of constitutional restrictions. It is the ques­
tion whether the Congress may substitute for constitutional courts, in which the 
judicial power of the United States is vested, an administrative agency-in 
this instance a single deputy commissioner--for the final determination of the 
existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of the constitutional rights 
of the citizen depend. The recognition of the utility and convenience of ad­
ministrative agencies for the investigation and finding of facts within their 
proper province, and the support of their authorized action, does not require 
the conclusion that there is no limitation of their use, and that the Congress 
could completely oust the courts of all determinations of fact by vesting the 
authority to make them with finality in its own instrumentalities or in the 
Executive Department. That would be to sap the judicial power as it exists 
under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a government of bureaucratic 
character alien to our system, wherever fundamental rights depend, as not 
infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, and finality as to facts becomes 
in effect finality in law." 
411 See the note in 39 Col. L. Rev. ( 1 939)  693. 
"' Crowell v. Benson, ( 1 932) 285 U. S. 22  at 63. 
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Administrative Law Reforms 
The discretionary element in both the exhaustion and the 
finality doctrines must be kept well in mind if proposed ad­
ministrative law reforms in this country are to be intelligently 
appraised. Any legislative attempts to enlarge, or even to fix, 
the circumference of administrative autonomy is hemmed in 
by judicial conceptions of basic constitutional principles. Leg­
islation which transcends the indicated limits will escape a 
declaration of unconstitutionality only if it is susceptible of 
an interpretation that will neutralize those provisions not in 
harmony with the announced principles. It must also be ob­
served that the utility of proposals tending to strengthen 
rather than to curtail court control of the administrative may 
run afoul of the same barriers. The defunct Logan Bill/1 first 
sponsored 48 and later abandoned 49 by the American Bar As­
sociation, embodied a scheme for the creation of a federal 
administrative court or, as it was later termed, "a consolida­
tion of existing legislative courts."50 This organism, to be 
composed of trial and appellate divisions and nominally in­
tended "for the gradual segregation of judicial functions now 
exercised by federal administrative agencies,"51 would ac­
tually have adjudicated controversies arising from adminis­
trative action. Being a legislative court, it would have had the 
power, not enjoyed by the constitutional courts, to pass on 
administrative questions. 52 Assuming that the personnel of 
this tribunal would have been selected with a view to ad­
ministrative qualifications and that through its routine the 
court would in any case have soon developed into an expert 
•• S. 3787  and H. R. 1 2 297, 74th Cong., 2d sess. ( 1936) • 
.. 6 1  Rep. A. B. A. ( 1936) 720 at 76o. 
49 62 Rep. A. B. A. ( 1937)  789 at 8os. 
00 6 2  Rep. A. B. A. ( 1937)  789 at 8os. 
01 6 1 Rep. A. B. A. ( 1 93 6) 720, recommendation 2 (a) • 
.. Supra, note 1 1 .  
ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 73 
body, the net gain would still have been disproportioned to 
the effort spent. For while all disputes to come before the 
court would have received specialized treatment, the limita­
tive interpretations of the exhaustion and finality principles 
in an indeterminate number of instances would have reduced 
the effect of the scheme to hardly more than a multiplication 
of available appeals. Viewed in this light, at least the ultimate 
object of one feature of the new Administrative Law Bill/13 
which has not fared well with the critics, 54 deserves some 
credit. 55 Section 4 of the bill provides for intra-agency review 
by specially organized review boards whose personnel would 
be recruited from within each agency. The institution of 
hierarchic appeals in the case of all administrative agencies is 
indispensable to an integrated administrative process and con­
tributes substantially to the respect which administrative com­
petence should and can command.36 
However, no legislative proposals nor new designs for the 
judicial or administrative apparatus are of themselves suf­
ficient to insure the best possible relationship between the two 
departments of government. The problem is not merely one 
of mechanics ; it is also one of attitudes. In this country ad­
ministrative autonomy, because of constitutional conceptions, .. . 
is to a large extent dependent upon judicial self-restraint. It 
is important, therefore, that this restraint should be carried to 
the point where the interplay of adjudication and adminis-
"' S. 9 I S, H. R. 4136, 76th Cong., Ist sess. ( I939) .  See McGuire, "The 
American Bar Association's Administrative Law Bill," I La. L. Rev. (I939) 
sso. See also infra, chaps. VI, XI. 
.. Jaretzki, "The Administrative Law Bill : Unsound and Unworkable," 2. 
La. L. Rev. ( I 940) 194 ; Symposium, "American Bar Association's Adminis­
trative Law Bill," 34 Ill. L. Rev. (I94o) 64I ; see also Jaffe, "Invective and 
Investigation in Administrative Law," 52. Harv. L. Rev. ( I 9 3 9) 12.01 at 
u z s-u J2.. 
"" The procedural and technical defects of section 4 are fully discussed by 
Professor McAllister in his contribution, "Administrative Adjudication and 
Judicial Review," to the Symposium in 34 Ill. L. Rev. 64I at 68o, and by Mr. 
Jaretzki in the article in 2. La. L. Rev. 194 at J u-3 IS· 
"" Cf. Jaffe's article, 51  Harv. L. Rev. uoi at uz7. 
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tration becomes cooperative rather than competitive. To this 
end "we must learn, as quickly as we may, how to make popu­
lar government at once responsible, capable, and just."57 
Manifestly, traditional prejudice against administrative ac­
tivity, born of a habit of thinking, is most apt to recede in the 
proportion that the tasks assigned to the administrative are 
customarily well done.58 Consequently the constant supply 
of adequately trained personnel 59 to take over those tasks is 
essential, and a critical glance at the law schools, in which a 
large number of our public servants receive their prepara­
tion, is pertinent. Philosophically there may be no funda­
mental distinction between private law and public law. 
However, in our law schools, which are primarily geared to 
preparation for immediate practical tasks, the differentiation of 
private and public law courses in the curriculum is in need of 
greater emphasis. A better integration of the public law 
courses would be of benefit to our future public servants. 
•• Fuchs, "Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law 
Theory," 47 Yale L. 1. (1938)  5 3 8  at 576. ' .,. Landis, The Administrative Process, pp. 143-144· Cf. Cooper, "Admin­
istrative Justice and the Role of Discretion," 47 Yale L. J. ( 1 938)  577  at 6o1 .  
111 See the proposal of the American Bar Association concerning "A Yearly 
Clinic to Study Administrative Processes," 62 Rep. A .  B. A .  ( 1 937)  789  
at  8o1 ; cf. Ballantine, "Administrative Agencies and the Law," 24 A. B.  A. J. 
(1938)  1 09· 
PART III 
THE REVIEW POWERS 
OF THE 
ORDINARY COURTS IN FRANCE 
CHAPTER VI 
Review of Administrative Regulations 
IN FRANCE, under the principle of differentiated agencies, a system has evolved which sanctions adminis­trative finality in all matters of administrative concern, 
and the sanction extends to actual administration, as well as to 
the adjudication of ensuing controversies. Nevertheless, a 
mere summary conclusion that all matters not specifically in­
terpreted to have administrative content are cognizable by the 
ordinary courts would fall far short of an accurate appraisal of 
the French administrative system. Judicial authority in re­
gard to administrative action at certain points has always as­
serted itself and has not been content with concessions of 
jurisdiction. These assertions indicate areas in which public 
and private interests overlap and compete and where the 
actual review powers of the ordinary courts of France assume 
a familiar significance. 
A. THE QUESTION OF THE LEGALITY OF REGULATIONS 
Despite the firm language of the enactments prohibiting 
judicial interference with administration/ there have been 
read into the differentiation of agencies nonstatutory excep­
tions which actually permit the ordinary courts of France to 
control administrative action to some extent. This power of 
the civil courts, which generally rests upon illegality, varies 
in scope with the nature of the ace before them, and especially 
in the case of administrative regulations it has been subject 
to fluctuating limitations. 
Administrative regulations result from the exercise of the 
power of administrative agencies to make rules and to adopt 
1 See p. 1 31 supra. 
• See Duguit, Traiti de droit constitutionnel, zd ed. { 1 92 1 ) 1  Vol. z, p. z63 fi. 
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ordinances.3 Such regulations have been defined as "obliga­
tory rules imposed by a public agency other than the legis­
lature."4 For a long time it has been conceded that the courts 
have power not only to interpret these regulations but also 
to inquire into their legality. 5 Likewise, a duty on the part of 
the courts to exercise these powers has been recognized. 6 His­
torically, the acknowledged jurisdiction of the ordinary courts 
in regard to the interpretation and legality of administrative 
regulations has its origin in a famous statutory exception to 
J( the rule prohibiting the judicial agencies from obstructing the 
actes de la puissance publique. By virtue of the Penal Code 
of 1 832/ the judicial courts were permitted to interpret and 
to verify the legality of certain regulations before they pro­
ceeded to impose the penalties provided for their transgres-
a Aucoc, Con/irences sur /'administration et le droit administratif, 3d ed. 
(r 8 85) ,  Vol. r, p. I Z3 ff. ; Ducrocq, Cours de droit administratif, 7th ed. 
( 1 897) ,  Vol. r, pp. 81 ff., 1 7 8  ff. ; Moreau, Le reglement administratif ( 1 9oz) ; 
Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif, roth ed. ( 1 9.z r ) ,  p. 6o ff., nth ed. 
( 1933) ,  p. 555 ;  Bertkilemy, Traite elimentaire de droit administratif, 1 3 th 
ed. ( 1933) ,  p. ur  ff. ; Esmein, Eliments de droit constitutionnel, franfais et 
compare, 7th ed. ( r 9 Z I ) ,  Vol. r ,  pp. 536, 537, Vol. 2, p. 75  ff. ; Duguit Traite, 
Vol. 2, p. 1 82 ff. ; Duguit, Law in the Modern State, English translation ( 1 9 1 9 ) ,  
p .  79 ff. ; Bannard, Precis de droit administratif ( 1 9 35 ) ,  p .  246 ; Waline, 
Manuel elimentaire de droit administratif ( 1936),  p. 290 ff. 
• Moreau, p. 2. 
• Aucoc, Vol. r ,  p. 499 ff. ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 291 ; Moreau, p. z6o ; Esmein, 
Droit constitutionnel, Vol. r ,  pp. 536, 537 ; Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, pp. 49 
ff., 72 1 ; Dareste, Les voies de recours contre les actes de la puissance publique 
( 1 9 14) , pp. 1 65, r 67 j  Hauriou, Precis, roth ed., p. 69, 1 2th ed., p. 5 6 8 ;  
Appleton, Traite elimentaire du contentieux administratif (1 927) ,  p. 1 05 ff. ; 
cf. Jeze, Les principes geniraux du droit administratif, 3d ed. ( 1 925) ,  p. 3 78. 
• Ducrocq, Vol. r, p. 84:  "The principle that regulations are subject to the 
limitations of the laws has received the double sanction of the recourse to 
the Conseil d'Etat for excess of power, and the obligation of the judicial au­
thorities not to apply regulations until after having verified their legality .... 
(Italics added.) See also Moreau, p. 26 1 ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 2, p. 1 89, Vol. 3, 
p. 49 ; Dareste, p. 1 65, note 3, citing note by Sarrut, D. 1 89 7·2.2 2 5 ;  Apple­
ton, p. 1 05. 
• Code penal, art. 471 ,  § 1 5, confers upon the judicial courts power to 
convict, and subject to the penalties provided, "those who shall have offended 
._ against regulations lawfully made by administrative agencies, and those who 
shall not have complied with regulations or orders issued by municipalities." 
(Italics added.) 
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sion. 8 However, even before the enactment of this statute, 
and as far back as I 8 I o, the Cour de cassation insisted upon 
this right of the courts to inquire into administrative regula­
tions.9 In doing so the courts carefully avoided asserting the� 
power to annul regulations or to interpose direct obstacles to 
the execution of administrative orders. But they took the 
position that they must refuse any aid in the execution of un­
lawful orders because they had authority to grant judicial 
enforcement only where it served the execution of laws. Con­
sequently, before they could intervene on behalf of an ad­
ministrative agency they were bound to ascertain whether or 
not the act to be enforced was legal and was therefore law.10 . 
Thus, in 1 830, a civil court11 refused to apply an administra­
tive regulation on the ground that "ordinances may not be 
issued except for the purpose of executing or maintaining the 
laws, and that the regulation before it would, on the contrary, 
have the effect of violating a statute." The regulation in­
volved attempted to suspend the freedom of the press.12 Giv­
ing due consideration to this attitude of the judicial courts, 
it is not surprising that the enactment of 1 83 2  came to be in­
terpreted extensively at once, and that the power of the courts 
to refuse to enforce police regulations which they deemed il-
8 Laferriere, Traite de la juridiction administrative et des recours con­
tentieux, zd ed. ( I 896) , Vol. I, p. 480 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traite, pp. uo4-
I I  o6;  Reg lade, "L'Exception d'illegalite en France," 40 R. D. P. (I 9z 3 )  
393 ; Waline, Manuel, p. Z95· 
0 Laferriere, Vol. I ,  pp. 48 I-48z, and the cases cited in the note on p. 48z ; 
Berthelemy, Traite, p. uos ;  Moreau, pp. z6o-z6I ,  note 6, and cases cited 
there ; Garner, "Judicial Control of Administrative and Legislative Acts in 
France," 9 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. ( I 9 1 5) 6 3 7 ;  Garner, "French Administrative 
Law," 33  Yale L. J. (I 9Z4) 597· 
10 See the opinion of the commissaire du gouvernement in the Septfonds 
case (infra, note 4 I ) ,  S. I 9Z3 ·3·49, D. I 9Z4·3·4I ,  and the accompanying note 
by Hattriou, La jurisprudence administrative ( I9Z9),  Vol I ,  pp. so, sz, 53· 
11 The Tribunal de commerce de la Seine ; see H auriou, ibid., p. 53. 
'" The ordinance of July zs, I 83o, was held to violate the law of July I 8, 
I 8z8, regulating the freedom of the press. 
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legal13 was, for a time, held to extend to all types of adminis­
trative regulations. The statute indeed was held to express 
nothing more than the legislative sanction of a "pre-existing 
and superior rule." 14 
B. THE INTRINSIC NATURE OF REGULATIONS 
It was inevitable that the doctrine of the differentiation of 
administrative and judicial agencies should lead to virtually 
insoluble difficulties at this juncture. Actually, it complicated 
the question of jurisdiction over regulations to a degree which, 
up to very recent times, precluded reconciliation of the re­
spective attitudes of the two sets of courts. 15 This condition 
was the result of mutual insistence that the application of the 
doctrine of differentiated agencies depended upon the intrin­
sic nature of the rule-making function and of administrative 
regulations, 16 a matter itself in dispute. 
The theory of delegated legislation has been quite gen­
erally rejected by modern French writers.17 On the other 
hand, the legislative character of administrative regulations 
13 Laferriere, Vol. I, pp. 48I ,  483 ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 5 I .  
:u Ducrocq, Vol. 3 ,  p .  292. See also Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3 ,  p .  5 2 .  Appleton, pp. 
I 06-I 07 {and cases cited) : "At this point judicial doctrine began to see in 
the implied power of the judicial tribunals under art. 4 7 I, § I  5 • • • but 
an individual application of a general, presupposed rule, according to which 
the courts may interpret regulatory acts and test their legality in connection 
with controversies over which they have jurisdiction." (Italics added.) The 
entire development is set out in the opinion of Commissaire Matter in the 
Septfonds case and in Hauriou's accompanying note (see note 1 0, supra) . 
10 Bannard, Precis, p. I 62 ;  Appleton, Supp., pp. I 5-I 6. 
lB Cf. Waline, Manuel, p. 7 ;  Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. I 82 ff. 
17 Esmein, Droit constitutionnel, Vol. 2, p. 8 I ; Duguit, Manuel de droit 
constitutionnel, 3d ed. ( I 9 I 8 ) ,  p. 506 ; cf. Duguit, Traite, Vol. 2, p. 4I4, 
Vol. 3> p. I44 ;  Hauriou, Precis, I oth ed., pp. 6I ,  68, 1 2th ed., pp. ss6, 567, 
5 76 ;  Moreau, p. I 64 ff. ; Reglade, 40 R. D. P. at 403 ; Berthilemy, Traite, 
pp. I 24-1 2 5 ;  Jeze, Principes, p. 3 7 8  ff. Cf. Dareste, p. I 65, and a case cited 
there decided by the criminal division of the Cour de cassation in I 845, using 
this language : "the ordinance of May 2, I 84I, being but the result of a delega-
, _  tion of legislative power, was essentially in the nature of a law and its inter­
pretation belongs to the ordinary courts." 
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persists in being partly acknowledged, although it is the sub­
ject of much controversy.18 The disputable argument has been 
advanced that the character of regulations is nonlegislative 
because of the sole fact that they emanate from agencies other 
than the legislature. But neither the assimilation nor the dis­
tinction of the two types of general rules resulting from legis­
lation and from rule-making could contribute materially to 
the clarification of the complex situation confronting courts 
and theorists. If Duguit's analysis, unquestionably correct in 
its emphasis upon the two-fold quality of the regulation, is 
accepted, it is possible to avoid objection to the power of the 
courts to interpret general administrative rules. For the con-:J 
stitutional prohibition contemplated administrative acts only, - ­
not legislative acts; and the interpretation of legislative acts, J. 
by whomever promulgated, is certainly the very essence of 
This interesting problem cannot be considered except by way of the most 
perfunctory allusion, because of the proportions it has assumed in the discus­
sions of both continental and Anglo-American writings. See, e.g., Jacoby, 
"Delegation of Powers and Judicial Review: A Study in Comparative Law," 
36 Col. L. Rev. ( 1 936) 8 7 1 ; Jellinek, Gesetz und Verordnung ( r 8 87) ; Mayer, 
Deutsches Verwaltungsrecht, 2d ed. ( 1 9 14),  Vol. r ,  pp. 65, 68-70. 
18 The principal exponent in France of the theory of intrinsic identity of laws 
and regulations is Duguit; see Traite, Vol. 2, pp. r 82, r 89, Vol. 3, pp. 49 ff., 
72 1 .  In the same sense, Moreau, p. 6o ; Reglade, 40 R. D. P. at 401 ; Bannard, 
Precis, p. 247 ; Jeze, Principes, p. 28. For the contrary view, see among others, 
Hauriou, Precis, roth ed., p. 54 ff. [However, the insistence upon a fundamental 
difference is no longer to be found in the r zth edition (p. 563 ff.) and one 
may rather conclude that the similarity is implicitly admitted.] ; Berthilemy, 
Traite, p. 1 22 ff. ; Appleton, p. r o8. 
The courts seem to favor the theory that although formally regulations are ­
administrative they bear a notable resemblance to the laws. See, e. g., Compagnie 
generale de navigation v. Grandperrin, (Cass.) D. r 9o8.r .76, holding that 
the judicial agencies could interpret a regulation concerning river navigation 
because it was not an "individual and special administrative act" but a 
regulatory ordinance made under the police power conferred upon the ad­
ministrative by law, and therefore "partaking of the character of a law." 
Similarly the same court, in Guillou v. Prefet de la Seine [S. 1 9 1 8-1 9 1 9. 1 . 1 94 
at 1 95, cited by Duguit, Traite, Vol. 2, p. 1 90, Vol. 3, pp. 7 2 1-722 ; see the 
note in 34 R. D. P. ( 1 9 1 7 ) ,  p. 6zo], said that the "regulations • • •  do 
not constitute special and individual administrative acts . . • but general 
provisions made by virtue of the rule-making power of the administration, 
which consequently partake of the character of the laws." The same language 
was employed by the Tribunal des conflits in the Septfonds case, infra, note 41 .  
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the judicial function.19 Conversely, the remaining adminis­
- trative quality of regulations would still prevent the judicial 
courts from ascertaining their legality as a condition prece­
dent to their application. 
Admittedly the argument involved is highly formalistic. 
Nevertheless it deserves to be elaborated further, if only to 
demonstrate the complications into which the seemingly well­
defined doctrine of differentiated agencies has led. While it 
has not been difficult to maintain that, due to their legislative 
aspect, regulations may be interpreted by the ordinary courts 
without violating the principle of judicial noninterference,20 
the recognition of a power in those courts to inquire into their 
legality has necessitated an exception to the doctrine of dif­
ferentiation.21 For, the nullification incident to declarations 
of illegality most clearly constitutes interference with . ad­
ministration. But the impediment of the doctrine can be 
--avoided by disregarding the administrative origin of regula­
tions, and by deriving from their legislative character not 
only the power and duty of the courts to interpret them, but 
also the power to refuse application for illegality.22 In the 
lJl Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 2, p. I 89, Vol. 3, pp. 49, 7 2 I .  
20 Ibid., Vol. 3 ,  pp. 5o-sz.  
"' Ibid. p. 52 ; Duguit insists that this exception, originally statutory and 
limited to one specific type of ordinance (art. 4 7 I, § I 5, Code Penal, supra, 
note 7) , came to be given general scope "par la force 'meme des chases.' " 
22 See the note by Sarrut accompanying the decision in Raoulx v. Gallet, D. 
I 8 9 7.2.225 at 2 2 6 :2 :  "The ordinary courts have a right to interpret these 
\ regulatory decrees ; since they are in the nature of laws there is no violation 
of the principle of the separation of powers. . . • The ordinary courts 
may, and are even required to, verify the legality of these regulatory decrees, 
that is, they must inquire whether the chief executive did not exceed his delega­
tion, and whether he observed the form and other requirements imposed by 
law. For in doing so, far from exercising an improper control over the law 
itself . . . they [the courts] on the contrary cause the text and spirit 
of the law to be protected in regard to the act which the law authorized the 
tchief executive to accomplish within designated limits." (Quoted by Dareste, 
--p. I 6 5, note 3.) 
See also Ducrocq, Vol. I ,  p. 84, Vol. 3, p. 2�1 ; cf. Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 26, 
note r ,  
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very case23 repeatedly referred to by Duguit, decided upon­
the report of an outstanding jurist of the day/4 the court said 
verbatim : "for that reason [that regulations partake of the 
nature of laws] 25 it is for the judicial authorities . . . to test 
their legality and to interpret their meaning." On the other 
hand, the power to declare regulations illegal has also been 
defended on the ground that it is an integral part of the ju­
dicial function, whether exercised by the administrative or the 
ordinary courts, and therefore is not dependent upon the in­
trinsic nature of regulations. Thus Professor Hauriou very 
interestingly has referred to the principle of the "supremacy 
of the law" insisting that every court must be able to refuse 
to apply regulations which are illegaP6 
-
"" Guillou v. Prefet, S. I 9 I 8-I 9 I 9. 1 . 1 94, cited supra, note 1 8  . 
.. Ambroise Colin ; see Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 7 2 2 ;  note, 34 R. D. P. 
( 1 9 1 7) 623.  
"" See note 1 8, supra . 
.. Hauriou, Precis, Ioth ed., p. 69 (see 1 2th ed., p. s68) ; cf. Appleton, 
p. 1 09. As far as the differentiation of agencies is concerned, Hauriou, while 
finding nothing in the relevant statutes in the way of this power of the ordinary 
courts, considered the precept displaced by the more important rule that "le 
juge de /'action doit etre juge de l'exception.'' See Hauriou, Jurisprudence, 
Vol. 1 ,  p. 6o (note under the Septfonds case) and Precis, 1 2th ed., p. 568. .. 
In the 1 oth edition of his Precis (p. ss) Hauriou circuitously argued that 1 
administrative regulations "are not laws" for "they can be declared illegal.'' 
It would seem, however, that the existence or nonexistence of a power in the 
courts to make declarations of illegality depends upon the constitution rather 
than upon the nature of the impeached act. Cf. Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 2, p. 1 9 3 1  
but see Berthilemy, Traite, p .  1 2 3 ,  note 1 ,  interpreting the Guillou decision, 
supra, notes 1 8  and 23, as not assimilating regulations to laws, "because it, 
affirms the right of the courts to inquire into their legality.'' _J 
On the absence of judicial authority in France to declare parliamentary laws :-:·· 
illegal, see : Laferriere, Vol. 1, p. 483 ;  Moreau, p. 263, note t ;  Dareste, p. I 63, 
note 1 ;  Esmein, Droit constitutionnel, Vol. I ,  p. 563 ; Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 2, 
p. I 9 3 1  Duguit, Etudes de droit public ( 1903) Vol. 2, p. 520 ff. See also Duez, 
"Le controle j uridictionnel de la constitutionnalite des lois en France," in 
Melanges Maurice Hauriou ( I 929),  p. 2 I I  ff., disapproving contemporary 
efforts to vest the courts with power to question the constitutionality of the 
acts of the legislature ; also the note in 53 R. D. P. ( 1 936) 670 ff., concern­
ing two recent decisions of the Conseil d'Etat [Arrighi and Coudert, Rec. 
1 9 36.966, S. I937·3·33> 54 R. D. P. ( 1 937)  3 70]. Cf. Waline, Manuel, p. 7• 
See also Ducrocq, Vol. I,  p. I 9, as to the former power of the Senate to deter­
mine the constitutionality of laws. 
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C. EFFECTS AND RATIONALE OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
ORDINARY COURTS OVER REGULATORY ACTS 
In view of the doctrine of differentiation of agencies, con­
siderable emphasis has been placed upon the fact that a judicial 
declaration of the illegality of a regulation is but a refusal to 
apply the regulation in a specific instance, and amounts in no 
way to an annulment.27 Since annulment can be obtained only 
through the administrative jurisdiction, i. e., the Conseil 
d'Etat, 28 a regulation stigmatized as illegal by an ordinary 
court nevertheless continues in force. Consequently, so long 
as an administrative agency does not see fit to revoke a given 
regulation, or so long as the regulation has not been annulled 
by the Conseil d'Etat upon a recourse for excess of power, each 
successive litigant whose right of action or defense depends 
upon the invalidity of the same regulation must renew the 
collateral attack. This circumstance seemed to open one more 
avenue of escape from the confusion which necessarily sur­
rounded all efforts to harmonize the power of the ordinary 
courts over the quasi-legislative acts of the administrative 
with the principle of noninterference. The argument was 
made29 that the statutory provisions embodying the principle 
must be given a practical interpretation to the effect that 
(a) every governmental agency ought to be left to fulfill its 
mission with absolute freedom, (b) every act by which one 
agency encroaches upon the freedom of action of another 
should be deemed void. Both of these rules were supposed to 
justify the contested review powers of the courts. First, with­
out these powers .the courts could not freely perform their 
adjudicating functions, and secondly, in pronouncing regula-
"' Laferriere, Vol. I ,  p. 504 ;  Ducrocq, Vol. I ,  pp. 84-85, Vol. 3, p. 292 ;  
Moreau, pp. 263, 265-266 ; Dareste, p. I69  (note particularly the interesting 
analysis of authorities in note I ) ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, pp. so, 722 ; Reglade, 
40 R. D. P. at 4 I6  :ff. ;  Hattriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. I ,  p. 59 ; .Appleton, p. I I o. 
28 Supra, chap. III. 
29 Moreau, p. 263. 
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tory orders illegal the ordinary courts did not encroach upon 
the administrative sphere of action since they merely refused 
to give a concurrence to which the particular administrative 
acts were not entitled.30 But even though this theory pre­
tends to break with the "obscure notion"31 of the traditional 
differentiation of agencies, the substituted "clear notion" of 
"the relative independence of the different agencies"32 pre­
sents little more than a change of argument and rationaliza­
tion. 
The fact that an administrative regulation remains intact 
notwithstanding a judicial declaration of illegality is com­
paratively unimportant. Consistent refusal by the highest ju­
dicial tribunal to apply a regulation certainly may become 
an effective means of forcing an administrative agency to re­
peal or to amend its act. 33 The administrative department can 
enforce its regulations manu militari only in exceptional cir­
cumstances ; ordinarily it is dependent upon judicial ma­
chinery for the enforcement of its rules and orders. 34 Except · ·­
in case of urgency35 the ordinary courts were thus actually 
placed in a position where they could exercise a certain control 
over the policies of the administration. 36 This result was not a 
desirable one in all respects, particularly because it could lead 
to the anomalous situation where a regulation declared illegal 
by one of the ordinary courts was treated as valid and ap­
plicable by the administrative courts. 37 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
80 Ibid • 
.. Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. so • 
.. Infra, chap. X, subdivision B. 
85 Infra, chap X, p. 1 69 ff. 
18 Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p. 63 ; d. Berthelemy, "De l'exercice de 
la souverainete par l'autorite administrative," 2 1  R. D. P. ( 1 904) 2.09 at : r.z i ­
:r.:u.  Moreau (p. 2.63) evidently underestimated the potential effects of the 
power of the ordinary courts in this respect. 
• See Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 504 ff. 
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Obviously the problem of the reviewability of adminis­
trative regulations was fraught with inconsistencies. Professor 
Appleton in his treatise on administrative jurisdiction38 sug­
gested that the si�uation could be clarified only by a proper 
understanding of the doctrine of the separation of powers, 
which he maintained should be taken in a political rather than 
a strictly functional sense. Conceding the mixed legislative-
. administrative nature of regulations, he realized that the 
separation of powers as previously interpreted could only lead 
to an impasse. For, "if regulations are deemed to be laws, 
the ordinary courts cannot adjudge them illegal or refuse to 
apply them without violating the principle of the separation 
of powers and the law of August I 6-24, I 790, title 2, article 
I O ;  on the other hand, if regulations are looked upon as ad­
ministrative acts, the courts can no more test their legality 
because this would be to misconstrue the principle of the dif­
ferentiation of the judicial and administrative functions, pro­
/claimed by title 2, article I 3 of that statute."39 
D. THE SEPTFONDS CASE COMPROMISE 
During the time when legal writers searched for a more 
realistic basis, the judicial courts conservatively continued to 
predicate their review powers on the legislative quality of ad­
ministrative regulations. Many of the decisions of the Cour de 
cassation and of the lower courts contain assertions of the right 
to interpret and to declare illegal general acts on that ground. 40 
Not until I 923 did the Tribunal des conflits signify its dis-
.. Pp. 1 09-I IO. 
"" Ibid., p. 108 .  Cf. the opinion in the Septfonds case, D. I 9 Z4·3·4I at 44 
(VIII) ,  infra, note 41 .  
<O See the cases collected by Appleton, p.  1 07 ;  Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1 ,  
p. sz  ff. In one instance, Martin v.  Ville de Marseille, S. I 9 I 8-I9I9 . I ·73> the 
Cour de cassation seemed to deviate from a consistent line of decision, holding 
that the judicial courts could not interpret an ambiguous term in a municipal 
taxing statute. However, Duguit, (Traite, Vol. 3, p. so) considers the de­
cision merely an "accidental error." Cf. Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p. 54· 
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agreement with these holdings in the much discussed de­
cision in the case of Septfonds v. Chemins de fer du Midi.41 
The Tribunal adopted the opinion of Commissaire Matter, 
who argued the case for the government. After analyzing 
minutely the question which was before the court, the com­
missaire du gouvernement suggested the necessity of making 
a distinction between the power of the courts to interpret regu­
lations and the power to test their legality. The argument was 
founded exclusively upon the basic law42 which prohibits ­
the judicial agencies from "disturbing the operations of the 
administrative department." The commissaire concluded that 
interpretation which "follows, conforms to and applies" the 
regulation, does not constitute an interference, while "a decla­
ration of illegality and a refusal to apply it wipes out the 
regulation, and consequently interferes with the administra­
tive action."43 Consequently the power of the ordinary courts 
to interpret administrative rules was conceded and the right 
to determine the question of legality was denied. 
It is of interest to note that already in an earlier case44 the 
Tribunal des conflits seems to have attempted to create an ex­
ception to the rule by which the courts inquired into the legal­
ity of the administrative acts. That case involved a regulation 
issued by the military authorities in time of war and the 
Tribunal held the civil court bound by the regulation. The 
decision was severely criticized and it was insisted that not 
even the exigencies of the war could justify an "extension in 
the application of the principle of the differentiation of 
agencies." 45 
01 D. I 924.J.4I, S. I923 ·3·49 ; see Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. I ,  p. so ff. ; 
Precis, uth ed., p. s68 ; Appleton, p. I I I ,  Supp., p. I 6 ;  Berthilemy, Traite, 
p. I 24, note ; Bonnard, Precis, p. 1 62 ;  Waline, Manuel, p. 5 1 .· 
.. Law of Aug. 1 6-24, I 790, tit. 2, art. 1 3, supra, p. I 3, note 3 8 .  
48 D. 1 924·3·41 at 44 :2 (VIII) . 
" Chemins de fer du Nord v. Vion et fils, S. I 9 I 7.J . I ,  D. 1 9 1 6.3·57> de­
cided July 29, 1 9 1 6. 
415 See Reg lade, 40 R. D. P. at 406 ; Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p. 34 
ff., p. 5 7  and note, S. I 9 I 7·3 ·I ·  
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The doctrine of the Septfonds case reserving the question 
of legality for the administrative courts became the accepted 
rule after the Cour de cassation, in I 926/6 asserted once more 
the jurisdiction of the judicial courts over the legality of ad­
ministrative regulations. The subsequent adherence on the 
part of the judiciary to the Septfonds compromise is reflected 
in the case of Lamy v. Chemins de fer du Nord,41 decided by 
the Cour d'appel of Paris in I 930. 
E. CONCLUSION AND COMPARISON 
The rule announced by the Tribunal des conflits in the 
Septfonds case standing by itself seems to mark a return to a 
stricter interpretation of the differentiation · of agencies and 
the consequent curtailment of the scope of judicial review of 
administrative regulations. Such a development seems to be 
in harmony with the previously discussed trends in the di­
rection of autonomy in all essentially administrative matters. 
However, it would be a grave error to assume that the sequel 
of the Septfonds doctrine was a complete surrender by the 
judiciary of previously asserted power. The true import of 
the doctrine is indicated by the exceptions to which the rule is 
subject. These exceptions were carefully pointed out by the 
commissaire du gouvernement, although they were not in­
volved in the case.48 They were grouped under two separate 
categories, the first of which derives from express statutes. 
Most important is section I 5 of article 4 7 I of the penal code, 
interpreted to confer power on the judicial tribunals to verify 
the legality of all regulations imposing criminal penalties. 
Secondly, plenary jurisdiction over all matters of indirect 
taxation has been given to the civil courts. Of far greater 
significance, however, is the reference to certain nonstatutory 
"' Alamichel v. Ville de Vichy, S. I 9z6. I .z I 3, cited Bonnard, Precis, p. I 6z. 
•• Gaz. Pal. I 930.I .684. See the note there ; Appleton, Supp., p. I 6. 
48 D. I 9Z4.J.4I at 44 :z-45 : I .  
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exceptions comprised in the second group. The commissaire, 
citing various authorities/9 defended the theory that the or­
dinary courts could always determine whether an administra- . .  
tive agency had acted within its power in  issuing any regula­
tion affecting ( 1 ) personal liberty, and ( 2) personal status 
or property rights. 50 
That the Septfonds decision has not been understood to in­
augurate a sweeping change is very probably indicated by the 
fact that criticism has been confined to its procedural implica­
tions. It must be borne in mind that the abolition of judicial 
review of the legality of regulations is not synonymous with 
complete absence of court review. Ascertainment of legality, ·­
so far as affected by the Septfonds decision, has merely been 
remitted to the· exclusive jurisdiction of the administrative 
courts. Therefore, if a judicial court, called upon to apply an 
administrative regulation, is in doubt as to its legality, it must 
refer the issue to the Conseil d'Etat. 5.1 That this procedural -
complication was undesirable because of the additional ex­
pense and delay involved is evident.52 
'" D. I 9 24·3·4I at 45 : 1 .  
150 Infra, chap. IX, subdivision A. 
01 Prior to the Septfonds case the Conseil d'Etat not infrequently had to 
pass upon the legality of regulations which had been referred to it by lower 
judicial courts, even though the latter might have decided the issue themselves 
under art. 4 7 x, § 1 5 of the Code Penal (supra, note 7) .  See Reglade, 40 R. D. P. 
at 424; Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. x, p. 6o, Precis, uth ed., p. 568.  
Technically the issue of legality in these cases becomes what is known as 
a question prejudicielle. The doctrine of the questions prejudicielles through a 
system of declaratory judgments operates to keep intact the respective spheres of 
administrative and ordinary jurisdictions. Thus whenever the decision of a 
controversy properly before a court necessitates the determination of a question 
that may not be passed upon by that court, that question must be referred to 
the competent tribunal. See Laferriere, Vol. x, p. 492 ff. ; Appleton, p. 126  :ff. ;  
Hauriou, Precis, x oth ed., p. 8 77  :ff. ;  Bonnard, Precis, p .  1 59 :ff. ;  Waline, 
Manuel, p. 1 5 8  :ff. The courts will not allow a question prejudicielle obviously 
designed to delay judgment; cf. the conclusions (VIII) of the commissaire in 
the Septfonds case, D. 1 924.3.41 at 45· See the recent decisions of the Tribunal 
des conflits in Societe des forces motrices d'Arrens v. Pahu, and Durand v. 
Societe L'Energie electrique Rhone et Jura, D. 1 934·3·57 (6o) (and note by 
Prof. Pepy) , noted 52 R. D. P. ( 1 935) 329.  
a Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. I,  pp. S I-52, Precis, uth ed., P·  568,  note 
1 9 ;  Appleton, Supp., p. 1 6. 
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In the United States the separation of powers as originally 
conceived has been favorable to judicial control of the legality 
of the quasi-legislative acts of administrative agencies. Ad­
ministrative regulations are deemed to grow out of the ex­
ercise of delegated power, and the courts may invalidate the 
delegation by the legislature if it is too broad. 53 Morever, 
they may set aside the regulation if the administrative body 
in making it has exceeded the delegation.54 In the adjudica­
tion of controversies the courts have reserved to themselves 
the interpretation of regulations although weight is given to 
prior consistent administrative interpretation. 
The circumstance that American administrative law has 
been unencumbered by the difficulties accompanying the de­
velopment of the French droit administratif makes the simi­
larity of the net result of the two systems all the more impres­
sive. True, the French judiciary was finally limited to the 
interpretation of administrative regulations. However, the 
statutory exceptions, read in conjunction with the general doc­
trine that the legality of any general rule encroaching upon 
personal liberties or property rights is subject to judicial ap­
praisal, render the review powers of the French courts com­
parable, if not equal, to those of the constitutional courts in 
the United States. 
The proposal of the Administrative Law Bill 55 to vest the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
with power "to hear and determine whether any [ administra­
tive J rule . . . is in conflict with the Constitution of the 
"" Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, ( I 935) 293 U. S. 3 8 8 ;  A. L. A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, (I 935)  295 U. S. 495· Cf. Waline, Manuel, 
pp. 32  I-241 referring to certain extreme instances of legislative "abdication" 
in France during the period I 924-1935 .  
"' Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, ( 1 935) 296  U.  S .  I 76 • 
.. S. 9 1 5, H. R. 4236, 76th Cong., r st sess. ( 1939) ,  § 2 ;  62 Rep. A. B. A .  
( i 937)  789 at 8 1 6, 847 ; 63 Rep. A .  B .  A .  ( 1 938)  33 I  a t  3 34 ;  McGuire, 
"The American Bar Association's Administrative Law Bill," I La. L. Rev. 
( I 939) sso; Symposium, 34 Ill. L. Rev. ( 1940) 64I .  
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United States or the statute under which issued" would not 
affect the foregoing result. Nevertheless, for present com­
parative purposes the proposal is exceptionally noteworthy. 
It is not intended as a substitute for existing methods of ju­
dicial review of regulations in connection with actual con­
troversies. 56 But it provides a procedure for obtaining de­
claratory judgments on the validity of administrative rules. 57 
Since the federal constitutional courts, even under the De­
claratory Judgments Act,58 could not render such judgments, 
except in connection with a "case or controversy,"59 it must 
be assumed that the court of appeals would render such judg­
ments in its capacity as a legislative, or let us say an adminis­
trative, court. Thus administrative rules could be annulled 
upon the petition of private parties in precisely the same man­
ner in which the French Conseil d'Etat acts upon a recourse 
for excess of power. If, however, the petition fails and the 
rule is upheld, then it may again become subject to attack 
in connection with an ordinary action. 
However, it should not be overlooked that there has been 
a tendency to incorporate more drastic provisions for the ju­
dicial review of regulations into modern statutes, of which the 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1 93 8  60 is the most outstand-
"" Sec. 3 specifically provides that "nothing contained in this section shall 
prevent the determination of the validity or invalidity of any rule which may 
be involved in any suit or review of an administrative decision or order in 
any court of the United States as now or hereafter authorized by law." 
61 S. 9 1 5, sec. 3 :  "The court . • • shall have no power in the proceed­
ings except to render a declaratory judgment holding such rule legal and 
valid or holding it contrary to law and invalid." 
08 48 Stat. L. (r 934) 955, 2.8 U. S. C. ( 19 34) § 400. 
1111 Muskrat v. United States, ( r 9 r r )  2. 1 9  U. S. 346 ; Liberty Warehouse Co. 
v. Grannis, ( r 92.7) 2.73 U. S. 70 ; Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Association, 
( 1 92.8)  2. 7 7  u. s. 2.74· 
00 52.  Stat. L. ( 1 938) 1 040 ; z r  U. S. C. (Supp. 1 939) ,  § 301 et seq. See "The 
New Food, Drug and Cosmetic Legislation," 6 Law fs! Contem. Prob. ( 1 939) 
r ;  Fuchs, "The Formulation and Review of Regulations under the Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act," ibid. 43· 
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ing instance. Under this statute61 "any person who will be 
adversely affected" may obtain a review of the regulation in 
a United States Circuit Court of Appeals. These courts are 
given jurisdiction not only to "set it aside in whole or in 
part, temporarily or permanently," but also "if the Secretary 
[of Agriculture] refuses to issue, amend or repeal a regula­
tion . . .  [to] order [him] to take action, with respect to 
such regulation, in accordance with law."62 Provisions of 
this type seem to run so definitely counter to heretofore ac­
cepted notions of division of labor in the departments of 
government that the flagrant imposition of administrative 
functions upon federal courts can scarcely be expected to stand 
the test of constitutionality. Since they have not as yet been 
put to that test, it is very doubtful whether they should be 
considered as representative of the American administrative 
system. 
11 Z l  U. S. C. (Supp. 1939) ,  § 3 7 1  (£) . 
81 Ibid., § 3 7 1  (£) (3) . 
CHAPTER VII 
Jurisdiction Over Public Officers 
JURISDICTION of the ordinary French courts has been limited in regard to administrative regulations on the constitutional ground that they emanate from adminis­
trative bodies.1 As a rule2 acts of general application, even if 
illegal, retain their administrative immunity. So far as the 
judicial courts are concerned, they are not nullities until so 
declared by the administrative courts. Acts of individual ap­
plication,3 however, have not been accorded the same treat­
ment. In respect to these acts it has been held that certain 
kinds of illegality deprive them of their: administrative char­
acter, notwithstanding their administrative origin, so that 
controversies to which they give rise must be litigated in the 
ordinary courts. The classic instances with which the new 
regime administratif had to deal were official acts which fur­
nished the basis for actions ex delicto or quasi-ex delicto against 
administrative officials. The difficulties which at the outset 
grew out of these cases had an important bearing upon subse­
quent jurisdictional developments. 
1 Reference must again be made to the law of the 1 6th Fructidor, year III 
(Sept. z, 1 795) : "Defenses iteratives sont faites aux tribunaux de connaitre 
des actes d'administration de quelque espece qu'ils soient. • • . " See 
translation, supra, chap. I, note 3 8. 
• Septfonds v. Chemins de fer du Midi, S. 1 923-3 -49> D. 1 924·3·411 supra, 
chap. VI, note 4 1 .  
8 Continental writers have frequently given specific attention to  the dis­
tinction between acts of general and acts of limited application. See, e. g., 
Waline, "Observations sur la gradation des normes juridiques etablie par M. 
Carre de Malberg," 51 R. D. P. ( 1934) 521 at 539 ; Mayer, Deutsckel 
Verwaltungsreckt, zd ed. ( 1 9 14) ,  Vol. 1 1  pp. 84 ff., 95 ff. ; Bernatzik, 
Recktspreckung und materielle Recktskra/t (1886) ,  pp. 1 ff. 
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A. THE CONDITIONS AT THE TIME OF THE FRENCH 
REVOLUTION 
The new regime, solicitous to ward off interference by the 
judiciary with administrative objectives and policies, pro­
hibited not only judicial inquiry into administrative acts but 
also actions against administrative officials and agents on ac­
count of such acts.4 For it was apparent that without the second 
interdict the first might easily be circumvented. But even so, 
the problem to be solved was far too intricate to yield to these 
simple rules. 
The new order could not hope to succeed by discarding the 
institutions of the ancien regime in their entirety; nor did it 
attempt to do so. Certain traditions inevitably survived and 
served to qualify the content of the new doctrines and the 
meaning of the new labels. It was not difficult to oust the ju­
dicial courts from all participation in and control over ad­
ministrative action. On the other hand, to prohibit those 
courts from assuming jurisdiction over the persons of ad­
ministrative agents conflicted sharply with the fact that re­
dress of all delictual and quasi-delictual acts was available 
only in the ordinary courts. This limitation was itself due to 
the doctrine of the differentiation of agencies, which pre­
cluded the administrative from exercising jurisdiction over 
strictly judicial matters. 5 But it is well to bear in mind also 
that at the beginning the new administrative organism was 
not equipped with any machinery for the judicial disposition 
of complaints.6 The personal liability of public officers be­
came thus at once submerged in a vexing problem of juris­
diction. 
4 Statutes quoted supra, chap. I, note 3 8. 
• Art. 891 Constitution of the sth Fructidor, year III (Aug. :u, 1 795) .  
See supra, chap. I, note 40. 
1 See supra, chap. I, subdivision C. 
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In France, prior to and immediately following the Revo­
lution, 7 the maxim obtained that "the king can do no wrong."8 -­
Consequently suits for damages sustained on account of the 
acts of governmental agents could be directed only against 
those agents personally and had to be prosecuted in the ordi­
nary courts. But the political background of the French sys­
tem forced later developments to take a turn away from the 
earlier practice. In France the position of the judiciary prior 
to I 789 was extremely strong, although it was so in a political 
rather than in a constitutional sense. Prosecutions of adminis­
trative officials in the judicial courts often had political sig­
nificance, and the Crown frequently found it necessary to 
protect itself with evocations,9 that is, by withdrawing from 
the courts the jurisdiction which they had assumed over the 
person of public officers. The revolutionary legislators there­
fore felt that they were confronted with a double task. Pro­
vision had to be made for the personal liability of public pf­
ficials in order to provide an effective guarantee against arbi­
trary invasion of civil liberties.10 At the same time, it seemed 
necessary to protect administrative agents against mala fide 
actions which, as the experiences of the past taught, might in­
directly impair administrative efficiency. The personal liabil­
ity of public officers was originally sanctioned by article I 5 
of the Bill of Rights of I 789,11 and was reiterated in article 24 
7 Cf. Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif et de droit public, Ioth ed. 
( 1 9 2 1 ) ,  p. 367 . ;  Duguit, Traittf de droit constitutionnel, 2d ed. ( 1 92 3 ) ,  Vol. 
3, p. 262  :ff. (also the bibliography at p. 294) .  
8 Hauriou, supra, note 7 ,  referring to the Anglo-American conditions, sug­
gested that this principle can survive only in countries where "the courts are 
pervaded with the sense of their responsibility." Cf. Duguit, Etudes de droit 
public ( I903) ,  Vol. 2, p. 637. 
• Supra, pp. I x ,  25 ; cf. Laferriere, Traiti de la furidiction administrative 
et des recours contentieux, 2d ed. ( 1  896), Vol. I ,  p. 638, note I .  
10 Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, pp. 2 63-264 ; Ducrocq, Cours de droit adminis­
tratif, 7th ed. ( 1 897),  Vol. 3, p. 330. 
u "Sbciety has a right to demand that each public officer account for his 
official acts." Declaration of Rights of Aug. 2 6, I 789, art. I 51 quoted in 
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of the Bill of Rights of I 793.12 Regulation of criminal liabil­
ity was effected through specific sections of the criminal code, 13 
while civil liability for torts was derived from the broad 
language of article IJ82  of the civil code14 which provides 
that "Anything done by a person which causes damage to 
another obligates the person through whose fault the damage 
has occurred to make reparation." On the other hand, abuses 
of criminal prosecutions and civil actions against administra­
tive functionaries were first sought to be checked by a statute 
enacted in I 79015 which required the concurrence of the hier­
archic superior before a court could proceed to determine the 
personal liability of an official on account of an act done in the 
exercise of his official function. 
B. THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
AGENTS OF THE YEAR VIII16 
The incorporation in the constitution of the year VIII 17 
of the provisions of its article 7 5,18 requiring the consent of the 
Duguit, Traitl, Vol. 3, p. 264 ;  Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 30 ;  Jacquelin, Les 
principes dominants du contentieux administratif ( I  899),  p. 1 26. 
"' The security of society "cannot exist if the limits of the functions of 
the state are not clearly defined by law and if the personal liability of all 
functionaries is not assured." Declaration of Rights of May 29, I 793, art. 24, 
quoted by Duguit, Traitl, Vol. 3, p. 264. 
18 See Duguit, Traitl, Vol. 3, p. 267 .  
" See Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 I ; Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 364. 
ll! Law of 7-I4 October, 1 790 ; see also the similar provision of the law of 
Dec. I4, I 789, art. 6I ,  as to municipal officers. Laferriere, Vol. 1, p. 6 3 7 ;  
Ducrocq, Vol. 3 ,  p .  3 3 I ; Jacquelin, Principes, p .  1 2 6 ;  Appleton, Traite 
lllmentaire du contentieux administratif ( I927  ) ,  p. 20. This provision must 
be read together with the statutes enacting the differentiation of agencies and 
imposing forfeiture for nonobservance by the courts (supra, p. 1 3 ) .  
111 De Cormenin, Droit administratif, sth ed. ( I 84o) , Vol. 2 ,  p .  3 3 8  ff. ; 
Laferriere, Vol. 1, p. 637  ff. ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 32  ff. ; Jacquelin, Principes, 
p. 1 2 7  ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, 1 0th ed., pp. 367-368 ; Appleton, pp. 228-229 ; 
Bertkllemy, Traitl lllmentaire de droit administratif, 1 3th ed. ( I933) i  p. 
8s-&6. 
11 1 799-I 8oo. 
18 22 Frimaire, Year VIII (Dec. I 3, 1 799) : "Art. 75·  The agents of the gov­
ernment, other than the ministers, may not be prosecuted on account of acts related 
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Conseil d'Etat to prosecutions of administrative agents, did 
not establish a new principle. The enactment merely gave new 
emphasis to the necessity of protecting administrative agents 
and placed the power to authorize actions against them uni­
formly and exclusively19 in the hands of the highest adminis­
trative body. However, this article 7 5 became the basis of 
important developments which caused a great deal of dis­
pute and discussion because of their bearing upon both the 
scope of the differentiation of agencies and the extent of the 
personal liability of administrative functionaries. Correspond­
ing to the diverging attitudes toward the issues involved, in­
terpretation and appraisal of the effect of article 7 5, which 
remained in force until r 8 7o, fluctuated considerably.20 
In the case of Lefevre-Pontalis v. Cheronnet/1 decided in 
r 8 64, the Cour de cassation held that "the guarantee of art. 
7 5 is but the consequence of the fundamental principle of the 
separation of powers," and that "its only object is to insure 
independence of the administrative department from the ju­
diciary and to protect, not the accused person, but the admin­
istrative act."22 However, it is quite clear that the require­
ment of special authorization of suits against administrative 
agents was motivated by other equally forceful considera­
tions.23 At the beginning of the new regime the only remedy 
which a private party had to recover compensation for ad­
ministratively inflicted injuries was an action against the of-
to their functions, except in pursuance of a decision of the Conseil d'Etat. In -
that case the action must be prosecuted in the ordinary courts." 
"' There were nevertheless a few, though unimportant, exceptions. See 
Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 63 8 ;  Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 27. 
20 The life-span of the provision was somewhat of an anomalous phenomenon. 
Art. 7 5 continued to be applied as a strictly administrative rule, notwithstand­
ing its origin as a constitutional precept and notwithstanding the fact that 
several succeeding constitutions had not reenacted it. Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 332 ; 
Jacquelin, Principes, p. 129 ;  Appleton, p. :u8 ;  Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 85, note 
I .  Cf. de Cormenin, Vol. 2, Appendix, pp. 99-100. 
lll s. 1 864. 1 .248. 
mo In the same sense, de Cormenin, Vol. 2, p. 342. 
28 Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 8 7. 
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ficial. The potential intimidation of administrative agents, 
who were thought to be exposed not only to personal liability 
but also to prosecutions tainted with personal and political 
motives, had to be counterbalanced by a certain amount of 
protection. Even without the attempted differentiation of 
agencies, this seemed necessary in a country where deliberate 
judicial interference with administration was anticipated. 
Likewise the placement of a protective mechanism in the 
hands of the highest administrative body was more effective 
than a mere procedural device for the guidance of the courts. 
The latter, Hauriou24 suggested, would have been adequate 
only in a country with a "stronger and a more responsible 
judiciary" than that of France at the time. 
The amount of protection of officials from mala fide prose­
cutions actually afforded by article 7 5 can be gathered from 
its sanctions as well as from its practical operation. Whenever 
a criminal or civil action was instituted in a judicial tribunal 
to whose jurisdiction it normally belonged/11 the court was 
bound 26 to exercise its jurisdiction, unless the incriminated act 
was "related to an administrative function" within the mean­
ing of the constitutional provision. Whether or not this was 
the case the court determined for itself. 27 The administrative 
department had no authority to assert a conflict, since there 
was no dispute as to jurisdiction; only its exercise was sub­
jected to administrative consent.28 In view of these limita­
tions, the scope of article 7 5 could easily be overestimated.29 
"' Precis, roth ed., p. 3 67. 
211 Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 3 ·  
28 Ibid., p. 334, and cases cited. 
"' Ibid., p. 3 3 8 ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 2. 8 ;  Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p. 
368,  note 2.. 
"" Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3  7 ;  Jacquelin, Principes, pp. 12. 8-r 2.9. Art. 3 of an 
ordinance of June r,  I 8 2. 8 express! y prohibited conflicts. There was no occasion 
for the administrative to vindicate jurisdiction, and conversely the authoriza­
tion to be given by the Conseil d'Etat did not confer jurisdiction but merely 
removed a procedural obstacle to its exercise. Laferriere, Vol. r ,  pp. 63 8-63 8 .  
""' Cf. Ducrocq, Vol. 3 ,  p. 3 3 8 ; Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p. 368, note 2..  
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Nevertheless, the provision was implemented with sanctions 
which rendered it far more effective than was ultimately 
found desirable. The law of August I6-24, I 790,30 embody­
ing the differentiation of agencies, and also the criminal code31 
provided forfeiture and civic degradation for judicial officers 
who deliberately interfered with matters of administration by 
entertaining actions and executing judgments against admin­
istrative officers. 32 Furthermore, the criminal code33 imposed 
money fines for wilful violations of article 7 5. In fact, the 
cases in which the courts requested authorizations from the 
Conseil d'Etat were numerous,34 and the general consensus 
is that the constitutional provision was "scandalously -­
abused."35 According to statistics for the latter part of the 
period which ended in I 8 70, the number of authorizations by 
the Conseil was uniformly much lower than that of the re­
jections.86 This, however, contrasts sharply with the corre­
sponding figures for the years I 808 to I 8 I 3,  when the au­
thorizations far outnumbered refusals.37 It is in regard to 
this earlier period that de Cormenin spoke of the Conseil 
d'Etat as an advisory body "without favor and without hatred, 
and better suited than any other official body to protect at once 
80 Supra, p. 1 3, note 3 8. 
111 Art. u7 (2) , Code penal. 
82 Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 7 ·  
83 Art. 1 29.  Ducrocq, ibid. ; Hauriou, Precis, x oth ed., p .  3 6 7, note 3·  
"' See the tables of the Mises en jugement concluding each volume of the 
Recueil des arrets du conseil for the years 1 845 through 1 8 6 6 ;  see also the 
statistics given by De Cormenin, Vol. 2, p. 3 8 0  . 
.. Laferriere, Vol. x, p. 640 ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, pp. 3 3 8-3 9 ;  Jeze, 26 R. D. P. 
( 1 909) 263,  quoting from the conclusions of Commissaire du Gouvernement 
Tardieu in Girodet v. Morizot [D. 1 90 8.3.57 :3 ; S. 1 908.3 .8 1 ] ; Hauriou, 
Precis, x oth ed., p. 3 6 8 ; Waline, Manuel ilimentaire de droit administratif 
( 1 9 3 6) , p. 3 73 ·  
88 See Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 3 ·  It i s  difficult to reconcile the figures given 
by Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 2 8, for 1 852 to z 864 with the data referred to 
by Ducrocq ; the latter, however, seem to be more in accord with the tabula­
tions in the volumes of the Recueil des arrets (supra, note 3 4) for the same 
years. 
111 De Cormenin, Vol. 2, p. 3 8o : 1 22 7  authorizations, 3 05 rejections. 
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the governmental agents against private vengeance, and pri­
vate persons against arbitrary action of such agents."38 Later, 
when the situation reversed itself, proportionately the great­
est number of rejections involved civil actions against admin­
istrative functionaries,39 which do not seem to have been 
within the purview of article 75 at the time of its enactment.40 
The gist of article 7 5 of the constitution of the Year VII I  
lies in that its operation was limited to suits on account of "acts 
related to [official] functions."41 The limitation, as inter­
preted, attained an importance far beyond the immediate oc­
casion in so far as it rested on the fundamental distinction be­
tween faute personnelle and faute de service. Undoubtedly 
-bearing in mind the political environment of article 7 5-
there is some .significance in the fact that the interpretations of 
the limiting phrase subsequently relied upon are those con­
tained in the decisions of the judicial courts rather than in the 
mises en jugement of the Conseil d'Etat. The case most fre­
quently referred to is Lejevre-Pontalis v. Cheronnet/2 de-
as Ibid., pp. 339-40. 
89 Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 3 3 3 ; Jacquelin, Principes, pp. 1 2  7-1 2 8 ;  cf. the tables 
in the volumes of the Recueil des arrets covering the corresponding years . 
.. Jacquelin, p. 1 2 7 ;  Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p. 368, note 2 . 
... Supra, note r 8. 
42 S. r 864.1 .248 ; referred to by Laferriere, Vol. r ,  p. 6 39 ;  Ducrocq, Vol. 3 ,  
p .  334;  Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 28. Action was brought against the mayor 
of a town who in the course of duties performed in connection with an elec­
tion had publicly slandered the plaintiff. Defendant invoked the protection of 
art. 7 5 and was upheld both at the trial and upon appeal. The Cour de cassation 
reversed the lower courts. 
Laferriere, however, insists that the decision misconstrues the scope and in­
tent of art. 7 5, because of certain language which must be taken as dictum only 
and not essential to the definition of acts of administrative officers which are 
relatifs a leurs fonctions. The court prefaced the body of its decision by term­
ing art. 75  "a consequence of the separation of powers" (supra, at page 97) 
and "protecting not the inculpated person, but the administrative act." 
Earlier, in the matter of Regnault [S. r 846.1 .59o], the same court had 
found art. 7 5 to apply because delictual acts imputed to a public weigher were 
"related to the function." The officer in charge of a public weighing machine, 
after having performed his duty at the instance of the owner of a wagon, was 
requested to reweigh the wagon upon the intervention of the mayor. The 
weigher, taking offense, refused to reweigh and accompanied his refusal with 
verbal abuses, threats, and assault upon the mayor. These acts, having occurred 
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cided by the Cour de cassation in I 8 64. I t  held that for article 
7 5 to be applicable "it is not sufficient that the defendant be 
an administrative agent, nor that the incriminated acts occur 
during the performance of his duties," but that "it is essential 
that the acts are related to the function, in other words, that 
they form a part of the very function with which they are 
identified, and of which they constitute the execution, even 
though a malicious one." 
C. REPEAL OF THE "ADMINISTRATIVE GUARANTEE"­
INTERPRETATION-CONSEQUENCES 43 
The growing unpopularity of the protection of adminis­
trative agents under article 7 5 of the constitution of the Year 
VIII manifested itself through frequent attacks upon the 
provision in and out of parliament.44 Ultimately, pressure 
from liberal factions45 resulted in an assault upon its pro­
tracted existence46 through the abrogating text of the decree 
of September 1 9, I 870.47 However, the seemingly unambigu-
upon the demand made and in connection with the refusal to perform an act 
within official duties, were deemed related to the function. (Laferriere, loc. 
cit., contrasts this decision with that in the Cheronnet case as representing the 
correct doctrine.) 
48 Laferrih·e, Vol. r ,  p. 640 ff. ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, pp. 3 3 2, 339 ff. ; Jacquelin, 
Principes, p. 1 30 ff. ; Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3 ,  p. 291  ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, roth 
ed., p. 368  ff. ; Appleton, p. 229 ff. ; Berthilemy, Traite, p. 84 ff. ;  Waline, 
Manuel, p. 3 7 3  ff. 
•• Laferriere, Vol. r ,  p. 640 ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 332 ; Duguit; Traiti, Vol. 
J, pp. 290-29 1 ·  
'" Laferriere, loc. cit; Duguit, loc. cit. 
48 See note 20, supra. 
41 The provisional National Defense Government of r 87o, which was en­
dowed with virtually dictatorial powers, decreed : 
"Art. I .  Article 7 5 of the constitution of the year VIII is repealed. 
"Also repealed are all other provisions of general or special laws whose ob­
ject is to impede actions against officers of all classes. 
"Art. z. Provision shall hereafter be made for civil penalties which in the 
public interest may have to be imposed upon private persons instituting ill­
founded actions against funtionaries." 
This enactment in the form of a "decree-law" (decret-loi) ,  subsequently 
ratified in national convention, had all the legislative force of an act of Parlia-
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ous death sentence of the decree served only to prove the 
transmigratory powers of the substance of the ill-respected 
article 75· 
The language of the decree was indeed broad. All laws ob­
structing suits against administrative o:fficers48 were repealed. 
But the law of August I 6-24, I 790, which contained one of 
the sanctions of the former "administrative guarantee,"49 also 
gave statutory expression to the constitutional differentiation 
of the judicial and administrative agencies. Whether this law, 
together with other statutes depending upon it, was affected 
by the decree was therefore of the utmost importance. It must 
be remembered that the ouster of the ordinary courts from 
jurisdiction over matters pertaining or related to public ad­
ministration had never been acquiesced in unconditionally in 
all quarters. It is particularly interesting here to follow 
J acquelin's50 defense of his thesis that the decree of I 8 70 re­
pealed the differentiation of the two jurisdictions. To Jac­
quelin the intent of the decree was obvious. It reflected the 
ideas of the liberal party of the day. On September I 8, I 870 
the government appointed a commission which was to examine 
the question of suppressing the administrative courts. A favor­
able report was unanimously voted. On the following day, 
September I 8, the law abrogating article 7 5 of the constitu­
tion of the Y ear VIII was passed. This viewpoint that the leg­
islative intent behind the decree of I 8 70 was to remove any 
and all obstacles, with no solicitude for the maintenance of 
the differentiation of agencies, has at various times been 
forcibly defended. 51 The contrary attitude received its chief 
ment. Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 30.  Cf. Laferriere, Vol. 1 ,  p. 640 ; Ducrocq, 
Vol. 3, P· 355·  
48 Ducrocq, Vol. 31 p. 3 5 3, Jacquelin, Principes, pp. 1 3 1-3 z ;  Appleton, pp. 
U9-30. 
48 Supra, chap. I, note 3 8. 
"" P. 1 3 9· 
61 See Ducrocq, Vol. 3 1  pp. 339 1f. ; 345, 3 5 1 ; Waline, Manuel, p. 3 741 re­
ferring to the conclusions of Leon Blum, who, in a I 9 1 8  case before the Conseil 
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support from the argument that the absence of specific lan­
guage52 in the hastily made58 decree does not warrant the as­
sumption that it should have such drastic consequences. 
It seems natural that the judicial tribunals should have 
seized the opportunity to exercise once again, without restric­
tion, their traditional jurisdiction in criminal and tort cases. 
The impediment of having first to ascertain whether the crime 
or tort was a functional rather than a personal act had been 
removed. It is in this sense that the Cour de cassation in 1 872 
interpreted the decree of 18 70 in Meyere v. Rollin,"4 which 
has become the leading case on the point. The court held that 
d'Etat, undertook to deduce the intent of the framers of the decree from the 
preceding debates. 
Hauriou (Precis, 1 0th ed., p. 3 69, note) ,  taking issue with Jacquelin, ad­
vances the argument that the latter might be correct "if the principle of 
[statutory] interpretation, which consists in supplementing the language of 
statutes by the intent of the legislature and by preparatory material, were 
universally accepted" ;  that, however, "this is not so," and "that, quite to the 
contrary, the principle applied in practice is that of purely objective interpre­
tation, i. e., the reconciliation of the language with the situation to be regulated 
by the statute." 
52 Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 64I .  
63 Berthelemy, Traite, p .  8 7 .  The reporter of the decree, i n  the Collection 
complete des lois, decrets, etc. [Duvergier, Vol. 70 ( I 8 7o) , p. 3 35, note] 
was apprehensive of the broad implications of the decree, which was passed 
at a time (war of I 87o with Germany) "when even the firmest minds did 
not retain desirable composure." He remarks that the National Convention would 
have to decide whether or not the decree should have the broad effects given 
to it at the time, perhaps without fully realizing the consequences. [The decree 
was later approved without restriction (supra, note 47 ) ,  though no civil pen­
alties pursuant to art. 2 of the decree were ever enacted. Ducrocq, Vol. 3, 
pp. 355-5 6 ;  Repertoire de legislation (Dalloz) Supp. ( I 892) , Vol. Io, p. 
786.] 
"' D. I 8 72 . I .385 ; Laferriere, Vol. I ,  pp. 642-643 ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3,  p. 340 ; 
Jacquelin, Principes, p. I34 ;  Hauriou, Precis, I oth ed., pp. 368-369, note 4 ;  
Appleton, p. 2 3 1 .  
The case involved a civil action against an army general (Meyere) who had 
Rollin imprisoned for two weeks, without a hearing in court, after an alterca­
tion with an officer. The general contended that Rollin was a member of the 
mobilized forces. Rollin denied that he came under the jurisdiction of the gen­
eral and recovered a judgment ordering his release as well as damages for 
wrongful imprisonment after the civil court found that he was not a member 
of the army (because previously rejected on account of physical defects) . The 
general appealed, asserting that the civil court violated the principle of the dif­
ferentiation of agencies in that it had interfered with the execution of an 
administrative act. 
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the necessary effect of the decree was to permit the judiciary 
to appraise and determine the nature of the act of a govern­
ment agent alleged to give rise to a civil action for damages. 
It was argued that if the determination of this question had to 
be referred to the administrative courts, this would revive, in 
a different form, the former protection of administrative of­
ficers. However, it is of even greater significance that the ad­
ministrative Conseil d'Etat55 had already attached the same 
meaning to the decree of I 8 70, less than a year after its pro­
mulgation, in another oft-cited case, de Cumont & Stofflet v. 
Engelhard. 56 In the appeal Engelhard, 57 the Cour de cassation 
again held that the differentiation of the administrative and 
judicial agencies did not nullify the right restored to private 
individuals by the decree of September I 9, I 8 70, to proceed 
directly against administrative officials in the civil courts in or­
der to obtain indemnity for injuries to such individuals. More­
over, the decision pointed out that the ordinary courts could 
not be denied the power to appraise the facts and motives en­
tering into the delictual acts brought before them without 
rendering illusory the remedy afforded. The language em­
ployed was repeated by the Cour de cassation in the matter of 
"' Charged at the time with the disposition of conflicts (supra, p. z6) . 
"" D. I 87z.3. I 8  (3d case), decided contrary to the conclusions of Laferriere. 
The case was referred to by the commissaire du gouvernement in the Meyere 
case. It is cited by Laferriere, Vol. 1, pp. 641-64z ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 34 ;  
Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p .  369, note 4 ·  Two newspapers had been suspended 
for two months upon the order of a prefect, at the instance of military author­
ities in time of war, with approval of the Minister of the Interior. The prefect's 
publicly posted order set forth as grounds that the newspapers incited to civil 
war, that their owners were guilty of conniving with the enemy, and that 
they endangered their country. The publishers sued to have these statements 
declared defamatory and libelous and to have the judgment published at de­
fendant's expense. See also Dune v. Engelhard, D. 1 87z.J.I 8 (zd case) . 
"7 D. I 873.1 .29 1 .  After the Conseil d'Etat had confirmed the jurisdiction 
of the civil court in de Cumont v. Engelhard (supra, note 56) ,  the plaintiffs 
recovered judgment. Engelhard, the defendant prefect, appealed ; but the 
Cour de cassation rejected the plea that the judgment violated the "separation 
of powers." The case is discussed in Repertoire de legislation (Dalloz) Supp. 
( 1 888) ,  Vol. 3, p. 245, and referred to by Laferriere, Vol. 1, pp. 643, 64s ; 
Jacquelin, Principes, p. 1 34· 
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Petit58 decided during the same year. Consequently the repeal 
of the "administrative guarantee" had effectively removed all 
obstacles to the exercise of jurisdiction by the ordinary courts 
in actions against administrative agents. 
D. REACTION-THE TRIBUNAL DES CONFLITS AND THE 
PELLETIER CASE 
The judicial interpretation of the decree of I 870, which 
made a visible inroad upon the well-guarded administrative 
sanctum, had begun to entrench itself firmly. Suits against 
public officers on account of their official acts increased in 
number. 59 Possibly the fear-or hope-that the principle of 
differentiation was losing vitality was well founded. How­
ever, fear and hope subsided suddenly with the advent of the 
Tribunal des conflits and its resolution of the conflict in the 
case of Pelletier v. General de Ladmirault.60 
The Tribunal des conflits was permanently established 
by the law of May 24, I 8 72 .61 A year later the administrative 
department invoked its jurisdiction in an effort to have the 
judgment of a civil court in the Pelletier case set aside because 
of an erroneous interpretation of the decree of I 8 70, and of 
the consequent violation of the differentiation of agencies. 
The Tribunal in its de�ision 62 sustained the challenge and 
.. D. I 8 73 · I ·390 ; cited in Repertoire de legislation (Dalloz) Supp. ( I 8 8 8) , 
Vol. 3, p. 245 ; Laferriere, Vol. I ,  pp. 643, 645 ; Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 340 (see 
also the other cases there) ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. I J4. The case involved an 
"administrative delict" of a member of a municipal council ; no detailed facts 
are given in the decision . 
.. Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 643. 
00 s. I 8 74·:Z.:z 8 ;  D, I 8 74·3·5· 
81 Supra, p. z6. 
82 Pelletier v. de Ladmirault, S. I 8 74.z.z 8 ;  D. I 8 74·3·5 [the decision is re­
ported as of July 30, I 873,  but by many writers (Laferriere, Ducrocq, 
Jacquelin, Duguit, Hauriou) it is assigned to July z 6, I 8 7 J] . The relevant 
parts of the decision are in the following language : "Article 7 5, constitution 
of the year VIII, does not affect the prohibition addressed to the civil courts 
regarding cognizance of administrative acts, and refers exclusively to the 
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confined the operation of the decree of I 8 70 within limits 
sufficiently narrow to preserve the full force of the law of 
August I 6-24, I 790, fortified by that of the I 6 Fructidor, 
Year III. 
prohibition to summon before them administrative functionaries on account of 
their functions, These texts [the laws of August 1 790 and Fructidor, 
year III, on the one hand, and article 7 5 of the constitution of the year VIII, 
on the other] established two distinct prohibitions which, although they both 
rest upon the principle of the separation of powers, whose exact interpreta­
tion they were intended to assure, referred to different objects and do not 
produce the same consequences in point of jurisdiction. The prohibition ad­
dressed to the judicial courts to take cognizance of acts of administration of 
whatever nature constitutes an absolute and general rule of jurisdiction de­
signed to protect administrative acts and can be enforced by the administrative 
department by exercising its right to assert a conflict whenever, contrary to this 
prohibition, the judicial courts have assumed jurisdiction over an adminis­
trative act. The prohibition to sue the agents of the government without pre­
vious authorization, designed first of all to protect public functionaries against 
malicious prosecution, did not constitute a rule of jurisdiction, but created a 
plea in bar, placing an obstacle in the way of all suits against these agents on 
account of acts related to their official functions, even when the acts in question 
did not have an administrative character and constituted crimes or delicts sub­
ject to the jurisdiction o� the ordinary courts. This plea was available only in 
the ordinary courts and could never occasion the assertion of a conflict on the 
part of the administration. The decree abrogating article 7 5 of 
the constitution of the year VIII, as well as all other provisions of general 
and special laws whose object is to hinder suits against public functionaries of 
all kinds, has had no other effect than to suppress the plea in bar founded 
on the absence of authorization with all its legal consequences, and to restore 
to the ordinary courts their entire freedom of action within the limits of their 
jurisdiction ; however, it [the decree] could not have had the further effect of 
extending the limits of their jurisdiction, and of removing the prohibition, 
addressed to them in provisions other than those expressly repealed, by the de­
cree, to take cognizance of administrative acts, and to deny in that case to 
the administrative authorities the right to assert conflicts. Such an interpreta­
tion could not be reconciled with the law of May 2.4, I 8 72., which, by establish­
ing the Tribunal des conflits, sanctions anew the principle of the 'separation 
of powers' and the rules of jurisdiction which follow from it. Furthermore, 
in the case at bar it is necessary to apply the special legislation concerning 
the state of siege. In fact the action commenced by Pelletier • • against 
General de Ladmirault • intends to have the seizure {performed 
by virtue of the law concerning the state of siege) of the newspaper 
published by Pelletier declared arbitrary and illegal, and therefore of no force 
and effect, and consequently to have ordered the restitution of the copies 
improperly seized and to have the defendants jointly condemned to the pay­
ment of two thousand francs in damages. The prohibition and seizure of the 
newspaper ordered by the general as commander of the state of siege constituted 
a preventive police measure taken by the general as a representative of the 
state in the exercise and within the limits of the extraordinary powers con­
ferr,ed upon him by article 9, section 4 of the law of August 9, 1 849, concern-
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The decision attracted widespread attention 63 commen­
surate to its immediate and mediate import, and although it 
disposes of a purely jurisdictional issue, the facts upon which 
the original cause of action rests must be specifically noted. 
As in the de Cumont & Stoffiet case,64 the plaintiff in the 
original action was a publisher, the first issue of whose news­
paper had been confiscated upon the order of an army general 
in time of war. If, therefore, the civil court had the power to 
declare the seizure of the newspaper, illegal-as it did-so 
that the plaintiff might recover judgment for restitution and 
damages, it had necessarily power to scrutinize the propriety 
of the administrative act,61' the seizure itself. 
In laying the foundation for its decision the Tribunal des 
conflits referred to the statute to which it owed its exist­
ence.66 This law, the Tribunal held, reaffirmed the differ­
entiation of agencies, and that doctrine consequently could 
ing the state of siege, and responsibility for which rests with the government 
which delegated its powers to him. Plaintiff's claim rests entirely upon this 
exercise of police power, and, aside from this act, does not impute to de­
fendants any personal errors of the character which would involve their 
personal liability ; in fact the action is directed against the act itself, repre­
sented by and merged in the functionaries who caused its performance and 
cooperated in its execution. Upon these grounds the civil court of Senlis was 
incompetent to take cognizance of plaintiff's claim." 
68 See Laferriere, Vol. 1, p. 643 ff. ;  Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 341 ff. ; Jacquelin, 
Principes, p. 1 34 ff. ; Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 29 1  ff. ;  Jeze, 2 6  R. D. P. at 
264;  Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p. 3 6 8 ;  Appleton, p. 23 1 ;  Waline, Manuel, p. 
3 73 ff . 
.. Supra, note 56. 
06 Compare the opinion of the commissaire du gouvernement, David, who 
contended (D. 1 8 74·3.6 :3) that the de Cumont case (D. t 8 72 .3 . I 8 ,  supra, note 
56) was decided by the Conseil d'Etat in the opposite sense only because the 
civil court did not have to pass upon the validity of the administrative act in 
order to determine the consequences of the delictual act complained of, which 
could be appraised separately. Cf. Waline, Manuel, p. 3 74· 
06 Supra, p. 1 05 .  Jacquelin (Principes, p. 1 4 1 )  objected that a conflict could 
no more be asserted by the administrative under the regime of 1 8 70, than for­
merly when art. 7 5 of the constitution of the year VIII was in force ; for art. 3 
of the ordinance of June 1, 1 828, never having been repealed, still prohibited 
conflicts in matters of suits against administrative agents. However, it would 
seem that the very language of the statute precluded its operation once the sys­
tem of administrative authorizations had been abolished. 
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not be affected in its scope by the decree of I 8 70. The latter, 
it found, had only abolished the "plea in bar" by which the 
exercise of jurisdiction normally belonging to the ordinary 
courts could be arrested in the absence of preliminary author­
ization. The decision draws a distinction between the statutes 
of I 790 and the Year III as compared with the repealed 
article 7 5. The former were said to contain a general rule of 
jurisdiction intended to protect all administrative acts; the 
latter only afforded a procedural protection for the benefit 
of administrative agents. The procedural obstacle indeed had 
been removed, but the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts 
was not thereby enlarged. It was obvious that unless the 
abrogating decree of I 870 was construed to leave the differ­
entiation of agencies unaffected, actions against adminis­
trative officials could be readily turned into a device for col­
lateral attacks on administrative acts in the civil courts. To 
forestall this contingency67 was the unmistakable aim of the 
Tribunal des conflits. 
The doctrine announced in the Pelletier decision became 
at once the law applied by all courts, 68 and its significance is 
well reflected in the subsequent developments. The critics of 
67 D. r 874·3·5 :3. Cf. the conclusions of the Attorney General, Reverchon, 
in the Meyere case (D. r 872. 1 .385 at 391  :r ) : "It [the decree of r 8 7o] indis­
putably derogates the principle of the separation of powers, and it is not to 
be supposed that its authors did not sign it with full knowledge. But even if 
they had not realized all the consequences thereof, it would not be for the 
judicial authorities to pass upon its wisdom . . . .  It is their duty • . •  simply 
to assure its exact and faithful application." See also Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 340. 
But see the conclusions in the matter Valentin, cited by Laferriere, Vol. I, 
pp. 645-46, note z, criticizing the Meyere decision. 
68 Laferriere, Vol. I, p. 645 ; Jeze, 26 R. D. P. at 264;  see also Jacquelin, 
Principes, p. I34  ff. ; Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 2 9 1 .  The force of the decision 
is interesting as an indication of the great respect which the Tribunal des 
confl.its commanded immediately following its organization. 
Cf. Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 343, citing early cases in which, by way of distinction, 
the Tribunal had held the civil courts competent in actions against administra­
tive officers because the acts attacked were deemed purely personal and not re­
quiring inquiry into official functions (e. g., Godart v. Cliquet, D. I 874·3·4) . 
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the doctrine of the Pelletier case insisted not only that it 
resurrected the former "administrative guarantee," but also 
that it re·placed that guarantee with an even more effectively 
protective mechanism.69 Indeed, formerly the ordinary 
courts determined for themselves whether a cause before 
them required the formality of authorization by the Conseil 
d'Etat. But the new order of things apparently enabled the 
administrative department to withdraw from the civil courts 
suits against administrative agents which they had determined 
to be within their jursdiction. The defendant official would 
therefore escape personal liability whenever a conflict should 
be resolved against these courts ; for the administrative courts 
have no power to hold the individual members of the active 
administration liable in damages. 70 The argument which saw 
in the new system an aggravation of the evil sought to be 
remedied 71 apparently assumed that the Pelletier decision 
would encourage the administrative department to abuse its 
right to challenge the jurisdiction of the judicial courts, and 
furthermore that it would have the necessary support of the 
Tribunal des conflits. Had these anticipations been well­
founded, the subsequent legislative proposals to restore ad­
ministrative protection as it existed prior to I 8 70 would have 
been almost certain to become law. 72 However, the fears en­
gendered by the Pelletier holding did not materialize. Even 
though the decree of I 8 70, as finally interpreted, afforded 
•• Ducrocq complained that the decree of I 8 70 seemed to be destined to have 
none of the effects intended by its authors (see also p. 346) . 
Jacquelin, Principes, pp. I J Z-I J J, I43 : "· . .  it [the administrative pro­
tection] has been reestablished . . . with the aid of the erroneous conception 
of the principle of the separation of powers." 
76 Jacquelin, Principes, p. I J 3 ;  Waline, Manuel, p. 3 74· 
71 Ducrocq, Vol. 3, p. 352 ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. I 33 ·  
72 Bills continued to be introduced after I 873 ; in I 8 79, the principle co-author 
of the decree of September I 9, I 8 7o, introduced a draft of a law to this effect, 
which was favorably reported by a committee. Ducrocq, Vol. 3, pp. 343-345 ; 
Jacquelin, Principes, pp. I43-44· 
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protection to administrative agents, it was a new form of 
protection. It was no longer administrative but judicial pro­
tection-73 protection by judicial methods. 74 
'18 Waline, Manuel, pp. 3 73, 3 75· 
" Berthelemy (Traiti, p. 87) defends the doctrine of the Pelletier case on 
another ground : Even if it be conceded that the doctrine limits greatly-not 
wholly-the scope of the decree of 1 87o, it is unimportant. For neither under 
the old nor under the new systems was the administrative officer privileged as 
compared with a private person. There could, ab initio, be no privilege be­
cause what is protected is the functional act only. The private person, not 
having any official functions, needs no such protection (p. Ss ) .  The argument 
is valid if in each case the functional act can be and actually is distinguished, 
and if the machinery provided is capable of precluding abuse or even error. 
CHAPTER VIII 
Faute Personnelle and Faute de Service• 
THE Pelletier decision was an award by the newly ap­pointed arbiter, the Tribunal des conflits, in favor of the continued unimpaired validity of the principle 
of the differentiation of agencies. Nevertheless, only the ac­
tual applications of the doctrine announced can throw light 
upon whether or not it has succeeded in barring collateral at­
tacks upon administrative acts in the form of damage suits in 
the civil courts. In order to appraise the respective develop­
ments accurately, various circumstances must be taken into 
consideration. 
Some of the anticipated effects of interpreting restrictively 
the act that repealed the unpopular "administrative guar­
antee" were checked almost at once, and one factor in partic­
ular contributed to making generally palatable the doctrine 
whose birth had been attended by so much skepticism. At the 
time of the Pelletier case an old notion was being super­
seded, 2 and the French had definitely arrived at admitting 
that the king can do wrong. In other words, the principle of 
state liability had taken root and was being established on a 
broader basis as time went on until, soon after the turn of the 
century, it extended to all administrative acts, excepting only 
acts of state. 3 
1 Lafe"iere, Traite de la juridiction administrati'Ve et des recours conten­
tieux, 2d ed. (1 896) , Vol. 1, p. 646 ff. ; Jeze, note, 26 R. D. P. ( 1 903) 263 ff.; 
Duguit, Traite de droit constitutionnel, 2d ed. ( 1923 ) ,  Vol. 3 ,  p. 277 ff.; 
Appleton, Traiti eUmentaire du contentieux administratif ( 1927) , p. 232 ff., 
and notes, D. 1 92I . I .41  ff., D. I 92 I .I.I 7 ;  Hauriou, Precis de droit admin­
istratif et de droit public, 1oth ed. ( 1 92 1 ) ,  p. 3 70 ff. ; Bannard, Precis de droit 
administratif ( 1935) ,  p. 99 ff. ; Waline, Manuel elimentaire de droit adminis­
tratif ( 1936) ,  p. 376  ff. (See chap. IV, note 3 1,  supra.) 
• Hauriou, Precis, 1oth ed., p. 366 ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 426 ff. 
• Bannard, Precis, p. 97, and cases cited there. According to the numerous 
adjudications, state liability seems to have been primarily based on a theory of 
I I I  
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With state liability complementing the administrative 
agent's personal liability, private persons injuriously affected 
by administrative action appeared to have ample protection. 
It mattered little what instrumentality administered the re­
lief to which they were entitled, so long as the dispensation 
of relief was fair and satisfactory. Furthermore, the solvency 
of the state, as compared with that of the individual agent, 
afforded greater assurance of ultimate indemnification. Thus, 
what once was purely a jurisdictional issue now turned prima­
rily into the less vexing problem of allocating liability,4 and 
the spectre of the differentiation of agencies withdrew into 
a convenient distance. Nevertheless, the two issues remained 
inseparably connected, and any decision fixing liability, which 
must always turn on the distinction between personal and 
service errors, inevitably and automatically determines 
whether an administrative or a civil court shall have juris­
diction. Consequently, the actual extent of the jurisdiction 
of the ordinary courts in suits against administrative officers 
depends upon the current definition of faute personnelle. It 
is important for the purpose of this investigation to demon­
strate conclusively that the definitions underlying the long 
line of adjudications initiated by the Pelletier decision 5 dis­
close no attempts to transform suits against officers into in­
direct attacks upon administrative acts by broadening the 
concept. Indeed, if there had been, for an instant, a breach 
through which judicial competence might have been ex­
tended to strictly administrative acts, that breach was well­
nigh hermetically sealed by the doctrine of the Pelletier de­
cision, aided by the evolving theory of state liability. 
"fault," i. e., faulty (defective) functioning of the public services, equivalent 
to which is the failure to function and delay in the functioning (ibid., p. 92, and 
cases cited) . However, the courts have gone a step farther and have recognized 
liability for exceptional risk in some instances (ibid., pp. 94-95) . 
• Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p. 366 ;  cf. Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 274. 
5 D. I 874·3 ·5 at 7 :3 :  "Pelletier's claim is founded exclusively upon the ad­
ministrative act . . •  [and] imputes no personal act whatever to the defendants 
which would involve their personal liability." 
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A. EARLY PERIOD--LAFERRIERE 
"Personal fault" and "fault in the service" are mutually 
exclusive concepts. The classification of official conduct as one 
or the other determines the liability of the individual whose 
apparently authorized act has caused injury to a private per­
son. 6 This acute difference in the consequences calls for ac­
curate definitions. But in law mutually exclusive concepts are 
forever prone to defy inclusion in neatly divided groups. 
They overlap, and every disputed area means litigation and 
work for the courts, as well as stimulus for the minds of the 
theorists. The latter, in France, endeavoring to detect and fix 
the characteristics of faute personnelle, have time and again 
suggested abstractions. Repeatedly attempts have also been 
made to demonstrate that the abstract criteria thus proposed 
are the ones which have guided the courts in fixing liability 
in individual cases. 
I .  Intent and Magnitude of Error 
The pioneer analysis of the qualities which indicate that the 
act of an administrative officer is personal rather than admin­
istrative is that of Laferriere. 7 The matter of Laumonnier­
Carriol,S in which Laferriere acted as commissaire du gou­
vernement, originated with an action for damages in the civil 
courts by a match manufacturer who sought to hold two 
former ministers of finance and a prefect personally liable for 
6 As to concurrent liability, see note 72, infra. 
• Vol. 1, p. 648 ff. 
" Decided by the Tribunal des conflits in 1 8 7 7, S. 1 8 7 8.2.93, D. 1 8 7 8·3·1 3 ·  
The decision is  important also because i t  holds that the annulment of an ad­
ministrative decision does not retroactively render its execution illegal. How­
ever, in this case the state was declared liable in damages subsequent to the an­
nulment of the administrative act. The excess of power, which was found to 
be the ground for annulment, consisted in the attempt to circumvent expropria­
tion proceedings in order to avoid compensation. Cf. Monpillie v. Gruet, infra, 
note 7 1 .  On the other hand, execution of an annulled decision is personal error. 
Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 2 84. 
1 14 REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS 
having had plaintiff's factory closed. The Tribunal des con­
flits found that no acts had been alleged which pointed to 
personal liability so as to justify the ordinary jurisdiction. 
In this often cited case Laferriere suggested to the Tribunal 
that there could be no personal liability for the following 
reason : The acts complained of were administrative and not 
personal because they "revealed an administrative agent, a 
representative of the state, more or less subject to error," 
but they did not reveal "the human being with his weak­
nesses, his passions, his indiscretions."9 The personal nature of 
the act, which is the condition precedent to personal liabil­
ity, manifests itself according to Laferriere either through 
the magnitude of the error, where it "exceeds the ordinary 
risks of the function," 10 or in the "bad intentions" of the ad­
ministrative officer.11 In support of this proposition, Laferriere 
referred to the following fact situations 12 which had previ­
ously come before the Tribunal des con:Hits and which had 
been held to involve personal acts : ( 1 ) defamatory utter­
ances of a police commissioner concerning the official func­
tions of a former magistrate ; 13 ( 2)  libelous statements con­
cerning private persons contained in a prefect's letter to an 
under-prefect and divulged to third parties ; 14 ( 3 )  incrimi­
nating allusions, oral 15 or inserted in the minutes of a council 
meeting.16 Although these verbal acts had been committed 
while the respective functionaries were engaged in the per­
formance of their official functions, they could be easily dis­
tinguished from the function. 
• Laferriere, Vol. I, pp. 648-649 ; see the case, S. I 8 78.z.93 at 94 :3 and 
D. I 87 8·3 · I 3 : I .  
10 Laferriere, ibid. 
n Ibid. 
u Ibid. 
13 Catta v. Troquier, Rec. 1 8 8 1 .403. 
" De Rubelles v. Prefet de 1' Allier, Rec. I 880.999. 
15 Virnont v. Prefet de Ia Marne, Rec. I 884.58 I .  
18 Anduze v. Maire de Chalabre, Rec. 1 8 79.8os. 
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In addition, Laferriere pointed out another type of case, 
the classification of which, however, proved far more trouble­
some. This is the type of case presented by an act which 
obviously is quasi-delictual, if not delictual, because of the na­
ture of its injurious consequences, and yet coincides so com­
pletely with the administrative act which constitutes the 
legitimate performance of a function that to judge the one 
would be to judge the other. In  one case referred to by 
Laferriere,17 an administrative agency, in order to justify 
certain action it had taken, published a statement rectifying 
facts alleged in an article by the party adversely affected. In 
an action against the responsible official, the plaintiff claimed 
damages because of (inter alia) the defamatory nature of the 
statement so published. The Tribunal found that it was within 
the power of the administrative agency to publish the state­
ment and that "no passage thereof could be separated so as to 
b� susceptible of individual appraisal."18 Consequently, the 
Tribunal held the act administrative in its entirety and there­
fore not cognizable in the ordinary courts. 
2.  Negligence 
The Tribunal des conflits in Laferriere's time, however, 
was far from applying a well-formulated concept of faute 
personnelle. This is amply illustrated by a number of de­
cisions. Various degrees of negligence frequently appear to  
have been sufficient for the Tribunal to  find that the nature 
of the acts complained of was personal : 19 e.g., misdirection 
of a valuable letter by a carrier;20 errors in the text or delay 
11 Vol. I ,  p. 649 ; Soleillet v. Briere de Lisle, Rec. I 882..J73·  
18 Similarly, involving official publication of statements of facts, Viette v. 
Dalloz, Rec. I 877 . I075 ; Bousquet v. Pougin, Rec. I 878.47 ; see Laferriere, 
Vol. I , pp. 649-650, note 6. 
19 Laferriere, loc. cit. 
00 Bertrand v. Rimbaud, Rec. 1 874.643. 
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in delivery of telegrams ; 21 negligent homicide resulting from 
the disregard of precautions by a highway engineer; 22 per­
sonal injuries inflicted upon a private person by the horse 
of an army officer out riding but not on duty. 23 
3·  Abuse of Power 
The personal character of acts connected with the perform­
ance of official functions is more evident in those early de­
cisions which involved abuses of power. Laferriere24 refers, 
as an illustration, to a case of mutilation by administrative 
officers of an election advertisement recommending candi­
dates for election and also attacking certain members of the 
government.25 The mutilation, though made upon the or­
der of the Minister of the Interior, was held to involve per­
sonal liability, since it infringed upon the statute26 by which 
the defacing of election advertisements was made a delict ir­
respective of the person by whom it was committed. The 
case of Requite v. Grignoux-Vienne/7 involving abuse of 
power, which the Tribunal des confl.its was called upon to 
decide in I 8 79, has often served to indicate the point at which 
erroneous official action may turn into personal fault. A gov­
ernment munitions factory had ordered that all stray dogs 
entering upon its premises be poisoned by throwing a poison­
ous substance into the courts and paths of the factory grounds. 
An agent employed on the premises intentionally attracted 
a dog and threw some of the poisonous substance to it, caus-
01 No early cases involving this particular situation have been found although 
Lafe"iere (loc. cit.) uses it as an illustration ; but see Sureau v. Rigaudie, 
D. I 907·3 · Io2, Rec. 1 9o6.I 96. 
22 Matter of Pradines, Rec. I 87  5.764. 
23 Tubeuf v. General du Guiny, Rec. I 893 . I 54. 
•• Laferriere, Vol. I,  p. 6so. 
23 Vincent v. Fosse, Rec. I 89o.I 83 ; D. I 8 9 I ·3·3 I . 
.. Art. I 7, law of July 29, I 8 8 I .  
"" Rec. I 879.803. 
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ing its death. The officer was held personally liable to the 
owner. Classified along with the Requite case is that of 
Dezetree v. Maire de Meslay-le-Grenet/8 where the action 
of a mayor was found to have been personal rather than ad­
ministrative. The facts were as follows : A member of the 
town council on three occasions had absented himself from 
meetings of the council without offering a valid excuse. Un­
der these circumstances a declaration of resignation could 
have been obtained by the mayor from the prefect. However, 
the mayor, omitting this formality, ordered the member to 
leave when he appeared at a subsequent meeting. This act 
was held to engage the mayor's personal liability. 
By way of contrast, one should note the far more conse­
quential case of Gounouilhou v. de Tracy,29 in which the 
administrative department, insisting upon the administrative 
character of the act attacked, was sustained by the Tribunal 
des conflits. The action from which the conflict arose was 
directed against a prefect by the publisher of certain period­
icals. These periodicals had been stricken from the list of 
publications attached to the permits issued to newspaper 
vendors. It was held that the act of striking the names of the 
newspapers from the catalogue was not of itself responsible 
for the exclusion of these newspapers, but that the exclusion 
resulted from issuing licenses to vendors only upon the condi­
tion that the particular publications should not be offered for 
sale. In other words, the elimination of certain periodicals 
from the catalogue was an integral part of the act of licensing, 
which, if irregular in any respect, could be censured in its en­
tirety only by the administrative courts. Plaintiff's claim, the 
Tribunal said, ''tends to have the civil court indirectly order 
the prefect to reform his act by condemning him to pay dam-
118 Rec. r 883·939· See Laferriere, Vol. r ,  p. 65 r ;  Ducrocq, Cours de droit 
administratif, 7th ed. ( r 89 8 ) ,  Vol. 31 p. 347· 
'"' Rec. r 877 .93 1 ; S. r 878 .2..1 57 .  
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ages for each day's delay in revoking the re.strictions attached 
to the licenses."30 Laferriere criticized the decision 31 on the 
ground that it was beyond the powers of the administrative to 
impose a condition upon newspaper vendors which, in fact, 
operated as a limitation of the freedom of the press.32 Viewed 
in this light, the act of attaching the condition to the license 
seemed to him an abuse of power and a faute personnelle. This 
view obviously was not in accord with the doctrine of the 
Pelletier decision, which reserved administrative policies 
for the scrutiny of the administrative courts exclusively. 
However, Laferriere's critical comments concerning the 
Gounouilhou case significantly anticipated a trend of thought 
which later became articulate. 33 
' 
B. CLASSIFICATIONS OF JEZE 
From the beginning, the chief difficulty in determining the 
limits of personal liability presented itself when injurious 
acts of administrative officers appeared so intimately inter­
woven with the exercise of official functions that what was 
administrative could not be segregated from what was per-
80 Rec. I 8 77·9 3 I  at 93 8 (italics added).  The Tribunal's decision contains the 
language customarily employed since the Pelletier case, affirming that the de­
cree of September I 9, I 8 7o, had had no other effect than to suppress the plea in 
bar formerly available in case of actions against public officers without previous 
authorization, and that it did not remove the prohibition against cognizance 
of administrative acts by the judiciary. It held that "illegality imputed to an 
[otherwise] administrative act does not deprive the act of its administrative 
quality and does not convert it into a personal act" ; and that the act complained 
of "cannot be separated and qualified as a distinct and independent fact which 
might be appraised by the judicial courts." 
31 Vol. I, p. 65 I ,  note 3 ·  
'"' But compare the opinion o f  the commissaire d u  gouvernement i n  the case. 
A "law" attributed to December 2.5, I 8 75, in art. 3, provided that "prohibitions 
to sell and distribute in the public streets can no longer be issued by the ad­
ministrative agencies as isolated measures against individual newspapers." 
However, the statute required applicants for licenses to submit lists of the pub­
lications they intended to sell. These lists, upon inspection, were signed by the 
prefect and served as license certificates, 
88 See infra, chap. IX, "The Doctrine of Administrative Trespass." 
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sonal. Ever since, one of the primary concerns has been to 
trace as accurately as might be done this elusive line of de­
marcation. 
r .  Bad Faith-Gross Error 
In a comment published in 1 909 34 Jeze objected to the 
attempts which had been made to establish inductively the 
line dividing faute de service from faute personnelle. In­
stead, Jeze proposed to deduce from the cases the considera­
tions which had guided the courts in determining liability 
and jurisdiction. He found that the courts in fact had only 
elaborated and refined the criteria already detected by 
Laferriere. Obviously one of these criteria, "bad intention," 
Jeze pointed out, is not difficult to discover because its pres­
ence invariably manifests itself through an overt act of hos­
tility towards the victim.35 Consequently in cases of mali­
cious intent personal fault is not merged in but is ccdetached 
from the exercise of the function."36 The author, on the other 
hand, directed attention to the apparent complication which 
enters into the determination of liability when the latter de­
pends upon whether or not the error committed is great 
enough to "exceed the ordinary risks of the function,"37 or 
"to be inexcusable because of the peculiar situation of the 
official."38 Jeze, thus dividing personal faults into ( I )  faults 
accompanied by bad faith and ( 2)  faults arising from gross 
.. 26 R. D. P. ( 1 909) 263. 
36 Jeze, 26 R. D. P. at 267. In Grosson v. Souhet, Rec. 1 902.644, the Tribunal 
des conflits resolved a negative conflict arising from an action for damages by 
a plaintiff whom the mayor had denied access to the municipal slaughter-house. 
See also Lalande v. Peynaud, D. 1 899·3·93, Rec. 1 897 ·758, holding a faute 
personnelle the act of a mayor, who, after proper publication of a corrected 
election list, posted a second notice and had the town crier announce that a 
named person had been rightfully stricken from the list because of bankruptcy. 
88 Jeze, loc. cit. 
87 Ibid. 
"" Ibid. 
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error, expressed in fact what Hauriou39 later described more 
clearly as different degrees of "detachability." In  other words, 
there is either a personal act clearly separable from· the "me­
chanical or automatic" performance of the function, 40 such 
as disconnected defamatory statements ; 41 or there is a dis­
tinguishable but not detachable circumstance to which the 
alleged injury is attributable, for instance, gross negligence 
in the performance of an official duty. 42 
2. F autes Lourdes 
It should be observed that the decisions cited by Jeze to 
illustrate fautes lourdes (grave errors) 43 involving personal 
liability, are also instances in which the personal element of 
bad faith was discernible but not separable from the admin­
istrative act. Thus (a) in Gerome v. Gerbault44 the defendant 
postmaster had, without proof, formally reported the theft 
by an employee of a folder containing postal money orders. 
Actually the folder had been misplaced by the postmaster 
himself. (b) The fault imputed to officers of the sanitary 
police in Mascaras v. Sene et Chiche45 consisted in an erro­
neous diagnosis of a young woman aboard ship, which resulted 
.. P,·icis, Ioth ed., pp. 3 7 1-3 72 . 
.. Ibid., p. 3 70. 
" Lalande v. Peynaud, D. I 899·3·93• Rec. 1 897·758, supra, note 3 5· Cf. 
PrHet v. Loumagne, Rec. 1 897.49 7 ;  Hauriou, Precis, 1 0th ed., p. 3 7 2  . 
.. De Rubelles v. Prefet de VAllier, Rec. 1 88o.999, supra, note 1 4. But cf. the 
later case of Sureau v. Rigaudie (Rec. 1 906. 1 96, D. 1 907·3 · 102) holding the 
erroneous delivery of a telegram not to be a "personal fault." (Hauriou, Precis, 
1 oth ed., p. 3 73, note. The other case referred to there, Bouhier v. Candelier, 
Rec. 1 8 8 1 .9 1 8, does not seem to be in point.) Evidently it was recognized that 
the error, on the part of mail and telegram carriers, could not well be con­
strued as being tainted with bad faith in the absence of direct evidence. 
43 Subclassified into delictual and non-delictual errors (26 R. D. P. at 
267-268) . 
" Rec. I 9o8.501 ,  See also Coutareau v. Gillet, D. 1 9 I 3·3·1 Jo, S. I 9 I4.J-5 1 ; 
Waline, Manuel, p. 378  • 
.. Rec. 1 902.209, D. 1 903·3·93· 
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in her internment in a hospital and subsequent death. In these 
cases the personal fault apparently consisted in "gross error 
in the determination of facts."46 The decisions indicate that 
the error-or rather the negligence-was deemed equiv­
alent to bad faith. 47 
Another group of cases tends to show that personal liability 
may arise from errors of law, as for example where the ad­
ministrative officer is grossly mistaken as to his powers. The 
instances referred to in Jeze's comment48 involved the fol­
lowing situations : (a) A mayor, having custody of the survey­
maps recorded in the city registry, gruffiy prevented inspec­
tion by a taxpayer of a map already placed at his disposal by 
a clerk in the mayor's offi.ce.49 (b) The defendant mayor had 
given notice to a property owner to make repairs on a build­
ing to prevent danger to the public. 5° Upon failure to comply, 
the mayor ordered the immediate demolition of the building. 
Under the applicable statute51 the mayor had authority only 
to order provisional precautions to be taken in case of im­
minent danger. Destruction of a building in all cases has to 
be authorized by the Conseil de prefecture, and must be pre­
ceded by expert findings, notice, and opportunity for hearing. 
•• Jeze, z6  R. D. P. at 268. In the second case the Tribunal said, "these facts, 
if proved, would constitute gross errors which because of their consequences 
exceeded the normal exercise of the function with which the two physicians were 
charged." ("If proved" emphasizes the function of the Tribunal des conflits, 
which is not to establish the alleged facts, but merely to fix the liability and con­
sequent j urisdiction upon the assumption that the facts are as asserted.) 
47 Comparable are the cases involving utterances by public school teachers in 
class which, e. g., are indecent, violate the principle of neutrality in matters 
of religion, or tend to j ustify the commission of crimes. Girodet v. Morizot, Rec. 
1 908.59 7, S. 1 908.3 .8 1 ,  D. 1 9o8.3.57, noted 25 R. D. P. ( 1 908) 2 7 2 ;  Jeze, 
26 R. D. P. at 269. 
48 Jeze, 26  R. D. P. at z69-27o. 
48 Uhel v. Le Visage, Maire, Rec. 1 900.5 1 ;  the Tribunal held that "the act 
[of the mayor] could not be said to be of an administrative character because 
of the circumstances under which it occurred." 
"" Maudiere v. Maire et commune de Nouzon, Rec. 1 904.252 (negative con­
flict.) 
"1 Law of June 2 1 ,  1 898, chap. 1 ,  concerning the public safety, arts. 3-6. 
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(c) Demolition of a wall under construction on privately 
owned property on the bank of a creek was ordered by a 
mayor/2 and effected the day following. The order was is­
sued because of alleged public danger in case of flood. Upon 
complaint, the action was defended on the ground that it had 
been taken after due deliberation and approval by the city 
council, and in the belief that the wall was located upon land 
owned by the city. The mayor also insisted that under the 
circumstances he could legitimately hold himself to be acting 
with the implied statutory authority of the prefect. 53 How­
ever, the Tribunal des conflits held that the mayor acted 
without proper authority, and that the impeached act, being 
outside his powers, was "purely personal." 
In the first of the foregoing instances the personal element 
could well be said 54 to have manifested itself in the arbitrari­
ness of the act, amounting to an abuse of power. But in the 
second and third cases any intentional abuse of power had to 
be inferred from the grossly erroneous interpretation, if not 
the disregard, 55 of express statutory provisions defining the 
mayor's powers. In the light of the reported facts these are 
obviously borderline cases, and it is not too difficult to imagine 
that under somewhat similar circumstances no personal fault 
might be found. It seems indeed extremely probable that the 
supposed malicious motives of the respective officials were 
not the real ground of decision. The jurisdiction of the or­
dinary courts could well be confirmed in these cases ; but the 
result, as appears below, may more correctly be reached under 
"" Montlaur v. Balmigere, Maire de Tournissan, Rec. 1904.8 8 8, D. r 9o6.J.58. 
"" Art. r6 of the law of April 8, r 89 8, title II, Non-navigable Water Courses : 
"The mayor may, with the authority of the prefect, take all measures necessary 
in policing water courses." 
.. Jeze, 26 R. D. P. at 270, 274 • 
.. These cases should again be considered in connection with the doctrine of 
administrative trespass, infra, chap. IX, pp. 143 and 1 50 ff. 
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the doctrine of trespass56 instead of by what seems a doubt­
ful application of the faute personnelle doctrine. 
Aside from the cases of non-delictual fautes lourdes, Jeze57 
calls attention to two decisions 58 holding that violations of 
statutes expressly prohibiting the acts involved constituted 
fautes personnelles. 
The author also considers the particular situation in which 
an unmistakable faute personnelle has been committed upon 
the order or with the approval of a hierarchic superior. The 
general rule 59 seems to be that the element of obedience does 
not affect the personal character of the act. In the Vincent 
case 60 police officers who had mutilated election posters in 
violation of a criminal statute were held liable notwithstand­
ing the order of the Minister of the Interior.61 A similar re­
sult was reached 62 in an action against a colonial official who, 
upon the order of his superior, caused a native to be forcibly 
expelled from his hut and his property to be destroyed. Prob­
ably with greater justification, the same principle has been 
applied in the case of personal acts defended with the subse­
quent approval of a superior officer.63 
68 Infra, chap. IX. 
•• 26 R. D. P. at 270-27 1 .  
68 Vincent v. Fosse, Rec. 1 890. 1 83,  D .  1 89 1 .3 .31 ,  supra, note 2 5 ;  Girodet v. 
Morizot, Rec. 1 908.597, S. 1 908.3.8 1 ,  D. 1 908.3·57, noted 25 R. D. P. ( 1908 ) 
272, supra, note 47· 
68 Jeze, 26 R. D. P. at 27 1-273.  
00 Supra, note 58 .  
61 The case is especially interesting if viewed in the light of the objections 
raised before the Tribunal by the Minister of the Interior. The latter directed 
attention to the fact that the action was brought not only against the officers 
who executed the order but also against the under-prefect who had transmitted 
it. On the other hand, the prefect who had received his instructions from the 
minister and had traJ!smitted them to the under-prefect was not made a party 
defendant. The government suggested that this had been done in order to avoid 
involving the minister personally. See Waline, Manuel, pp. 3 79  ff., 3 82, con­
cerning the virtual absence of a civil liability of the ministers. 
82 Mohammed-ben-Belkassem, Rcc. 1 89 1 .542, D. 1 892·3·1 25.  
88 See Saffroy v. Martin et Ligeron, Rec. 1 894.628, D. t 896.3 . 10. Duguit 
(Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 285 ff.) agrees that superior orders or approvals do not 
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C. LATER DEVELOPMENTS 
The earlier analyses of faute personnelle have been fol­
lowed by various attempts to devise more accurate definitions. 
However, no new criteria have been discovered and in fact 
little has been done beyond carefully redefining the basic 
ingredients ; that is, the personal intent and the evidentiary 
circumstances which must accompany the impersonal func­
tional act. 
r .  Duguit-Detachable and Nondetachable Errors 
Duguit, in his treatise on constitutional law and in a note,64 
emphatically insists upon the necessity of dividing personal 
faults into ( r )  "detachable"65 and ( 2)  "enclosed"66 faults. 
Accordingly, in some cases the fault consists in an independ­
ent act, which, purporting to be official, is in fact personal be­
cause of obvious bad faith or malicious intent. 67 In  other 
cases, however, there is only one functional act, but this act 
"contains a personal element." 68 The distinction emphasizes 
anew that personal fault can always be isolated from the of­
ficial function whether the former takes the form of a separate 
preclude the subordinate's personal liability ; however, he thinks that these 
facts should operate as a mitigating circumstance [referring to Barthelemy's 
article, "L'influence de l'ordre hierarchique sur la responsabilite des agents," 
3 1  R. D. P. ( 1 9 1 4) 49 1] ,  insisting that the order of the hierarchic superior is 
capable "of giving administrative character to a faute personnelle," (p. 54 7 ) .  
The classic exception to the prevailing rule is the absolute obedience due a 
military superior. Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, pp. z86, z89-z9o. 
"' Traiti, Vol. 3, p. z78 ff. ; note under Monpillie v. Gruet, Maire de Bor-
deaux, S. 1 9 1 8- 19 19.z.1 ff. 
"" F aute di tachable (ibid.) . 
66 Faute incluse (ibid.) . 
87 Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, pp. z8o-z 8 1 ,  cites as examples Lalande v. Peynaud, 
s. I 899·3·95, D. I 899·3·93> Rec. I 897·7 5 8, supra, note 4 1 ; Girodet v. Morizot, 
S. 1 908.3.8 1 ,  D. I 908·3·57> Rec. 1908.597, supra, note 47 ; and Carbonnel v. 
Sige, S. I 9 I Z·3·33, in which the facts were similar to those in Gerome v. 
Gerbault, Rec. I 9o8.5oi,  supra, note 44· 
66 Duguit, ibid., p. z&z. 
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act or of a. qualifying fact. Duguit, however, draws the 
further conclusion69 that if the fault is incluse, the ordinary 
courts cannot take jurisdiction. For in order to determine 
whether an administrative act contains a personal element, 
these courts would have to scrutinize the administrative act 
in its entirety. This, of course, would contravene the differ­
entiation of agencies and the doctrine of the Pelletier de­
cision. Duguit's theory has not been accepted ; nor is there 
any indication in the decisions70 that the administrative do­
main has been invaded through the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the ordinary courts over what Duguit termed fautes incluses. 
2. A ppleton-1 ntellectually Discernible Fault 
The decision of the Cour de cassation in Monpillie v. 
Cruet, Maire de Bordeaux,71 which inspired Duguit's an­
alysis, brought forth a further attempt to circumscribe with 
particular care the characteristics of personal fault. Profes­
sor Appleton, commenting on the Monpillie case and a few 
years later on the decision of the same court in Laur v. Le­
monnier/2 in principle adopted the definition according to 
•• Ibid., pp. 290 ff., 292-93. 
7° Cf. Appleton, note, D. I 92 I . I .4 I  at 42 : I .  
'11 D.  I 92 1 . 1 .4 1 ,  S. I 9 1 8- 1 9 I 9.2.r .  The mayor of the city of Bordeaux is­
sued an ordinance regulating the inspection of meat imported into the city and 
making provision for the transportation of meat found unstamped to a central 
inspection place. The parties affected by the enforcement of this provision, over 
their objections, entered a recourse for excess of power and obtained annulment 
by the Conseil d'Etat because of a vice of form (Matter of Chambre syndicale, 
etc., Rec. I 9 I 6.243 ) ; they also prosecuted the mayor for abuse of power 
under arts. I 84 and I 86 of the Code penal, and simultaneously instituted suit 
for damages against the city and the mayor. In both actions the j udicial courts 
held themselves without jurisdiction and were upheld by the Cour de cassation, 
which found that the measures taken by the mayor "did not involve any per­
sonal fault separable from the function which could be determined by the civil 
courts without inquiring into the administrative act itself." 
72 D. 1 92 I . I . I 7. The mayor of a town had authorized the installation of an 
outdoor rifle range. Upon being notified of the danger resulting to the public, 
certain precautions were taken, but proved insufficient. A passerby was seriously 
1 26 REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS 
which personal fault arises from malicious intent either ap­
parent on the face of the act or inferable from the gravity of 
the error. 73 This author also recognizes that fault, liability 
for which can be determined by the ordinary courts, may ap­
pear in the form of a separate act accompanying the lawful 
exercise of a function. However, Professor Appleton con­
cludes from the adjudicated cases that the civil courts are 
competent even if the element of fault, though inseparably 
connected with (inclus Y4 the functional act, can be "intel­
lectually" or "by an operation of the mind" discerned from 
the latter. 
Neither of the two cases annotated by Professor Apple­
ton held that the impeached acts contained a personal ele­
ment. In the M onpillie case the enforcement of a regulation 
by confiscating meat for the purpose of inspection was found 
"to have been within the exercise of administrative functions," 
although the procedure followed was irregular. In other 
words, illegal administrative enforcement is not deemed per se 
a faute personnelle.75 In Laur v. Lemonnier/6 no personal 
error was imputed to the mayor because of his failure to take 
adequate measures for the protection of the public. 77 It seems 
injured and filed suit in the Conseil d'Etat for damages against the town, and 
in the civil court against the mayor. The latter found in favor of plaintiff but 
was reversed by the Cour de cassation because the act complained of "was in fact 
only an alleged insufficiency in the measure taken by the mayor in the exercise of 
his legitimate functions." (See also Compagnie d'assurances Rhin et Moselle v. 
Henry, D. 1 933·3 ·41 ; Appleton, Supp. p. 34.) The Conseil d'Etat held. the 
town liable in damages for faute de service. 
It is now recognized that faute personnelle and faute de service can exist 
side by side, though only one recovery is allowed. Bannard, Precis, p. 1 oo ;  
Berthilemy, Traiti ilimentaire de droit administratif, 1 3th ed. ( 1933) ,  p. 88" ;  
Appleton, note in  D.  1 92 1 . 1 . 1 7 :1 .  
, Appleton's notes in D .  1 9 2 1 . 1 . 1 7  and 4 1  are substantially identical with the 
corresponding text of his Traiti ilimentaire du contentieux administratif, p. 
230 ff. 
•• Cf. Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 2 8 1 ,  supra, note 67. 
"' Appleton, note, D. 1 9 2 1 . 1 .41 at 42 :2, and Traiti, p. 243· See supra, note 7 1 .  
76 D. 1 9 2 1 . 1 . 1 7, discussed by Appleton in a footnote t o  the case and in his 
Traiti, pp. 235, 2 38. 
n See note 72, supra. 
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therefore that, regardless of the magnitude of the conse­
quences, misfeasance does not result in personal liability if it is 
due to an error in judgment rather than to gross negligence.78 
These were indeed the immediate implications of each of the 
two decisions. But, as Appleton points out, 79 it is far more im­
portant to observe the new trend evidenced by a growing dis­
inclination on the part of the courts to hold administrative 
officers personally liable unless the injurious acts were clearly 
accompanied by personal motives. 
3·  Recent Decisions 
The marked shift of emphasis in the direction of the sub­
j ective element80 of bad faith or malicious intent is illus­
trated by several recent decisions. The Cour de cassation 
found personal fault in the refusal of an army physician to 
care for a soldier who insisted on two successive days that he 
was ill. The soldier died during the imprisonment ordered 
by the medical officer on the ground that the soldier was an 
alcoholic. 81 But in another instance an army physician was 
held by the same court not to be personally liable, although 
the death of a soldier occurred as a result of questionable 
diagnosis and treatment. 82 The Tribunal des conflits83 af:.. 
firmed the jurisdiction of a civil court on the ground that the 
following state of facts, if proved, would involve a faute per­
sonnelle because of obviously malicious intent. The prefect 
against whom the action was brought had issued a pass (carte 
.. Appleton, note, D. 1 9 2 1 . 1 . 1 7  at 1 8  and Traiti, pp. zJS, 2 3 8  . 
.,. Appleton, note, D. 1 92 1 . 1 .1 7-1 8 and Traiti, pp. 234-236. Cf. the early 
case in which an error in the delivery of a telegram was not treated as personal 
to the administrative agent. Sureau v. Rigaudie, D. 1 907·3·3·1oz, Rec. 1 906.196. 
80 Waline, Manuel, pp. 3 7 8-379. 
81 Fontenas v. B . • . .  , Gaz. Pal. 1923.2.3 1 9 ;  Appleton, Traiti, p. 244· 
80 Chiron v. Sineau, D. H. 1 926.8 1 ;  Appleton, Traiti, p. 244. 
88 In Matter of Navarro et Mounier, D. H. 1 926.55. See Appleton, Traiti, 
p. 245 ; Waline, Manuel, p. 3 78. 
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d'invalidite) to a disabled veteran. The latter was purposely 
led to believe that the pass entitled him to free railway trans­
portation. Upon the express order of the prefect the veteran 
was apprehended the first time he sought to make use of the 
pass for that purpose, and was charged with the violation of 
railway regulations. 
In another instance the infliction by police officers of per­
sonal injuries ("third degree") upon a prisoner while in 
custody at the police station was held to be a personal fault.84 
This case should be contrasted with a singularly illustrative 
set of circumstances in which the Tribunal des conflits de­
clined to find personal fault notwithstanding very grave con­
sequences. 85 An intoxicated person was arrested and detained 
at police headquarters. Without being searched he was locked 
into a room which he set on fire with matches he carried on 
himself. Due to the disorderly state of the room the fire 
spread, and the inebriate burned to death in consequence of 
delay on the part of the fire department. 86 
The tendency of the courts to recognize only malicious in­
tent or bad faith as indicative of personal fault, and to ex-
.. Immarigeon v. Perrin, (Confl.) Rec. 1922. 1 8 5 ;  Appleton, Traittf, p. 245· 
"' Dionnet et Proton v. l'Etat, ( 1 9 1 3) S. 1 920·3·47· See Waline, Manuel, 
pp. 3 77-3 78. See also the other cases cited there (Thomas v. Ruaux, Rec. 
1 928.87 1 ;  Claire v. }arnot et Loison, Rec. 1 929.3 89) . 
88 In this connection, compare Gerome v. Gerbault, Rec. r 908.501 and 
Coutareau v. Gillet, D. I 9 I J ·3 · I JO, S. I 9 I 4·3 ·5I  (cited Waline, Manuel, 
p. 3 7 8, supra, note 44) , involving negligent accusations of subordinate officers. 
See also Mayer v. Kraencker (D. H. 1 934·398 ;  Appleton, Traiti, Supp., 
p. 33 ) , where the Cour de cassation affirmed a decision of the Caur d'appel 
de Paris (which had reversed the trial court) answering in the negative the 
question whether the injury caused by the driver of a fire-truck through a col­
lision at a street intersection resulted from personal fault. Cf. two recent cases 
decided by the Cour d'appel de Paris (Beguin v. Choquet and Schmitz v. Cabanel, 
Gaz. Pal. 1 9J5.2.257, 52 R. D. P. 8 I I ) . In the first, unintentional disregard of 
traffic regulations by petty military officers in the course of a driving lesson, 
resulting in bodily injury to a third person, was held not to involve a fault 
which was "distinct from the exercise of [their] official function." [Similar, 
Thepaz v. Mirabel, (Confl.) Gaz. Pal. 1 93 5·2.261 .] On the other hand, in 
the second case, the fact that a police officer on duty was driving at an excessive 
speed and on the left side of the road was found to be a faute personnelle in 
respect to the resulting collision and injuries. 
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elude from consideration the seriousness of the injury, is 
well exemplified by Duez v. Fournier,S1 a late decision of 
the Cour d'appel of Douai. This case involved a tort action 
against an employee of the bridge and highway department 
who in criminal court had been found guilty of negligent 
homicide. A child engaged with others in play had received 
fatal injuries through contact with machinery operated by 
the defendant. The record disclosed that the employee had 
repeatedly, and immediately before the accident, forbidden 
the children of the neighborhood to come on the premises 
where work was in progress. The court held that the act caus­
ing the death coincided with the lawful performance of an 
administrative function and that the civil liability therefore 
accrued to the state. 88 The decision of another appellate court, 
in Fournier v. Bonnefond,89 was felt to be inconsistent with 
the holding in Duez. v. Fournier because of the supposed sim­
ilarity in the facts of the two cases. In the B onnefond case a 
public school teacher had injured the eye of a pupil with her 
fountain pen. The court found that the abrupt gesture of the 
defendant which had caused the harm was "a fact completely 
apart from the acts which constituted the exercise of her pub­
lic functions," and that the fault therefore was imputable to 
her personally. However, differences in the circumstances 
attending the two cases90 may account for the seemingly con­
flicting solutions. The act which caused the death of the child 
in the Duez case coincided completely with the regular, 
87 D. 1 93 6.2..5 1 ,  53 R. D. P. ( 1936) 6 8 5 ;  contrasted in 54 R. D. P. (1937)  
1 54· 
88 Waline, in a note accompanying the decision (D. 1 9 36.2..5 1 ,  53 R. D. P. 
685) ,  criticizes the result and suggests that criminal negligence necessarily in­
volves personal fault. Cf. 52 R. D. P. (1935)  8 1 o  .. 
"" D. H. 1 936.502.. 
00 See 54 R. D. P. ( 1937)  1 5 3-154· The decision in part reads : "· , ,  one 
can indeed not accept as admissible the explanation given by [the defendant] con­
cerning the happening of the accident, because a fountain pen simply gliding from 
the hand of the person using it could not . , , penetrate the eye of a child 
standing in the vicinity of the [teacher's] desk. , , , In fact the [her own] 
statements disclose that she turned around abruptly." D. H. 1 93 6.502. at 503. 
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though negligent, exercise of the function, viz., the operation 
of the machinery by the engineer in charge. On the other 
hand, the abrupt movement of the teacher which injured the 
pupil was an independent act obviously calculated to have 
a disclipinary effect. Furthermore, the different relationships 
between the administrative agent and the victim may also 
have influenced the result. 91 
In terminating this perusal of the more recent adjudica- · 
tions, a somewhat unusual case should be considered in which 
the Cour de cassation 92 declined to find personal fault in the 
inaction of a mayor who had failed to notify an inhabitant of 
the granting of a petition by the town council. The court held 
that this omission, which resulted in pecuniary damage to the 
plaintiff, was an "act inseparable from the [mayor's] func­
tion," and therefore not reviewable by a civil court. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In the light of the adjudicated cases, it is quite clear that 
there has been no inclination to inflate the faute personnelle 
concept for jurisdictional purposes. It is true that legal writers 
at various times have attempted to read new criteria into the 
decisions. Moreover, the courts may have refrained from in­
dicating the exact contours within which they would confine 
the doctrine.93 But it is equally true that the courts have never 
deviated from the base line of culpable intent, but have 
rather in the course of time kept closer to it. In the main they 
01 Cf. Lemaire v. Prefet du Nord, Gaz. Pal. 1 937·1 ·396, 54 R. D. P. ( 193  7)  
3 8 1, where a municipal hospital attendant in immediate charge of a patient was 
held personally liable on the ground of gross negligence. 
02 Saint-Martin v. Gaussorgues, Gaz. Pal. I 9J &.t 84, 55 R. D. P. ( 1 938)  1 68 .  
An inhabitant had petitioned the town council to make certain improvements. 
The petition was granted, but the mayor merely summoned the petitioner to ap­
pear before the public work commission without informing him of the favorable 
action of the council. This, the complainant insisted, caused him to abandon 
the matter. 
18 See Waline, Manuel, p. 377· 
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seem to  hold that an injurious act i s  personal to  the adminis­
trative official when "the function has served his personal 
ends," but not when <<in committing an error he believes him­
self to be performing his official function."94 To the essential 
requirement of abuse of power, gross negligence in the law­
ful exercise of power has at times been assimilated. 
The jurisdiction of the civil courts over the persons of ad­
ministrative officers has thus been limited to cases involving 
official activity which is faulty not because of intrinsic illegality 
but because of the presence of an independent, nonadminis­
trative element. The phrase that a fault to be personal must 
be "distinguishable and separable from the administrative 
act and from the exercise of the function," though stereotyped, 
is a clear affirmation of the sanctity of strictly administrative 
action under the differentiation of agencies. 
Upon reviewing the major steps in the jurisdictional de­
velopments connected with official tort liability in French law, 
the capital importance of one fact moves to the foreground. 
Ordinary court review of administrative action through the 
medium of damage suits against officers did not materialize. 
The repeal in 1 8 70, of the former "administrative guaran­
tee" had indeed opened the door to this form of collateral 
attack so well-known in American law.95 But to sacrifice ad-
.. Berthilemy, Traite, p. 8:r., quoted by Appleton, note, D .. 1 9Z I .I , 1 7 ::r., and 
Traite, p. z J4.. 
"' Collateral attacks upon administrative acts through damage suits against 
officials are unobstructed and common in American administrative law, and the 
jurisdictional complications of the French systems have been unknown in the 
United States. But also an ideal combination of state liability with personal 
liability of administrative officers is far from having been achieved. On the 
subject of personal liability, see Jennings, "Tort Liability of Administrative 
Officers," :1. 1  Minn. L. Rw. ( 1936)  ::63. Nevertheless, the inherent weaknesses 
of the principle of unmitigated personal liability are too obvious not to have 
been recognized. 
Federal law offers an interesting example of retaining personal liability as 
a matter of preserving obsolete form. In the case of taxes wrongfully collected, 
recovery must be sought in a suit against the collector personally. The tax­
payer's remedy against the collector, of common-law origin [White v. Hopkins, 
(C. C. A. sth, 1 9 3 1 )  51  F. (:r.d) 1 59 at 1 61 ]  and "equitable in its nature and 
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ministrative autonomy so lightly would scarcely have been 
consonant with the history and spirit of the droit administratif, 
and close adherence to a restrictive interpretation of the statu­
tory language which seemed to defy the differentiation of 
agencies effectively preserved the status quo. 
However, the conclusion is inevitable that the judicial con­
struction of the decree of I 8 70, which thus prevented a re­
distribution of jurisdiction, materially prompted the evolu­
tion of another phase of the French administrative system. 
grounds" [Hartwell Mills v. Rose, (C. C. A. sth, 1 932.) 6 1  F. (zd) 441 at 
443] has been appropriately called an "anomalous relic of bygone modes of 
thought," particularly where the officer "was acting in the line of duty." 
Justice Cardozo in George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, ( 1 933 )  2.89 U. S. 
373 at 3 82.. In fact, execution on a judgment against the collector or other 
revenue officer for money paid into the treasury cannot issue if there has been 
probable cause for the act or if the collection has been made under the directions 
of a superior officer. 2.8 U. S. C. ( 1 934) , § 842., In either case the officer under 
the statute is entitled to a certificate from the court. The effect of a certificate 
of probable cause or of direction of a superior officer is to convert the suit against 
the collector into a suit against the government. United States v. Sherman, 
( 1 878)  9 8  U. S. 565 ; George Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, supra. 
CHAPTER IX 
The Doctrine of Administrative Trespass 
A. IS THERE AN INHERENT JUDICIAL POWER TO PROTECT 
PERSONS AND PROPERTY AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVE 
ENCROACHMENTS ? 
THE question whether j udicial power necessarily im­plies power to protect persons and property against administrative encroachments can be evaded in the 
United States by pointing to the Constitution, under which 
the courts have successfully asserted the power to review ad­
ministrative acts. This power of the courts is commonly based -
upon the postulate of the "supremacy of law" and the re­
quirement of "due process of law." But more precise answers 
to the suggested question may be found in the motives which 
lie behind the express and implied constitutional guarantees. 
Penetrating legal analysis has arrived at the conclusion that 
"legislation and administration, representing the force of 
collectivism, clash to some extent with the courts, representing 
the interest of property owners : and the 'rule of law' takes on 
a deeper significance."1 Moreover, the Supreme Court itself 
points to its protective mission, reminding that "when funda­
mental rights are in question this Court has repeatedly empha­
sized 'the difference in security of judicial over administrative 
action.' " 2  
However, the different conception of the separation of 
powers with its companion doctrine of differentiated agencies 
might well be understood to have obviated the performance 
of an analogous function by the judiciary of France. It is 
1 Fuchs, "Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law 
Theory," 47 Yale L. J. ( 1938)  5 3 8  at 559· . 
• Crowell v. Benson, ( 1932.) 2.85 U. S. 2.2. at 6 1 .  
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therefore of vital importance to observe the doctrine of or­
dinary court protection of civil rights and property which 
has been unceasingly defended in the face of the postulate 
of administrative freedom from judicial interference. In the 
words of Dareste,3 "If the principle of the 'separation of 
powers' were pushed to its extreme . . . all rights and liber­
ties of the people would be remitted to the administrative . 
. . . This was indeed the theory of the revolutionary period; 
however, it soon became undermined and the entire doctrinal 
development of the last hundred years is but the history of 
the conflict between the 'separation of powers' and the equally 
essential principle which places the rights and liberties of 
the people under the safeguard of the judiciary." But the 
theory that declares the administrative courts utterly incom­
petent and postulates the ordinary jurisdiction4 for the re­
dress of all administrative invasions of "private constitutional 
rights" has at times been subject to dispute. Little or no light 
has been thrown on the origin of the doctrine by any of the 
conflicting authorities. Its validity has been assailed with 
considerable force by Jacquelin, 5 who denied that it had any 
influence upon the distribution of jurisdiction between the 
two sets of courts. On the other hand, a maj ority of the writers 
who have discussed the subject are unequivocally committed 
to the contrary view.6 Their statements of the principle, gen-
8 Les voies de recours contre les actes de la puissance publique ( x  914) ,  p. 1 76, 
note z (italics supplied) . 
• In the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary. 
• Les principes dominants du contentieux administratif (1 899),  pp. 8z ff., 
97 ff., xo6 ff. At the last page, it is stated : "The foregoing investigations with a 
view to discovering a general and directive principle have been fruitless, and 
this failure confirms the observation • . . that the distribution of jurisdiction 
[among the administrative and judicial courts] has been altogether arbi-
trary . • • •  " i 
6 Ducrocq, Cours de droit administratif, 7th ed. (x 897) ,  Vol. z, p. 1 3 :  "The 
judicial courts are the guardians of the right of property, and of the security, 
freedom and status of persons." 
Aucoc, Conferences sur /'administration et le droit administratif, 3d ed. 
( x 88s),  Vol. x, p. 48z :  "· . .  the judicial courts alone may adjudicate, even 
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erally broad and categorical, have a counterpart in many of 
the decisions of the courts.7 At the same time the adjudication 
of personal and property rights affected by administrative 
action has in many instances been reserved for the ordinary 
courts by express statutory provisions.8 Therefore, in order 
to determine whether the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts 
over questions of status, civil liberties and property rights 
must be considered as original and as having been confirmed 
rather than made the exception by the various statutes, other 
factors have to be taken into consideration. But even such 
adversely to the administrative department, questions relating to the civil 
status and the domicile of persons, to property rights [and] to servitudes founded 
on rules of private law." 
Laferriere, Traite de Ia juridiction administrative et des recours conten­
tieux, zd ed. ( I 896) , Vol. I, p. 5 I4 :  "The civil personality of each member of 
society . . . is placed under the exclusive protection of the judicial courts." 
Ibid., p. 5 29 :  "Aside from the civil rights properly so called, there are indi­
vidual rights, legal faculties attached to each person, which are more or less 
broadly recognized by the constitution and by political laws. Such are : the 
individual freedom, the freedom of the press, the freedom of work and of in­
dustry, the right to associate [and] the right to assemble. The controversies 
which may arise from the exercise of these rights, in principle, come within 
the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts ; it is before them that redress for illegal 
encroachments, be it by third persons or by the administration itself, must be 
sought." 
Dareste, p. 247 : "· . .  the ordinary courts . . .  are the natural guardians 
of the rights of property, of individual freedom and of the rights attached to 
the person." See also p. 272.  . 
Appleton, Traite elimentaire du contentieux administratif ( I927) ,  p. I4o: 
"It is generally recognized that the judicial courts alone are competent to 
adjudicate questions of status, civil capacity, domicile, violations of individual 
liberty and other similar rights immediately connected with the exercise of the 
liberties guaranteed to the individual by the constitution." Ibid., p. I 52 :  "The 
courts have affirmed ever so often that the judiciary are the natural guardians 
of private property." 
Cf. Moreau, Ll"reglement administratif ( I 9oz),  p. z6o ; Duguit, Traite de 
droit constitutionnel, zd ed. ( I 923 ) ,  Vol. 3, p. 3 0 ;  Bonnard, Precis de droit 
administratif ( I 935) ,  p. I 5 8 ;  Waline, Manuel elimentaire de droit adminis­
tratif ( I936) ,  p. 5 2. 
• See the cases in the Repertoire de ligislation (Dalloz) ( I 848),  Vol. I o, 
p. 472, No. 1 3 8  et seq. ; Supp. ( I 8 88 ) ,  Vol. 3, p. 2661 No. 209 et seq. Also see 
the cases noted in the digests to each volume of Dalloz, Recueil Periodique, 
under "C ompitence A Jministrative." 
8 Aucoc, Vol. I ,  p. 48I  ff. ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. 97 ff. ; Repertoire general 
alphabitique du droit franfais (I 894) , Vol. u, p. 639, No. 7 59 ;  Appleton, 
p. I4o ff. 
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sources as legislative history and annotations accompanying 
some of the recorded statutes afford no conclusive test.9 How­
ever, a recent legislative enactment of February 7, I 9JJ,10 
sanctioning the exclusive jurisdiction of the ordinary courts 
in all matters of personal liberty, is of considerable interest 
in this connection. This law expressly prohibits the adminis­
trative department from claiming jurisdiction over such mat­
ters in the Tribunal des conflits, even though acts of adminis­
trative agents may be involved. The discussion of the motives 
for the enactment11 makes especial reference to the judicial 
declarations that the ordinary courts are les gardiens naturels 
de la liberte individuelle.12 It is also of interest that the 
Conseil d'Etat at various times has acknowledged the purely 
declaratory nature of related statutory provisions by holding 
them to be but individual applications of a general principle�13 
The writers who deny that the protection of private rights 
is peculiarly a matter for the civil courts insist that the juris-
9 See, for example, Duvergier, Collection complete des lois, dicrets, etc., 
Vol. 3 3, p. 2 14, note 2. In connection with the law of June zz, 1 833 ,  regulating 
the organization of the Conseils generaux de departement and the Conseils 
d'arrondissement--both administrative bodies-it was argued that these elective 
bodies on general principles must be the judges of the validity of elections held 
for their formation ; "however, they [certain members of the legislature] con­
sented to make an exception to this rule, and to leave to adjudication by the 
ordinary courts questions relative to the eligibility [civil capacity] of the re­
spective persons, because these questions, of a totally judicial nature, require 
special knowledge which the council members might lack." [Italics added.] 
But compare the utterances made in the debates concerning the law of June 
30, 1 83 8, regulating the care of the insane. Duvergier, Vol. 38, p. 491 at 
5 1 2-5 13 .  Art. 29 of the statute makes provision for judicial inquiry into the 
legality of the detention of a person in an insane asylum under a decree of the 
administrative agencies. In regard to this statute it was said that "in the matter 
of personal liberty there is and can be but one recourse, that is, to the country's 
judiciary (la justice du pays) , because it alone offers a genuine guarantee." 
"' Art. 2 of the act amending the Code d'lnstruction Criminelle. 
n D. 1 933.4.66 at 67, note II. 
"" Cf. the opinion of the commissaire du gouvernment in L' Action fran�aise 
v. Bonnefoy-Sibour, D. 1935·3.25 at 2 8, discussed infra, chap. X, at note 1 .  
"' See Jacqteeli'1 Principes, p. 1 00 ;  Dareste, pp. 247-248, note 2 ;  decision 
of the Conseil d'Etat in the matter of Clouet, Rec. 1 844.493-94 (question of 
loss of citizenship) • 
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diction of the administrative courts is paramount and can be 
limited only by express statutory exceptions. As Bequet re­
marks,14 "jurisdiction depends upon the nature of the act 
under attack, and not upon the nature of the right in whose 
name action is brought." Further objections to the prevailing 
doctrine have been made upon the ground that there is no 
valid reason for discriminating between different private 
rights by not according all private rights the same protec­
tion.15 
However well taken the objections may be, and however 
numerous the statutory exceptions to the rule, the predomi­
nantly affirmative attitude of the authorities must at least be 
recognized as strong evidence of what the Germans would 
term a Rechtsuberzeugung; i. e., an innate belief pervading -
legal thought that the rights and liberties of the individual 
are more safely guarded in the hands of the judiciary than 
in those of administrative agencies. That this conviction among 
the French closely parallels the conception of the function 
of the courts in the United States can hardly be open to doubt. 
B. THE TRESPASS CONCEPT 
Prerevolutionary conditions in France called into being a 
jealously guarded differentiation of the administrative from 
the judicial agencies. For a time political bias obscured other 
14 Repertoire geniral alphabetique du droit franfais (1 894), Vol. n, p. 638, 
No. 752, citing Bequet, Contentieux administratif. 
115 Ibid., p. 639, No. 759 ; Jacquelin, Principes, p. 98.  Hauriou, Precis de 
droit administratif et de droit public, 1oth ed. ( 192 1 ) ,  p. 38,  note 1 ,  nth ed., 
( 1933) ,  p. 30, note 1 0  admits the principle of judicial competence in regard 
to invasions of property rights amounting to a total dispossession (cf. ibid., 
1 oth ed., pp. 876-77, note, nth ed., p. 347),  but denies its validity as to en­
croachments upon other private rights. 
Cf. the note by Alibert under the Melinette decision, S. 1 933 ·3·97, 5 1  R. D. P. 
( 1 9  34) 140 at 142, criticizing the decision because it was inspired by "the 
false and stereotyped" precept that the judicial courts are the guardians of 
personal rights and public liberties. 
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vital issues. But as the reasons for this attitude, and conse� 
quently the prejudice itself, began to disappear, interest in 
the normal scope of judicial authority revived. It was a natural 
course of events that evolved a means of bridging the gap be­
tween the competing principles of differentiation of agencies 
and of ordinary court protection of personal liberty and of 
property. Gradually, this means took shape in the form of the 
doctrine of administrative trespass-voie de fait.16 
r. General Theoretical Considerations 
(a) Illegality 
The act of an administrative officer, though performed in 
the exercise of his official functions, may be purely personal 
and therefore beyond the confines of the administrative juris­
diction.17 Similarly, acts of administrative officials or agencies 
may be devoid of intrinsic legality to a degree which reduces 
their administrative content to the bare fact of their origin 
within the administrative department. If such is the case, ac­
cording to the doctrine accepted in France, the department 
disclaims the act as nonadministrative, unless it is of a general 
regulatory nature.18 Jurisdiction may then be exercised by the 
ordinary courts without contravening the constitutional pro­
hibition against their taking cognizance of, and interfering 
with, administrative operations. 
As a rule, according to Laferriere's time-honored for­
mula/9 which continues to hold sway, illegality20 does not de-
16 "Administrative trespass" or "trespass" will be used interchangeably with 
the French term, voie de fait, throughout this discussion. 
17 Supra, chaps. VII and VIII. 
18 See supra, chap. VI. 
16 Vol. I ,  pp. 478-So, quoted by Dareste, p. I 68. Cf. Appleton, p. I03 ff. 
20 See Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 68I  ff. ; Hauriou, Pricis, I oth ed., p. 52 ff., 
nth ed., p. 577  ff. ; cf. Waline, Manuel, p. 97 ff., '3oo, 323 .  Cf. the declaration 
of rights of May 29, I 793, art. 24, supra, chap. VII, note I 2 ;  Duguit, Traiti, 
DOCTRINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE TRESPASS 139 
prive an action of its administrative quality21 so as to bring 
it automatically within the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
courts.22 To this extent the analogy between general regula­
tions and individual administrative acts is complete; both 
must be respected by the judicial courts and any infirmity in 
one or the other only "affects its validity, not its nature."23 
The rule, however, is subject to qualification in regard to acts 
of only individual application. 
(b) Usurpation of Power 
Individual administrative acts, in theory and practice, have 
always been recognized as being susceptible of varying degrees 
of illegality; as a result illegality has been deemed capable of 
assuming proportions that will destroy the administrative 
quality of the affected act. Such a high degree of illegality is, 
according to Laferriere, 24 present whenever an administrative 
agency steps not merely outside the sphere of its own compe­
tence but beyond the domain constitutionally occupied by the 
aggregate of administrative authority. 25 Any act illegal within 
Vol. 3, p. 264. See the comparative study of the question by Andersen, Ungultige 
Verwaltungsakte ( 1 927),  p. 293 ff. 
21 "Just as illegality or vice of form attending the decision of a judicial 
tribunal • • . does not destroy its judicial character." Laferriere, Vol. 
I, p. 478 • 
.. Laferriere, of course, had reference exclusively to actes de puissance pub­
lique, since according to his theory (see p. 40, supra), all actes de gestion in 
principle, come under the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. This, however, 
does not affect the validity of the doctrine in question but merely calls for the 
logically necessary extension of its application to all acts which according to 
modern prevailing theory have been beyond the reach of judicial scrutiny, viz., 
all acts--whether authoritative or managerial-pertaining to public service. 
Supra, p. 41 • 
.. Laferriere, ibid., p. 478. 
"' Ibid., p. 479· 
"" Cf. Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, pp. 7 14-1 5 ;  Dareste, pp. 262-265, citing 
Commune de Corbon v. Valet, D. I 877 . 1 .9.  Cf. the language used by the com­
missaire du gouvernement in Societe immobiliere de Saint-Just v. Prefet du 
RhOne, (discussed infra, chap. X, at note 24), D. 1903·3·41, S. 1904·3·1 7 at 
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this definition constitutes a usurpation of power.26 In turn, the 
resultant lack of administrative quality produces consequences 
whose nature differs according to whether the act bears the 
semblance of a decision or order/7 or of an act performed in 
the execution of such an order. 28 In the former case the pur­
ported decision is simply nonexistent, while in the latter the 
effects actually produced by the act of execution call for 
active redress. 
The "nonexistent act"29 by its very term implies that it is 
without any effect whatever, so that it may be completely 
disregarded. 30 Not being administrative and having no legal 
consequences, it is evident that it gives rise to no jurisdictional 
problem.81 
On the other hand, when usurped power not only is trans­
formed into an executory determination but manifests it-
20 :2 :  "Employing the customary legal terminology, it is not merely contended 
that [the administrative agency] exceeded 'the limits of its pow�rs,' but that it 
did not act in 'the exercise' of its powers, and that it left 'the domain legally 
assigned to it.' " 
"" Laferriere, Vol. 2, pp. 497-499 ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, pp. 709, 7 I 3  H., 
Vol. 2, pp. 294-95 ; Appleton, pp. IOJ-I 051 p. 593 :ff. ;  Bannard, p. 2 I 7· 
11 Decision executoire (supra, p. 36) .  
"" Operation materielle d'execution. Concerning the classification of  this type 
of act, and its relation to other forms of administrative action, cf. Kormann, 
System der rechtsgeschaftlichen Staatsakte ( I9 Io) ,  p. I J  :ff. ;  Jellinek, Verwal­
tungsrecht, 2d ed. ( I929) ,  pp. 2 37  H • 
.., Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 498, Vol. I, p. 48o ; Dareste, pp. I 5 J-I55> and cases 
there cited ; Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 7 I4 ;  Hauriou, Precis, Ioth ed., p. 3 9 ;  
Bonnard, Precis, p .  I 9 5 ;  Waline, Manuel, pp. 442-44, and cases there cited. 
See also the recent note by Blaevoet in D. I 9J8 . I . I06 (concerning four de­
cisions of the Cour de cassation) .  Blaevoet defends the theory of actes adminis­
tratifs inexistants and rejects the criticism of the doctrine by Professor Mestre 
(S. I 935·3·57) .  Blaevoet likens the nonexistence of an administrative act to its 
unconstitutionality (D. I9J8 . I .Io6 at u o :I ) . 
80 Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 498 ; Jeze, Les principes generaux du droit adminis­
tratif, 3d ed. ( I 925) , p. 76 H. ; Bonnard, Precis, p. I 95 i  Hauriou, Precis, 
I oth ed., p .  39·  
81 Because of the usurpation of power, such an act distinguishes itself from 
an act which is illegal because of an excess of power. See Duguit, Traite, Vol 3, 
pp. 7 I 4-7 I 7 ;  Hauriou, Precis, Ioth ed., p. 3 9 ;  cf. the note under Labadie v. 
Gaillard on, D. I 8 76. I .2 89 :2. The latter persists until annulled by the adminis­
trative j urisdiction. The nonexistent act need not (Laferriere, Vol. 2, p. 498 ; 
Appleton, p. 594) and, in fact, cannot, be annulled (Bonnard, Precis, p. I95) . 
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self through immediate and tangible results relative to  the 
rights of the individual, then the situation necessitates action 
to offset the illegal effects.82 In such cases it is no longer pos­
sible to speak of a "nonexisting act,"33 and under a system 
which postulates the differentiation of the administrative and 
judicial agencies the question of jurisdiction over the situa­
tion which arises must be dealt with.84 In fact, acts of this kind, ·· 
due to their flagrant illegality, have been deemed to be non­
administrative, so that the responsible administrative agency 
is concerned neither with the act itself nor with its conse­
quences. This construction automatically leaves the ordinary 
courts competent to grant relief whenever private rights have 
been thus invaded, without violating the principle of differ­
entiated agencies. 
2. Administrative Trespass Defined 
Illegality resulting from usurpation of power and the di­
rectly following violation of private rights are the basic ele­
ments �hich have been held to convert acts performed by 
administrative agents into trespasses. 35 
However, more recently the Conseil d'Etat has shown a tendency to allow a 
recourse for excess of power if not for the purpose of annulling, at least in 
order to censure the administration active for acting illegally. See Appleton, 
p. 596, Bannard, Precis, p. I 95, and the cases cited by these authors. Cf. Matter 
of Frecon, D. H. I 935· I 83, infra at note 54· 
82 Cf. Hauriou's note under the Piment case, S. I 9 I 0.3 .1 2.9, Jurisprudence 
( I 929) Vol. I ,  p. 6o4 at 6o9. 
83 Duguit, Traite, Vol. 3, p. 709. Cf. also Waline, Manuel, pp. 443-4441 as 
to indications in the Conseil d'Etat of a tendency away from the doctrine of 
actes inexistants (Ministre des Travaux publics v. Mahieu, D. H. I 932.I541 
S. I 932.3.6o ) .  
"' The distinction between the nonexisting executory decision and the wholly 
unauthorized act of execution has not always been made. It seems to have been 
stated clearly only recently by Professor Waline in his note accompanying the 
Action franc;aise case (D. I 935·3·25 at 2 6 :2 ) .  Cf., for instance, Appleton, 
pp. I o3-I 05, 593 ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, uth ed., p. 578.  See Duguit, Traiti, 
Vol. 31 pp. 7 I o-7 I 5 ;  cf. Dareste, p. I 551 note 3 ·  
85 Laferriere, Vol. I 1  p. 530 ; cf. Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 709 ; Hauriou, 
Precis, 1 2th ed., p. 578 ; Appleton, pp. I o4-I05 ;Bonnard, Precis, p. I58 ; 
Waline, Manuel, p. 5 7 ;  note in D. I935·3·25 at 26 ff. (see the cpnclusions of 
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The courts themselves do not seem to have ever given a 
clear definition of administrative trespass. Nevertheless the 
concept has served in numerous cases as a criterion of juris­
diction. Obviously the reluctance to indicate the probable 
limits of its application is calculated to preserve the freedom 
to predicate the ordinary jurisdiction over acts of adminis­
trative origin on other grounds than that they are "nonad­
ministrative." This applies equally to the administrative and 
to the judicial courts, as well as to the Tribunal des confl.its, 
in their respective concessions, assertions and affirmations of 
that j urisdiction.36 
In the frequent applications of the doctrine of voie de fait, 
the jurisdiction of the civil courts has commonly been justified 
by emphasizing only the "nonadministrative" character of the 
the commissaire du gouvernement, ibid.) . Cf. also, Dareste, pp. 262-267, 
2 7 1-2 7 9 ;  Teissier, La responsabiliti de la puissance publique (I  906) , PP· ss-s s.  
88 In the case of Favre v.  Mas, D.  I 9D4.2.321 ,  referred to by Dareste, p. 274, 
note 3, the Cour d'appel de Lyon held that the arrest by three police officers 
(agents des moeurs) , without warrant or express authority of law, of a woman 
suspected of prostitution because of her alleged conduct constituted a judicial 
and not an administrative act, even though performed by administrative officers. 
Consequently the judicial authority was competent in the matter of damages 
which the woman sought to recover for the illegal arrest ; for the judicial 
courts are "the natural guardians of individual liberty" and, in principle, their 
jurisdiction extends to all questions affecting that right. Dareste (ibid.) points 
out ,that this formula was used to circumvent the necessity of having the 
legality of an administrative act determined by the administrative jurisdiction 
(see question prijudicielle, chap. VI, note 5 1 ,  supra) . However, instead of 
reaching the same result by way of the simple and unquestionably applicable 
doctrine of trespass (Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 3o) , the court rested its authority 
upon the judicial nature of the act. (But see the law of Feb. 7, 1 933, supra, 
note 1 0, vesting jurisdiction in all matters of individual liberty in the ordinary 
courts and excluding conflicts where acts performed by administrative agents 
are involved.) 
In several cases of seizures (infra, chap. X, note 9) performed by police agents, 
the Conseil d'ttat refused to take jurisdiction, and the Tribunal des conB.its 
under similar circumstances confirmed the ordinary jurisdiction on the ground 
that the acts of seizure were judicial in nature. The acts in those cases were 
indeed authorized under statutes appointing the particular administrative agents 
officers of the police judiciare. (See Berthilemy, Traiti ilimentaire de droit 
administratif, 1 3th ed. ( 1 9 3 3 ) ,  p. 267.) Nevertheless it would seem to have 
presented little difficulty to term administrative an act as plainly so as the seizure 
of property. By way of analogy, if acts performed by administrative officers are 
not necessarily administrative, acts emanating from judicial officers need not 
indiscriminately be deemed judicial. 
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act complained of. 37 Thus, superficially, the primary con­
cern seems to have been that the principle of differentiated 
agencies should be left unimpaired. Nevertheless, sight must 
not be lost of the fact that every trespass presupposes the 
violation of a personal right. Hence the question becomes at 
once pertinent whether the rule of judicial competence in 
cases of administrative trespass is not in fact a manifestation 
of the desire to remit the protection of all civil liberties and 
property rights to the ordinary courts. 
(a) Applications 
i. Illegal arrest. The Cour de cassation, in I 876, in the 
case of Labadie v. Gaillardon,38 decided that an illegal arrest 
followed by unlawfully prolonged detention was not an ad­
ministrative act and that therefore the lower civil court was 
competent to take cognizance. Although there is · no express 
reference, the decision is a manifest application of the tres­
pass doctrine, revealed in this language : "In passing upon 
the character [illegality] and the consequences [invasion of 
personal liberty] of the act, the court below did not interfere 
with any administrative act, and consequently did not violate 
the principle of the differentiation of agencies."39 
87 Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 35, uth ed., p. 2 7 ;  Bonnard, Precis, p. 1 5 7 ;  
Waline, Manuel, p .  56. 
88 D. 1 8 76. 1 .289 at 296. Gaillardon was arrested upon the order of Labadie 
shortly before the latter received a telegram containing his expected nomina­
tion as prefect. Thereafter the prefect permitted Gaillardon to be detained 
seven days without a hearing. Gaillardon committed suicide, and his widow 
sued the prefect personally in the civil courts for indemnity and recovered the 
judgment which the defendant below asked the Cour de cassation to set aside. 
111 The case is noteworthy also because it is in sharp contrast with the later 
case of Favre v. Mas, D. 1 904.2.32 1 ,  supra, note 36, in that it expressly holds 
that the act of arrest was not a judicial function subject to inquiry only in the 
ordinary courts. The point is discussed with elaboration in the note accompany­
ing the report of the decision. 
Cf. Matter of GinU:re, Rec. 1 904.88, where the Conseil d'Etat, without qual­
ifying its grounds for the rejet, declined to take jurisdiction over a case of 
alleged arbitrary arrest of a woman. 
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ii. Illegal interference with religious· freedom. In Cure 
de Realmont v. Maire de Realmont/0 the Tribunal des con­
flits recently upheld the jurisdiction of a civil court which had 
been invoked by a church community to secure relief from 
administrative interference with property devoted to religious 
purposes. The action taken by the mayor was deemed not 
to conform to the resolution passed by the town council, and 
because of the resultant violation of religious freedom the act 
was characterized as a trespass. 41 
There is a series of interesting decisions of the Tribunal des 
conflits involving invasions of religious freedom in which the 
trespass doctrine was applied and the judicial competence 
affirmed. 42 The question presented by these cases was the 
authority of a mayor to order the ringing of church bells on 
the occasion of civil interments. Under certain statutes43 and 
regulations, 44 church bells are recognized as belonging to the 
religious cult, except in case of public danger and except as 
local laws or local custom authorize their use for other pur­
poses. In each case the mayor's order to ring the bells at a 
civil burial, having been found to be contrary to existing laws 
and regulations and without the sanction of a local custom, 
was held not an administrative act, but a voie de fait and sub­
j ect to redress in the civil courts.45 
.. s. 1 9 3 5-3-97· 
"' The council had authorized the construction of a public comfort station 
at a designated location behind a church building. The mayor had part of an iron 
fence upon the church property removed and had the station placed up against 
the church. In order to occupy premises devoted to religious cults it would have 
been necessary to follow a specific statutory procedure. 
40 Abbe Piment v. Guichard-Voillemond, Maire, Rec. 1 9 1 0.323,  S. 1 9 1 0.3.1 29, 
D. 1 9 1 1.3.4 1 ; Abbe Mignon v. Godet, Rec. 1 9 1 0.442, D. 1 9 1 1 .3 .41 ; Abbe 
Thiney v. Dompnier, Rec. 1 9 1 6.52. See also Duguit, Traittf, Vol. 3, p. 7 1 6 ;  
Jeze, Principes, p .  78.  
48 Art. 2 7, law of Dec. 9, 1 905 ; art. 5 ,  law of Jan. z, 1 907. 
" Art. 51,  Ordinance of March 1 6, 1 906 • 
.. Cf., however, the recourse for excess of power to the Conseil d'Etat in 
the . case of Abbe Bruant v. Maire de Breurey-les-Faverney, D. 1 9 1 1 .3.41 , S. 
1 9 1 0.3 . 1 29. t:nder identical facts, with the exception that the mayor alleged 
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iii. Illegal damage to land. In 1 8 92, the conflict arising 
from the case of Lebel v. Bault46 was decided in favor of the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. An action had been in­
stituted to recover possession of land, to enj oin the taking 
of material from the land, to have the land restored to its 
previous condition, and to recover damages for material al­
ready removed and used for maintenance work on a public 
road. The Tribunal found that the taking of the material was 
illegal and a trespass because of nonobservance of statutory 
formalities. 47 
The Cour de cassation in Ville de Mende v. Roussel 
( I  90 5 )  48 held that the Cour d'appel de Nimes did not violate 
the principle of the differentiation of agencies by ordering 
the city to  restore, at its cost, a private water supply which 
had been destroyed by its agents, without observing the re­
quired procedure. The action taken was termed a trespass. 49 
iv. Illegal military requisition. In 1 930, the Tribunal des 
conflits resolved a negative conflict50 arising from the refusal 
of both the civil courts and the Conseil d'Etat to exercise 
jurisdiction in an action for damages by the Union Villeneu­
voise de Comerves/1 whose canning plant had been taken 
a local custom, the Conseil d'Etat (July 8, I 9 Io) apparently treated the act 
as administrative, though it denied the existence of a local custom, and an­
nulled it. 
In a note concerning this and the above decisions (in S. I 9 I o. 3 .  x z  9, and 
Jurisprudence, Vol. I, pp. 6o4, 6o9 ff.) ,  Hauriou reconciled the holding of 
the Conseil d'Etat with those of the Tribunal des conflits, suggesting that the 
order of the mayor to ring the bells was considered by the Conseil as a decision 
executoire while the Tribunal treated it as an act of execution. This dual aspect 
of an order, or the coincidence of a preliminary determination with the order 
causing its execution, is only possible in case of verbal orders in which the 
two elements, though present, cannot be readily distinguished . 
.. D. I 892-J.I I O. 
"' Authorization by prefect, according to Law of May 2 r ,  I 8J 6, art. I 7. 
See "procedural trespass," infra, p. I 5 I .  
'" D. I 9 I O. I .266 a t  269. 
49 See "procedural trespass," infra, p. I 5 I .  
"" Supra, p .  27. 
151 D. H. 193 I . IJS·  
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over by the military authorities. The Tribunal ordered the 
civil court to take cognizance because the requisition, which 
had not been made in conformity with statutory formalities, 
constituted a trespass. 
v. Illegal encroachments on private property. A typical 
situation that has found its way into the courts with some fre­
quency is the encroachment on private property in the course 
of installing electric line equipment. As early as I 8 84 the 
Tribunal des conflits in Neveux v. Administration des postes 
et telegraphei2 affirmed the competence of the civil courts 
in which an action was pending against the post office depart­
ment on account of the installation of telephone line equip­
ment and apparatus on top of plaintiff's buildings. Finding 
that the prefect, in ordering the construction upon private 
property, had acted without statutory or regulatory authority, 
the Tribunal held that the act was not administrative.53 In 
a recent case, Matter of Frecon,54 the Conseil d'Etat again 
termed a voie de fait the act of placing telephone line supports 
into the fac;ades of private buildings without observing the 
statutory procedure which had been prescribed in I 8 8 5, as the 
sequel to the N eveux case. 55 
"" Rec. 1 884.909. 
"" In consequence of this litigation, the competent minister submitted a 
draft of a statute regulating the procedure to be followed by the prefect under 
similar circumstances. It became law on July 28, 1 8 85. 
"' D. H. 1 9J5.1 83 .  See 52 R. D. P. ( 1935) 340 and cases cited there. Cf. 
the five cases in D. 1 937.1 . 1 7  (Cour de cassation) ,  summarized 54 R. D. P. 
( 1937)  5 1 7 :  Compagnie nouvelle d'eclairage, etc. v. Guiringaud ; Regie du 
Syndicat intercommunal, etc. v. Same ; Beziat v. Societe Nord-Lumiere ; 
Syndicat des communes, etc. v. Societe Phelan-Segur ; Syndicat des communes, 
etc. v. Societe Cuvelier. 
111 Supra, note 52. The Conseil d'Etat "annulled" the act of the department 
and referred the plaintiff to the civil courts "which alone are competent to 
adjudicate the consequences of a voie de fait." The annulment of an executed 
decision of course amounts to no more than a censure, and the holding of the 
Conseil d'Etat does not imply that such an annulment was necessary before 
the civil court could take jurisdiction. Had the case been brought before the 
civil court at the outset, and had the administrative asserted a conflict, the 
latter would unquestionably have been resolved in favor of immediate action 
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vi. Illegal abridgment of the freedom of the press. In­
vasions of the freedom of the press have given further oc­
casion to sustain the power of the ordinary courts to grant 
relief from the administrative action. In the widely discussed 
case of L' Action franfaise/'6 the Tribunal des conflits held 
"the general seizure of a newspaper, wherever the same may 
be offered for sale" on a certain day, to be a trespass and sub­
ject to redress in the civil courts. The court's decision was 
based upon the ground that the measure, as taken by the pre­
fect of Paris, was not indispensable to the restoration and 
maintenance of the public order. 
(b) Evaluation 
Laferriere, 57 when expounding the theory of the judicial 
protectorate of civil liberties and property, envisaged situa­
tions virtually identical with those involved in the foregoing 
cases. These examples lead with indisputable force to the con­
clusion that in the case of trespass the jurisdiction of the or­
dinary courts rests entirely on the fact of invasion of personal ­
rights. Nevertheless this conclusion must be viewed with 
caution in order not to do violence to basic concepts of the 
droit administratif. Thus, while violation of civil liberties 
or of rights of property is an essential element of adminis­
trative trespass, the illegality of the invasion is no less im­
portant. So far as the courts are concerned, "illegality" refers 
to the intrinsic or "nonadministrative" nature of the official 
act, and this illegality, rather than the character of its conse-
in the ordinary courts without the previous intervention of the Conseil d'Etat. 
It may well be supposed that the particular procedure in the case was em­
ployed for the very purpose of bringing the matter before the administrative 
jurisdiction in order to provoke an expression of its attitude towards the issue 
involved. 
18 L'Action fran�aise v. Bonnefoy�Sibour, D. I 93 S·l·ZS1 noted 53 R. D. P. 
(1936) 296, discuSsed infra, chap. X. 
11'1 Vol, I, pp. 479-480, 530, 
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quences, has been the touchstone of jurisdiction. The emphasis 
upon the formal aspect of the injurious act is even more evi­
dent in the cases of clear trespass in which redress for the 
violated right is permitted to be had in civil courts on the 
purely formal ground that the act was nonadministrative be­
cause it was judiciaJ.58 Moreover, the element of illegality 
requires especial consideration because, as will be developed 
further, not all illegal administrative invasions of personal 
and property rights are trespasses in the sense that they are 
subj ect to redress in the ordinary courts. 
The utility of the concept of administrative trespass59 and 
the necessity when applying it of appraising separately the im­
peached act, as distinguished from its consequences, derive 
logically from the peculiar situation brought about in France 
by the interpretation of the separation of powers. It is true 
that the adjudication of private rights and the dispensation 
of relief in the event of the violation are generally deemed 
to be within the exclusive province of the judicial courts. But 
whenever acts of administrative agencies are involved, the 
question of their propriety and legality can, according to pre­
vailing doctrine, be passed upon only by the administrative 
m Favre v. Mas, D. 1 904.Z.J Z r ,  supra, note 36. 
"" There are some attempts to deny completely the soundness of the voie 
de fait doctrine. Laroque, in a note accompanying the report of the Cure de 
Realmont v. Maire de Realmont decision (S. 1 935 ·3 ·97> supra, note 40) , ques­
tions the grounds for the decision on that account. He finds justification for the 
jurisdiction of the civil court not in the violation of the freedom of religion 
but in the illegal entry upon the church property. Generally, he recognizes the 
principle of judicial competence only in the case of invasion of privately­
owned real estate. See also the note by Blaevoet under the decisions reported 
in D. I937 · I . I 7  at r 8 :z, supra, note 54· But see his more recent note (D. 
1938 . r . ro6) in which this commentator has fully "reconsidered" the valid­
ity of the voie de fait doctrine (ibid. at I r o.z ) .  [This note has not been avail­
able to the author until a time when it was no longer possible to give a fuller 
account of this interesting exposition of the doctrine of administrative tres­
pass. However, it may suffice to say that Blaevoet declares himself entirely 
in accord with Professor Waline's analysis (infra, p. I 54) of the trespass con­
cept. D. 1 938. I . Io6 at I I I  :r .] 
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courts and must always be referred to them.60 Under the con­
stitutional and statutory protection guaranteeing administra­
tive autonomy, the administrative courts are the sole judges 
of the formal validity, the administrative legality of such 
acts. The administrative department therefore will ordi­
narily not tolerate its own acts to be condemned, except by its 
own judicial machinery. It is always directly concerned with 
the act and its administrative purpose, although the judicial 
courts may deal with its collateral or secondary effects. How­
ever, now and then these effects are so drastic as to be wholly 
out of proportion to the original administrative object. May 
it not be assumed then that at such a juncture the administra­
tive department is no longer interested in being identified 
with the act, and therefore does not insist upon submission of 
the question of legality for its determination? Is it not more 
convenient, and less injurious to the administrative prestige, 
to abandon the enfant terrible to be branded a voie de fait 
and to be disciplined at the hands of a judicial court? 
The trespass concept is elastic. The civil courts may readily 
resort to it under circumstances where it would be rejected by 
the administrative courts. The degree of illegality required 
may vary according to the dissimilar views of the respective 
courts and these views in turn must be harmonized through 
the office of the Tribunal des conflits. However, it is certain 
that the doctrine of administrative trespass has a definite place 
in French administrative law61 and operates in the interest of 
both administrative and j udicial justice. In regard to the 
latter it offers a special advantage by eliminating in many 
80 See questions prejudicielles, supra, chap. VI, note 5 1 ; Hauriou, Precis, 
1oth ed., p. 877, note z .  
81 See the note by Blaevoet, D. 1 9 3 8. I . Io6 at  1 1 2 :2 .  It  will be made to 
appear more clearly (infra, p. 1 74) that, notwithstanding the similar juris­
dictional implications, voie de fait does not in any way coincide with faute 
personnelle (supra, chap. VIII) . 
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instances the necessity of referring to the administrative juris­
diction the question of the legality of acts for which redress is 
sought. 
3· The Elements of Trespa.ss- Analyzed 
The very fact that the doctrine of voie de fait has received 
close attention and analysis only in the comparatively recent 
legal literature is significant. It points unquestionably to the 
cause which, during the past two decades, has engendered a 
great deal of new and penetrating interest in the relation of 
the administrative and judicial departments. This cause, in 
France as in this country, is the rapid expansion of administra­
tive activity since the first World War. Indeed, it would have 
been strange if during this period the notion of administra­
tive trespass had escaped the searching thought of contem­
porary legal writers. 62 
(a) Illegality-Usurpation and Procedural Irregularity · 
· The results of the various analyses to which administrative 
trespass has been subjected are highly interesting and im­
portant for the present investigation. According to Hauriou, 
who was the first to undertake careful examination and defi­
nition, the illegality which may taint the act of an adminis­
trative authority can assume two distinct forms. Trespasses 
may arise not only from usurpation of power,U3 reflected in 
the ends towards which the act is directed, but also from the 
unlawfulness of the means employed, i. e., from disregard 
of procedural requirements. So Hauriou, 64 looking only to 
intrinsic defects, has classified trespass as ( I ) trespass due to 
82 See Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 35, uth ed., p. 26 ;  Bannard, Precis, 
p. 1 5 7 ;  Waline, note in D. 1 935·3·25 at 26. 
88 Supra, p. 139 ff. 
"' Hauriou, Precis, toth ed., pp. 35-36, note 3 ·  
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lack of lawful authority65 and ( 2)  trespass due t o  procedural 
irregularity.66 Trespass of the first type presupposes an act 
performed outside the exercise of authority expressly con­
ferred. Hauriou's qualifying phrase CCfor want of power"­
envisages both the constitutional power and authority derived 
from legislative and quasi-legislative acts.67 The absence of a 
power to act in this instance results in an excess of power at­
tended by a total lack of authority. On the other hand, in the 
case of a ((procedural trespass," there is an excess of power 
in the sense of a total disregard of required formalities.68 
A second classification of trespass on the basis of intrinsic 
illegality, suggested by Bonnard, 69 seems to differ from the 
foregoing in form but not in substance. Bonnard distinguishes 
(a) trespass because of irregularity in the executed decision, 
and (b) trespass because of irregularity in the act of execu­
tion. The former is attributed to the virtual nonexistence of 
the purported decision, 70 which is ineffectual because it tends 
611 Voie de fait par manque de droit ("for want of power") .  
"" Voie de fait par manque de procedure ("for want of procedure") .  
07 Cf. Abbe Piment v. Guichard-Voillemond, Maire, Rec. 1 9 10.3Z3, S. 
I 9 I 0,3. I Z9, D. 1 9 1 1 ·3·411 supra, note 4z. Hauriou, Precis, 1 oth ed., pp. 34, 
5z, emphasizes that there is an autonomous regulatory power which the ad­
ministrative may exercise to determine its own "rights" within a domain that 
not even the legislature may arbitrarily limit. If on the one hand the admin­
istrative has only such "rights" as have been specifically regulated by legis­
lative enactment or by its own rules, the administrative rule-making power, 
on the other hand, although it must not run contrary to the laws, may be exer­
cised to the extent that it is not expressly limited by law. See also ibid., p. 35, 
note 1 .  
Cf. Andersen, UngiUtige Verwaltungsakte ( 19z7) , pp. z93, 303 ff. And 
see also Jellinek, Gesetz und Verordnung ( 1 887) , pp. Z4 ff., 366 ff., 395 ff., 
Mayer, Deutsckes Verwaltungsreckt, zd ed. ( 1 9 14) , Vol. 1 ,  p. 65 ff. 
88 See Hauriou's note under Societe immobiliere de Saint-Just v. Prefet du 
Rhone, S. 1 904·3· 1 7 at 1 8 :1 ,  Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p. 84 at 1 00 :  "it is very 
important to confine the administration to its habitual procedure, otherwise, 
whenever the ordinary methods (mesures de haute police) proved incon­
venient, there would be added extraordinary procedures. • • • There 
should no more be extraordinary methods in administration than in the courts 
of j ustice." 
"" Bonnard, Precis, p. 1 5 7. 
70 Supra, p. 140, cf. !he, Principes, p. 78 .  
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to operate upon a subject matter wholly beyond the powers 
of the administrative71 or because it was made without express 
statutory authority. The latter is said to arise whenever one 
of the following defects is present : ( I ) intrinsic illegality in 
the means of execution, ( 2)  abuse of an intrinsically legal 
means, ( 3 )  employment of a legal means of execution but 
with complete disregard of the procedure prescribed, (4) em­
ployment of a legally permissible method of enforcement 
but without the judicial authorization which (subject to cer­
tain exceptions) 72 is required in all cases of direct execution 
against persons or property. It is interesting that in this one 
instance Bonnard associates the trespass doctrine with the 
principle that the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts extends 
to all questions concerning individual liberty and private 
property. However, there seems to be no adequate reason for 
differentiating between invasions of the private domain 
through the direct enforcement of general police measures 
against persons and property, as in the case of arrests or seiz­
ures, and incidental encroachments arising in coimection with 
administrative operations, for instance, the appropriation of 
private property for the public benefit. Taking Bcinnard's 
analysis as a whole, the situations contemplated under (a) 
clearly, and those under (b) ( I ) and ( 2) if only slightly re­
formulated, correspond to Hauriou's manque de droit, while 
(b) ( 3 )  and ( 4) are typical instances of manque de procedure. 
"Nonobservance of procedural requirements" has not 
always been distinguished from "lack of authority under posi­
tive general rules" as a separate form of intrinsic infirmity 
which may corrupt the acts of administrative agents. 73 Never-
n Supra, p. 1 39· See Duguit, Etudes de droit public, ( I 90 I )  Vol. I ,  p. I I ff. ; 
Esmein, Eliments de droit constitutionnel fran�ais et compare, 7th ed. ( I 9: u ) ,  
Vol. I ,  pp. 33-35, 548. 
1111 Infra, p. I 64 ff. 
"' See, for instance, Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, pp. 709-Io, 7 I 6-7 I 7 ;  Appleton, 
op. 1 04-5, 593-94. 
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theless, there are many instances in which the courts have un­
mistakably recognized procedural trespass. Some examples 
will be found among the cases which have been previously 
discussed. Thus, in the Realmont case74 the court held that 
"in the absence of a disappropriation effected in accordance 
with the statutory provisions, 75 the removal of the fence and 
the installation of the public comfort station . . . consti­
tuted a trespass."76 Instances of purely procedural trespass 
occur frequently in connection with the taking of private prop­
erty for public use. So in the Lebel case77 the failure to obtain 
the authorization of the prefect 78 required by statute caused 
the removal of materials from private land for road purposes 
to be characterized as a trespass. Similar results were reached 
because of the disregard of statutory procedure in the Union 
Villeneuvoise 79 and the Frecon80 cases. 81 
•• Supra, note 40. 
75 Art. 1 3  of the law of Dec. 9, 1 905, concerning the separation of church 
and state provides that church property can be taken only upon securing a 
decree from the Conseil d'Etat or in pursuance of a special act of the legislature. 
76 S. 1935 ·3 ·97 at 99 : 1 .  The court's language in this case indicates that a 
double trespass was found. Not only had church property been taken without 
observing certain statutory formalities, but at the same time religious freedom 
had been violated. 
The invasion of liberties through the taking of private property may occur 
in other situations as well. Compare the seizure of newspapers or printing 
machinery, which also involve encroachment upon the freedom of the press. 
Obviously coincidences of this type, together with the comparative frequency 
of trespass in regard to property, have militated against the recognition by 
some writers of the utility of the concept of voie de fait administrative. 
77 Supra, note 46. 
78 Art. 17 of the law of May :u, 1 836, concerning rural highways. 
"" Supra, note 5 1 .  The formalities prescribed by the law of July 3, 1 8 77  (as 
amended) relative to military requisitions had been completely omitted. 
80 Supra, note 54· Telephone line equipment had been attached to the walls 
of a privately-owned building with complete disregard of the requirements 
of notice and hearing provided by art. 6 et seq. of the law of July 2 8, 1 885, 
regulating the construction, maintenance, and operation of telegraph and 
telephone lines. 
81 See also Repertoire pratique de ligislation de doctrine et de jurisprudence 
( 19 1 2 ) ,  Vol. 3, pp. 257-58, Nos. q6  et seq. 
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(b) Invasion of Civil Liberties and Property Rights 
Until very recently, analytical treatment remained con­
fined to the forms of inherent illegality which convert the 
act of an administrative agency into a trespass. The attendant 
violations of specific rights and liberties have received only 
incidental attention.82 However, the aftermath of an uncom­
monly important decision rendered by the Tribunal des con­
flits on April 8, 1 93 5  brought forth penetrating examination 
of the elements of voie de fait by Professor Waline.83 For 
the first time an equal amount of attention was given to the 
criterion of "invasion of private property or of public liber­
ties." 84 Waline has demonstrated that actually the violation 
of a right or of a liberty is sufficient to constitute a trespass 
only where the injury is especially severe. 85 The relevancy of 
· · the degree or magnitude of the unlawful invasion of rights 
and liberties is exemplified by cases in which the jurisdiction 
of the ordinary courts was not conceded although the pre­
requisites of voie de fait seemed fully satisfied. 
"" Hauriou, Precis, 10th ed., p. 3 5 ;  Bannard, Precis, p. 1 5 7. 
83 See Waline's note in D. 1935·3·25. Waline is otherwise in agreement with 
Hauriou and Bonnard and distinguishes trespass arising from complete want 
of authority from trespass due to nonobservance of formalities prescribed by 
statute and especially intended for the protection of private persons. 
84 "By public liberties are understood certain rights whose exercise appears 
particularly precious to the individual, and which, therefore, have been 
guaranteed by the laws or by the constitution." Waline, Manuel, p. 52.  
85 See note by Blaevoet, D. I 9J 8. I . I o6 at 1 1 1 :1 .  
CHAPTER X 
Recent Applications of the Trespass Doctrine 
A. THE ACTION FRANc;AISE CASE 
FOR complete understanding of the significance of the doctrine of administrative trespass in French law, it is necessary to examine in detail the resolution of the con­
flict in the case of L'Action franfaise v. Bonnefoy-Sibour.1 
The Action franfaise case involved the powers of adminis­
trative agencies in regard to the freedom of the press, and 
the conclusion reached is in striking contrast to the earlier 
1 D. 1 93 5·3·25, noted 53  R. D. P. ( 1 936) 296. The decision is in the 
customarily concise form : "The laws of August 1 6-24, 1 790, Fructidor 1 6, 
year III, Pluviose 28, year VIII, July 29, 1 88 1  and April s, 1 8 84, have been 
examined. 
"Considering that the action instituted by the publishing company L' Action 
franfaise against Bonnefoy-Sibour before the justice of the peace of the northern 
canton of Versailles has for its object the reparation of the damage caused by 
the seizure of the newspaper L' Action franfaise on the morning of Febru­
ary 7, 1 934, ordered by the prefect of police to be made at the depositories of 
that newspaper in Paris and in the Department of the Seine ; considering that 
the seizure of newspapers is regulated by the law of July 29, 1 8 8 1 ; that, 
although it is the duty of mayors, and in Paris of the prefect of police, to take 
all measures necessary for the preservation of public order and safety, these 
duties do not carry with them the power to cause, as a preventive measure, 
the seizure of a newspaper without a showing that the seizure, ordered in such 
a general manner as appears from the record, viz., wherever the newspaper 
shall be offered for sale, in Paris as well as in the suburbs, was indispensable 
for the maintenance or restoration of public order; that, therefore, the measure 
attacked in the circumstances constituted merely a trespass so that the ordinary 
courts have jurisdiction over the case now pending before the court of Ver­
sailles ; considering, nevertheless, that the court could not, without exceeding 
its powers, condemn the prefect to the costs on account of the rejection of his 
challenge [concerning the jurisdiction], because the prefect [in asserting a 
conflict] did not act as a party to the proceeding but as representative of the 
sovereign power: 
"Art. 1 .  The arrete de con flit made by the Prefect of Seine-and-Oise on 
December 20, 1 934 is annulled. 
"Art. 2. The disposition in the judgment of the civil court of Versailles, 
dated December 14, 1 934, condemning the Prefect of Seine-and-Oise to the 
costs is deemed not to have been made." 
ISS 
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holdings in the Pelletier2 and Gounouilhou3 cases. Upon 
the order of the prefect of police of Paris, the newspaper 
L'Action franfaise had been seized on the morning of Febru­
ary 7, 1 934, at all places where it was held for sale and dis­
tribution within the city of Paris and the Department of the 
Seine. The plaintiff publisher instituted an action for dam­
ages in the civil court of Versailles, whose jurisdiction was 
affirmed by the Tribunal des conflits after it had been chal­
lenged by the defendant prefect. The seizure had been or­
dered during the grave political situation existing in Paris 
on the night of February 6, and the commissaire du gouverne­
ment pointed out that4 "if ever a police prefect could make 
use of exceptional powers it was during that night, and the 
seizure of newspapers containing appeals to riot could well 
constitute a legitimate use of the police power to the extent 
that the seizure was indispensable to the prevention of re­
newed and more serious disorders.''5 The conclusions of Com­
missaire J osse, which the Tribunal adopted, rest on a minute 
analysis of the jurisdictional issue involved, and thus con­
siderable light is thrown upon the broader implications of the 
trespass doctrine and upon the import of its application in the 
case. 
The Tribunal des conflits had to determine whether or not 
it was proper for the civil court of Versailles to allow the ac­
tion against the prefect. This rendered it necessary to consider 
individually the possible factors which could subject the act 
of an administrative agency to the scrutiny of a civil court. 
• Supra, chap. VII, note 6o. 
8 Supra, chap. VIII, note 29 ; note particularly Laferriere's interesting criti­
cism, ibid. at note 3 I .  
• D. I 9 3 5·3·25 at 3 0 :  2. 
6 The prefect of police, under article 8 of a regulation of March I 31 I 9241 
concerning newsstand concessions by the city of Paris, had power to prohibit 
the sale at stands of newspapers which in his opinion endangered the public 
order ; but he had no such special power as to the sale in other places, as for 
instance in the streets. 
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In the first place the question arose whether the prefect had 
committed a faute personnelle6 which would involve his per­
sonal liability. This question was answered in the negative by 
the commissaire, 7 and implicitly by the court, on the ground 
that obviously the prefect had acted not from personal mo­
tives but from the manifest desire to restore and maintain 
public order in the city of Paris on that critical date. In other 
words, he "exercised police powers which he had, or believed 
he had ; whether wrongly or rightly, legally or illegally, 
matters little as far as jurisdiction is concerned."8 
The second consideration was the apparent analogy in the 
facts of the case to those of tpree earlier cases9 decided by the 
Tribunal des confl.its in 1 8 89. At that time the Tribunal had 
held the ordinary courts competent to entertain suits insti­
tuted against three prefects as the sequel to certain seizures 
which were found to constitute invasions of the freedom of 
the press. It had to be determined, therefore, whether the 
principle upon which jurisdiction depended in the former 
cases was applicable to the present case. The commissaire 
8 Supra, chap. VIII. 
7 Commissaire Josse, relying on Laferriere's definition of faute personnelle 
as an act "which reveals the man with his human weaknesses, his passions, his 
indiscretions," and not "the official, the representative of the state, more or 
less subject to errors." Supra, chap. VIII, note 9· 
" D. 1 9 3 5·3·25 at z 8 : I .  
• Defeuille v. Prefet de  police, Usannaz-Joris v. Lefebvre du  Grosriez, prefet 
de la Savoie, and Michau et Lafreney v. Boegner, prefet du Loiret, D. 1 89o.J.65. 
All of these cases involved political agitations directed against the republican 
government by the former nobility of France, in particular by Phillipe, Count 
of Paris. In the first case the prefect of police of Paris had ordered the seizure 
of a manifesto addressed by the Count of Paris to mayors and towns of France, 
as well as of plates and signature stamps used in the printing. In the second 
case the Prefect of Savoy had seized at a post office letters similarly addressed 
and containing copies of the same manifesto. In the third case the Prefect of 
Loiret ordered the seizure of likenesses of the Count of Paris to be distributed 
with a newspaper. The courts in which the respective complaints were received 
were held to have power to give relief by ordering the restitution of the confiscated 
property or by assessing damages against the prefects ; not, however, by holding 
the postmaster liable in damages for having surrendered the letters, as in the 
second case. 
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demonstrated at length that the earlier decisions could no 
longer stand as precedents, notwithstanding the fact that the 
freedom of the press was still regulated by the law of July 29, 
I 8 8 I ,  10 prohibiting preventive confiscations by the adminis­
trative and permitting seizures only in aid of criminal prose­
cutions for specifically designated offenses.11 This law had 
not been made the basis of the former adjudications, but the 
jurisdiction of the civil courts in those cases had been upheld 
on the ground that the respective prefects had acted as "of­
ficers of the judicial police"12 under powers conferred by 
article I O  of the Code d'instruction criminelle. Since in the 
Action franfaise case the prefect had not acted in such capacity 
nor in aid of a criminal prosecution/3 but strictly in the exer­
cise of police powers, justification for the ordinary jurisdic­
tion had to be found elsewhere. 
The seizure of the newspaper L' Action franfaise had the 
appearance of a bona fide act of an administrative official per­
formed in the exercise of his functions. The opinion of the 
commissaire points out that under normal circumstances the 
administrative seizure of newspapers would amount to such 
a flagrant violation of the freedom of the press that it could 
not be considered an exercise of police powers, but would 
10 As amended, Dec. 1 2, I 893·  
n Provocation to such crimes as murder and arson, and to crimes against the 
security of the state (see law of December 1 2, I 893) .  
"' Cf. the instances of  illegal arrest (s'upra, chap. IX, notes 3 8, 39) ,  where the 
jurisdiction also was predicated upon the judicial nature of the function. Cf. 
also the cases cited by the commissaire (Matters of Spitz, Rec. I 920.Ioo6 ; 
Dubois, Rec. I 92 I .23 I ;  Cons. Huignard, Rec. I 9 23.727 ; Marquie, Rec • 
. I 926.383)  in which the Conseil d'ttat declined to assume jurisdiction because 
the seizures had been made by commissaires de police "acting in their capacity 
as officers of the judicial police." 
18 At the particular time, art. Io of the Code d'instruction criminelle was 
not in force, having been abrogated by the law of Feb. 7, I 933  (supra, chap. 
IX, note I o) . It was, however, re-enacted by art. 6 of the law of March 25, 
I 9 35, amending the Code d'instruction criminelle. See W aline, Manuel 
illmentaire de droit administratif (I 936) p. 450. 
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clearly constitute a trespass.14 However, i t  i s  also pointed 
out that the fact that a liberty, such as the freedom of the 
press, is protected and that violations are subj ect to redress 
according to statute does not nullify the police powers which 
the administrative derives from other laws.15 It is of par-
H D. I 935·3 ·Z5 at 30 :1 1  citing two cases decided by the Cour de cassation 
involving violations of the press law of July z9, 1 8 8 1 : Lajudie v. Pomarede, 
and Vaugeois-Heron v. Rieunier, D. 1 9 1 9. 1 .3Z. 
15 This point is illustrated by a number of cases in which the Conseil d'Etat 
indicated the extent of the general police power. It was held that the "freedom 
of advertising" (art. 1 5, law of July :1.9, 1 88 1 ,  supra, at note 1 o) was not 
violated by a police order prohibiting the use of special vehicles for advertising 
purposes in the streets of Paris, in the interest of the safety and convenience of 
traffic. Matter of Hostein & Cie., D. 1 901 .3·53 ; Matter of Compagnie nouvelle 
des Chalets, etc., Rec. 190:1..4:!.. Cf. Matter of Cotte, Rec. 1 9:1.4.83 91 concerning 
the destruction of "suspicious" billboards under the order of a prefect duly 
authorized by the Minister of the Interior in 1 9 1 4 ;  held not in violation of the 
above law of July z9, 1 8 8 1 .  
Respecting the scope of  the general police power in  regard to  "public 
liberties" (peddling, art. 1 81 law of July :1.9, I 8 8 1 ) ,  the decision of the Conseil 
d'Etat of Nov. 30, 19:1.8, in the matter of Penicaud (D. H. 1 9:1.9.39) referred 
to by the commissaire du gouvernement appears especially pertinent. It was held 
that the statute did not preclude the exercise by the mayors and prefects of 
their general police powers in the interest of peace and order, and consequently 
they could prohibit the distribution of printed matter apt to endanger the 
public order in the vicinity of schools, churches, barracks, or factories; but 
that it would be an excess of power and contrary to the statute to prohibit the 
distribution of all writings whatsoever in all cases where there is a certain 
congestion of traffic. · 
Enlarging the background of the extent of the police power, there is repeated 
emphasis in the conclusions of a decision of the Conseil d'Etat (May 1 91 1933)  
annulling a prefect's decree which prohibited a public address by a named 
speaker, for the purpose of preventing anticipated disturbances of the public 
order. The language employed by the court is of interest in connection with 
the principal case : The right of free assembly being involved "the alleged · � ·  
probability of disturbances was not of such a high degree that the public order 
could not have been maintained without prohibiting the meeting." This 
implies that under different circumstances the same order might have been a 
proper police measure. Matter of Benjamin, D. 1 933·3·54 at 5 7  (italics sup­
plied) . 
Completing the outline, two cases of confiscation are considered in order 
to demonstrate the right of the administrative under its general police powers 
to interfere directly with property rights. In Monpillie v. Maire de Bordeaux, 
D. I 9 Z I . I .4I 1  S .  I 9 I 8-I9 I 9.Z .I 1  supra, chap. VIII, note 7 1 1  the Cour de 
cassation affirmed the incompetence of the ordinary courts in an action against 
the mayor on account of the seizure of meat brought into the city without having 
been submitted for inspection and stamping in accordance with a city ordinance. 
The reason was that both in issuing the order and in causing the seizure pur­
suant to it, the mayor had remained within his police powers and his admin­
istrative functions (art. 97, law of April s, 1 8 841 Municipal Organization) . 
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ticular interest to note that the opinion expressly denies that 
the jurisdiction of the administrative courts is automatically 
excluded whenever the exercise of such police powers con­
flicts with a protected liberty.16 
In drawing the final conclusions essential to the disposition 
of the principal case, the commissioner relied on the prece­
dents reviewed. He deduced from the earlier decisions that 
administrative agencies, in the lawful use of their general po-
- lice powers, may indeed curtail constitutional liberties without 
committing a trespass, and that redress by the ordinary 
And the Conseil d'Etat, in principle, decided that a mayor may within his 
police powers proceed to confiscate deteriorated foods where such action is 
urgent in view of the existence of serious danger to the public health. Matter 
of Societe Laitiere Maggi, D. H. I 924. I 70. 
18 Additional precedents sanctioning the administrative jurisdiction, i. e., 
denying the trespass character of the act, in case of illegal invasions of property 
rights, are cited in Professor Waline's note, D. I 9 3 5·3·25.  The Conseil d'Etat 
held itself competent to adjudicate a matter of illegal detention and utilization 
of a foreign neutral vessel in Matter of Chan Pek Chun, Rec. 1 9 3  I .I 1 2 5. [The 
case is relied on by Laroque, supra, chap. IX, note 59, in his endeavor to discredit 
the voie de fait doctrine.] 
In this particular instance the question seems pertinent whether the diplomatic 
aspects of the case did not contribute to the retention of jurisdiction by the 
Conseil d'Etat. Furthermore, one may well ask if and upon what grounds the 
administrative jurisdiction might have been vindicated before the Tribunal 
des conflits had the action of the owner of the ship been instituted in the civil 
court. 
In the case of Bailly v. Carques, D. 1 9 I 8.3.I ,  irregularities in effect­
ing military requisitions of beef cattle and grain, in the opinion of the Tribunal 
des conflits, did not deprive the respective acts of their administrative char­
acter so as to justify the jurisdiction of the civil court. This case should be 
compared with the Union Villeneuvoise case (supra, chap. IX, note 5 1 ) ; there 
is a difference both in the degree of procedural irregularity and in the conse­
quences. The former case involves the taking of personal property, while the 
latter was concerned with taking possession of an entire factory. It should be 
noted, however, that in the Bailly case the court did not refer to the trespass 
doctrine as an alternative solution but rather reached its decision on the basis 
of the distinction between faute de service and faute personnelle, i. e., by 
denying the quasi-delictual character of the acts in question. In the third case 
cited (De Gaste v. Hospices, etc., D. 1 895·3·45) the Tribunal des conflits de­
cided in favor of the administrative jurisdiction "because there was no trespass, 
even though construction on a public works had been begun prior to any admin­
istrative formalities and a water course to which plaintiffs claimed a right had 
been diverted." Waline, D. 1 9 3 5·3·25· It should nevertheless also be noted that 
the court expressly held that there had been no dispossession and that the right 
claimed was not a property right. 
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courts is not available unless the act complained of involves 
a malfeasance or usurpation of power. Consequently the seiz­
ure in the Action franfaise case could be impeached in a civil 
court only if there was something in the attending circum­
stances which deprived the act of the prefect of its apparently 
administrative character, thus reducing it to an unqualified 
violation of the law protecting the freedom of the press.17 
The test of this proposition depended upon the answers to 
two separate questions : ( 1 ) Did the police powers of the 
prefect under the particular circumstances extend to the 
seizure of the newspaper? ( 2) If so, was the seizure ordered 
and made as a means to an end, or as an end in itself? 
The first question presents two aspects, being concerned 
both with the existence of the powers as such, and with the 
mode of exercising them. The general scope of the powers of 
the prefect of police in regard to the press could be readily 
determined. Thus, according to the express terms of the con­
cessions of the city-owned newsstands, the display and sale 
of publications which were held to endanger the public order 
could be prohibited. Furthermore, since the police author­
ities were charged with the maintenance of order in the pub­
lic streets, 18 the sale of a newspaper inciting to violence in 
the streets of an already inflamed city could also be prohibited 
by the prefect. However, whether the newspaper could be 
seized raised a different, more delicate issue. The commis­
saire du gouvernement concluded 19 that, even though the 
11 Although the 1 889 cases (supra, note 9) denied all right of preventive 
seizure of newspapers, the commissioner insisted that "not every seizure of a 
newspaper is, nor can be, a trespass" per se. 
18 Baldy v. Prefet de Saone-et-Loire, D. 1920.3 .2 S ;  see art. 9 9, law of 
April s, I 8 84, Organization of Municipalities. Cf. Matter of Hostein & Cie., 
D. I90 I ·3 ·53• supra, note I S ;  Matter of Compagnie Nouvelle des Chalets, etc., 
Rec. I 902.42, supra, note I S. 
10 Reliance was had on the authority of the decision of the Conseil d'Etat 
in the matter of Anduran, D. 1 92S·3·43· Upon the recourse of the owner of a 
1l.our mill whose plant had been "sealed" because of numerous known and sus­
pected violations of certain statutes, it was held that the administrative de-
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seizure constituted an administrative execution, it was justi­
fiable because of the exceptional circumstances. It was pointed 
out that under the special terms of the concessions the action 
taken was appropriate as far as the newsstands were con­
cerned. However, in regard to the street sales it was neces­
sary to construe the seizure as a direct sanction of an implied 
prohibition to sell. On this basis the seizure could be justified 
on the ground of the existing emergency and imminent 
danger. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE EXECUTION AGAINST PERSONS AND 
PROPERTY 
At this point, a more intimate examination of direct ad­
ministrative execution 20 in French law is imperative. Pro­
fessor W aline 21 has said that that "is one of the most delicate 
problems of our public law, because it brings into conflict 
two fundamental principles, personal liberty and the respect 
due the laws." 
Trespasses by administrative agencies often stage their ap­
pearance in the cloak of acts of enforcement directed imme­
diately against persons or property. It is important, therefore, 
to determine under what circumstances direct sanctions may 
be applied, and when, on the other hand, their use is illegal 
in the sense that affected parties are entitled to the protection 
partment exceeded its powers in resorting to a sanction not specifically provided 
for in the respective statutes, which afforded other adequate means of enforce­
ment, since this was "not a cause of emergency and immediate danger." (See 
infra, p. r 6 8.) Commissaire J osse developed the problem of administrative exe­
cution more fully in the Anduran case. 
00 Berthelemy, "De l'exercice de Ia souverainete par l'autorite administrative," 
2. 1  R. D. P. ( r 9o4) 2.09 ; Dareste, Les voies de recours contre les actes de la 
puissance publique ( r 914),  pp. 7 1-89 ;  Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif, 
r oth ed. ( r 9z r ) ,  pp. 77-8o, 12.th ed. ( 1933) ,  pp. 578-5 82., and his note ac­
companying the Saint-Just decision in S. I904·3·I 7 and La jurisprudence ad­
ministrative de r892 a I929 (I 92.9), Vol. r ,  p. 84 at 99  ff. ; Bannard, Precis de 
droit administratif (1935) ,  pp. r 86-r 8 7. 
21 Waline, Manuel ellmentaire de droit administratif (1 936),  pp. 451-54. 
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of the ordinary courts. That one available form of relief, in 
case of the unauthorized application of such sanctions, is of 
the injunctive type should be especially noted. For this ex­
ceptional, although very limited, power of the French civil .� 
courts to enj oin administrative action must be related to 
the fact that no corresponding remedy is available in the ad­
ministrative courts.22 Attempts have not been lacking to equip 
the latter with powers of injunction (referes) .  The difficulty, 
however, has been that the administrative courts actually 
have no power to interfere with the execution of adminis­
trative orders lawfully made. Thus it is possible to obtain an 
injunction only by holding the act of enforcement "nonad­
ministrative" and therefore subject to the ordinary jurisdic­
tion. 
r .  The Rule of the Saint-Just Case 
The outstanding occasion for dealing exhaustively with the 
problem of direct sanctions arose in connection with the en­
forcement of the law regulating religious associations. This 
statute prohibited the formation of religious congregations 
without special legislative authorization, and permitted their 
establishments to be operated only by virtue of a special de­
cree of the Conseil d'Etat.23 In the case of Societe immobi­
liere de Saint-Just v. Prefet du Rhone,24 the owner of cer­
tain premises housing an unauthorized school of the Sisters 
of St. Charles brought action in the civil court against the 
prefect, who had ordered the premises sealed after evicting 
the congregation. The prefect had acted in pursuance of a 
22 Bannard, Precis, p. 1 59 ;  Jacquelin. "L'evolution de la procedure ad­
ministrative," 1 9  R. D. P. ( 1 903) 373 and 20 R. D. P. ( 1 903) 5 at 1 7-1 9 ;  
Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1 ,  p .  1 08. 
18 Law of July 1, 1 901,  art. 1 3· 
"' Decided December 2, 1 902, S. 1 904.3·1 7 ;  D. 1 903 .3·41 ; Hauriou, Juris­
prudence, Vol. 1 ,  p. 84. 
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decree of the "ministers in council,"25 and he challenged the 
competence of the court by asserting a conflict. 
The Tribunal des conflits had to decide, for the purpose 
of determining jurisdiction, whether the action taken by the 
prefect was within his administrative functions or whether 
it constituted a trespass. The decision required consideration 
of the important question of administrative sanctions in the 
form of direct execution against persons or property. The 
general rule is that direct enforcement of the commands or 
prohibitions contained in laws and regulations is permissible 
only if it has been previously authorized by a judicial court.26 
Penal sanctions for infractions cannot be applied except upon 
conviction in the ordinary courts. These courts alone are 
deemed competent to authorize or to order the appropriate 
means of execution to be employed. If the administrative de­
partment resorts independently to methods of direct enforce­
ment, it is held to violate the principle of differentiation of 
agencies,27 and its action constitutes a trespass because of the 
illegal invasion of private rights or property. 
This general rule is subject to exceptions. Thus, power to 
apply penal sanctions in a few isolated instances has been con­
ferred upon the administrative courts by statute.28 In addi­
tion, the rigid application of the principle was found to pro­
duce undesirable results, particularly where a law failed to 
provide sanctions for the violation of its terms. This was the 
.. This being the form of decree required by art. 13 of the law of July 11 
1 901 ,  for the closing of such establishments. 
28 See the conclusions of the commissaire du gouvernement in the case ; 
Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. 1, p. 8 6 ;  Dareste, p. 7 1  ff. ; Hauriou, Precis, 
1 oth ed., p. 77, uth ed., p. 580. 
"' See the opinion in the Saint-Just case, S. 1 904·3 · 1 7 at 2.2. :2, quoted 
by Dareste, p. 83 .  
28 See Laferriere, Traite de la juridiction administrative et  des recours con­
tentieux, 2d ed. ( 1 896) , Vol. 1 ,  pp. 2o-2 1 1  Vol. 2, p. 629 ff. ; cf. Hauriou, 
Precis, 1 oth ed., p. 879, uth ed., p. 350. The powers originally given have 
· recently been reduced by the law of Dec. 28, 1 926. See Berthilemy, Traite 
elimentaire de droit administratif ( 1 935) ,  p. 1 146;  Waline, Manuel, p. 554· 
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condition with which the Tribunal des confiits was confronted 
in the Saint-Just case. The statute involved in the case, pro­
viding penalties and civil sanctions for certain infractions,29 
did not make provision for the effective enforcement of .a 
closing order such as was before the Tribunal. Hence it was 
for the latter to decide whether the statute was to remain a 
dead letter or whether the responsible administrative agency 
could supply the sanction which the legislature had omitted. 
The Tribunal des conflits conceded the authority of the pre­
fect to come to the aid of the statute and to enforce it by seal­
ing the premises. 30 
The cautious conclusions in the case31 must be weighed 
carefully in order to gauge the exact import of the decision, 
which elicited approving as well as vehemently disapproving 
comment. It should nevertheless be observed that even the 
29 Law of July r, t 9or ,  arts. 8, 1 4, 1 6. 
80 Commentators have pointed out that it is possible for a law to be en­
tirely devoid of sanctions only because of the restrictive interpretation which 
the Cour de cassation has placed on art. 4 7 1 ,  § 1 5, of the criminal code (supra, 
chap. VI, note 7) . A more liberal interpretation would make this statute and 
its penalties applicable in case of violation of any administrative regulation. 
Consequently laws from which sanctions were omitted could then be effectively 
supplemented with regulations for the purpose of curing the defect. See the 
opinion in the Saint-Just case, S. I 904· 3 · I 7  at 2 1  : r ; Dareste, pp. 7 1-77 ;  
Hauriou, Precis, roth ed., pp. 77-78, Jurisprudence, Vol. r ,  pp. ro8-ro9, 126 ;  
Moreau, Le  reglement administratif ( r 9oz) ,  p .  325 ff. 
m The commissaire du gouvernement admitted the equal validity of a theory 
which denies that an "incomplete" statute may be administratively supple­
mented, because the guarantee of liberty and property must be the paramount 
consideration. On the other hand, the commissaire insisted that in France the 
postulate of the separation of powers implicitly demands that laws shall not 
be left unenforced. Nevertheless, he recognized the necessity of well-defined 
limitations upon direct administrative sanctions, for "One cannot overlook the 
serious disadvantages which 'forced administrative execution' presents. On one 
hand • . . direct execution by the administrative, 'by default,' without 
judgment, without opportunity of defense . . • aside from being contrary 
to our customs, may in certain cases foster arbitrary action and cover up illegal­
ities. On the other hand, the administrative courts are not equipped to pro­
tect effectively private rights which might be violated in a flagrant manner 
through abuses of acts of direct execution ; they do not have local judges for 
the purpose ; they do not dispose of injunctive relief [refire] and the slow­
ness of their intervention can often render their efficacy illusory." S. 1 904·3·1 7 
at z x :z. 
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champions of the doctrine that laws should never be permitted 
to remain unenforceable32 have been keenly aware of the 
danger to private rights from abuse of the requisite powers. 
They have stressed the necessity of strictly limiting those 
powers of the administrative department.33 Hauriou's note84 
on the decision seems to suggest that certain restrictions35 
proposed by the commissaire du gouvernement would not 
fully satisfy the exigencies of the situation. The author in­
sisted at the time that, although there may be occasion for 
direct execution by administrative agencies, these agencies 
should always conform to customary administrative methods, 
and should not resort to extraordinary measures. On the 
other hand, the doctrine has been vigorously condemned 
by Berthelemy36 on the ground that the paramount principle 
of public law demands that the administrative "exercise only 
those powers which have been expressly conferred upon it by 
statute."37 
82 Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p. 79, uth ed., p. 5 791 Jurisprudence, Vol. r ,  
p .  99 ; Waline, Manuel, p .  452· 
13 Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., p. 79, uth ed., p. 5 8 2 ; Waline, Manuel, p. 
45 1 .  See also Waline's note in D. 1 9 35·3·25 at 26. 
"' S. 1 904·3 ·1 7 ;  Jurisprudence, Vol. r ,  p. roo {quotation, supra, chap. IX, 
note 6 8) . However, the point seems to have been abandoned later on. Cf. 
Hauriou, Precis, r oth ed., pp. 79-80, uth ed., pp. 5 8 1-582.  
80 See note 3 8, infra. 
'"' "De l'exercice de la souverainete par l'autorite administrative," 2 1  R. D. P. 
( 1 904) 209 ff. 
"' Ibid., p. 2 1 6. The same writer also states : "The administrative cannot 
touch our property, put its hand upon our persons, except in pursuance of 
express statutory authority. Wherever the statute is silent the function of the 
administrator terminates. • . • the legislative intent may not be presumed 
if it has not been expressed." Ibid. 
It is worth noting that in the country which has sponsored administrative 
autonomy some of the foremost authorities are constantly pointing out and mili­
tating against the danger of opening the door to arbitrariness. Berthelemy 
sees "behind the independent exercise of sovereign power the spectre of ad­
ministrative tyranny. • . . the administrative may act only to insure the 
execution of the laws, only in the forms specified by statute, only to the extent 
indii:ated by the statute." Ibid., p. 2 1 4. And again, further on, "While one 
cannot overlook the disadvantages arising from leaving a statute temporarily 
devoid of all sanction, this disadvantage is not commensurate with the danger 
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In the Saint-Just case, the commissaire du gouvernement 
argued and the court found that in sealing the premises the 
prefect had acted within his powers. It was further held that 
the enforcement of the statute in question was accompanied 
by all the circumstances38 necessary to justify direct admin­
istrative execution. Thus, the act of the prefect was strictly 
administrative and, since there had been no trespass, the 
court had violated the differentiation of agencies by declar­
ing itself competent in the matter.39 
presented by the introduction into practice of arbitrary administrative pro­
cedures not sanctioned by law." Ibid., p. 22.3.  The author concludes that "the 
actor to whom the program assigns no part must not appear upon the stage." 
P. 22.7. See also the same writer's Traite, p. 349 ff. 
Cf. Duguit, Traite de droit constitutionnel, 2d ed. ( I 923 ) ,  Vol. 3, pp. 7 I I-
7 I 3 ;  cf. also Dareste, p. 8 6 ;  and the unsigned note in D. I 903·3·4 I .  
38 "I .  The administrative object for which exc:cution i s  necessary must have 
its sources in the express language of a statute ; 
"2. There must be cause for forced execution because of resistance to a 
law or to a sovereign command [acte de puissance publique] ; 
"3· The necessity for direct administrative execution must spring from the 
absence of a penal sanction ; 
"4· The means of forced execution must tend solely to realize the imme­
diate administrative object envisaged by the statute." Opinion in the case, S. 
I 904.3.I 7 at 2 I  :3. 
Hauriou (see supra, chap. IX, note 68) at that time insisted that the fourth 
limitation be further qualified, and he interpreted the decision as satisfying the 
double requirement. Through an interesting review of the earlier instances 
of sealing localities as a method of administrative execution, he shows that 
this has been a means "habitually" employed. Consequently, in the present case 
it was not an "extraordinary" means which would deprive the act of the prefect 
of its administrative quality and would remove it from the administrative juris­
diction. (The instances referred to are the suppression of the prerevolutionary 
system of courts, and the administration of the estates of emigrants and the 
royal family and of religious associations under the legislation of the years 
I 789-I 792..) See Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. I 1  p. I oo ff. 
80 The commissaire du gouvernement, whose reasoning was adopted by the 
court, viewed the question of jurisdiction from still another angle. Application 
to the civil court for an injunction had been made, not by the evicted congre­
gation, but by the owners-lessors of the building. These parties, although they 
did not do so, might have insisted upon the civil jurisdiction for the pro­
tection of their property rights. To meet this implied objection to the exclusive 
competence of the administrative court in the case, the court pointed out that 
"to seal the premises and to keep them temporarily sealed" did not amount to 
"an act of dispossession" such as would automatically confer jurisdiction upon 
the civil courts. S. I 904·3· I 7  at 24 :3. 
The civil jurisdiction in the case of expropriation (supra, p. I 35) has by anal­
ogy been extended to dispossessions by the administrative. See the conclusions of 
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The Saint-Just decision became a milestone by establish­
ing the rule that direct administrative sanctions may be em­
ployed in order to give effect to a statute which is unenforce­
able because of a deficiency in its terms. But the decision, 
through the underlying opinion of the commissaire du gou­
vernement, also indicates the further and probably far more 
frequent necessity for such sanctions in case of "extreme 
emergency in the sense of immediate danger to the general 
security, public health, or public order."40 The picturesque 
phrase coined by Commissaire Romieu in the case has often 
been quoted : "When the house is on fire one does not apply 
to a court for an order directing the firemen to extinguish it." 
The Conseil d'Etat, since its decision in the recourse Sure­
main, 41 has adhered to the principle stated in the Saint-Just 
case in several decisions of more recent date. 42 These cases 
hold that administrative agencies may take measures directly 
affecting persons or property whenever public interests are 
seriously and immediately endangered, and whenever, under 
the commissaire, S. I 904·3.23 :3 ; Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. r, pp. 95, 1 07, 
Precis, I 2th ed., p. 347· It seems extremely difficult in this particular instance 
to maintain a clear distinction between a dispossession and a trespass upon pri­
vate property. In the present case, assuming there had been a dispossession, the 
civil court obviously would have been held competent although the act re­
mained administrative. But the dispossession of the private owner of real 
property by an administrative act may very well present all the characteristics 
of a trespass. The outward guise of a dispossession incidental to an otherwise 
legal act may conceal a virtual expropriation without the requisite formalities. 
The complete disregard of procedure combined with the fact of dispossession 
unquestionably would result in a voie de fait. See Laferriere, Vol. I ,  p. 542 ff. ; 
Hauriou, Precis, 1 2th ed., p. 869 ff. ; Bannard, p. 459 ff. ; Waline, Manuel, p. 
468 ff., 529 ; Berthilemy, Traiti, p. 698 ff. 
40 S. I 904·3 · I 7 at 2 I  : 1 .  Hauriou, Precis, roth ed., p. 79, 1 2th ed., p. 5 8 I ,  
takes the position that the absence of a statutory sanction must coincide with 
emergency. Cf. Bannard, Precis, p. I 5 8 ;  Waline, Manuel, pp. 450, 453· See 
also Dareste, pp. 84, 86 ;  Appleton, note under Monpillie v. Gruet, D. I 9 2 I .  
1 .4I-42. Cf. Matter o f  Gilibert, Rec. I 933 ·930-3 I .  
" Decided in  I 907, Rec. I 907.345 ff .  (see the conclusions of commissaire 
Romieu, ibid., p. 347) . 
'" In I 9 I J  (Matter of Societe fran�aise d'industrie chimique, S. I 9 I 6.J .I ,  
Hauriou, Jurisprudence, Vol. I ,  p. 1 20) a manufacturer of chemical products 
complained of the action of a prefect who had served notice to discontinue the 
unauthorized and dangerous manufacture of certain products, and to suspend the 
previously authorized production of other chemicals on account of changed con-
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these circumstances, the terms of a statute cannot be adequately 
enforced by applying the sanctions which it provides.43 
2. The Saint-Just Rule and the Action Franyaise Case 
The conflict in the Action franfaise case could be resolved 
only by determining whether or not the seizure involved 
was a trespass in the sense of an unjustified application of a 
direct administrative sanction. According to the opinion of 
the commissaire du gouvernement, the action taken by the 
prefect, although it was in the nature of a direct execution, 
was not illegal per se. The prefect was under a legal duty to 
maintain order; an emergency existed, and the sale of printed 
matter inciting to violence would have seriously and imme­
diately endangered the public safety. These circumstances 
called for prompter action than could have been obtained 
through the intervention of the judicial department. Never-
ditions and considerations of public health, and who also had sealed machinery 
used in the manufacture. The Conseil d'Etat held that the notice constituted a 
definite prohibition ; however, it condemned the sealing of machinery. The de­
cision on the second point was interpreted to rest implicitly on the ground that 
there had been no emergency. (See Hauriou's note, S. 1 9 1 6.3.I ,  Jurisprudence, 
Vol. r ,  p. 1 20.) But it seems more likely that the sealing as a means of execu­
tion was inappropriate because adequate statutory sanctions were not lacking as 
in the Saint-Just case, inasmuch as art. 47 1 1  § 1 5, Code Penal, was operative. 
This meets the criticism of Duguit, Traiti, Vol. 3, p. 7 1 3, who insists that the 
solution in both cases should have been the same. See also Berthilemy, Traiti, 
pp. 355-356, note. 
In a cause of action which arose during the war of 1 9 14, the Conseil d'Etat 
approved the action of a prefect who destroyed all advertising signs and their 
supports in his district, although a government order prescribed the removal 
of "suspicious" signs only. The ground of decision was "extreme emergency." 
Matter of Cotte, Rec. 1 924.839. The Conseil d'Etat in Matter of Societe Laitiere 
Maggi, D. H. 1 924.1 7o, held that the mayor would have been justified in con­
fiscating in plaintiff's plant foodstuffs unfit for consumption, in direct execution 
of art. 9 7  of the law of 1 884 (Municipal Code) , only if this had been necessary 
because of the imminence of grave danger. In the Anduran case (D. 1 925.3·43) ,  
supra, note 1 9, it was held that the mills could not legally be  sealed for contra­
vention of certain statutes by the owner, because there was no emergency and 
immediate danger, and there were various statutory sanctions with which the 
prefect could have effectively enforced the infracted rules. 
411 The majority of writers is in agreement on this question. However, 
Berthelemy adheres staunchly to the theory that under no circumstances may 
the administrative proceed by way of direct execution. Traiti, p. 356, note. 
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theless the commissaire concluded that the seizure was a 
trespass on account of the object towards which it was ulti­
mately directed. Due to the broad scope of the prefect's order 
"to seize the newspaper Action franfai.s-e at all places where 
held for sale in Paris and suburbs," the seizure was not lim­
ited to designated places within the area where the sale of 
that newspaper would actually have become a menace to the 
public order and safety. The apparent purpose of the order 
therefore was not merely to forestall the potential effect of 
such sales, but to prevent the distribution of the newspaper. 
In the language of the opinion, the seizure under the cir­
cumstances appeared not as a means to an end but as an end 
in itself. On the basis of this construction, the commissaire 
du gouvernement suggested/4 and the Tribunal des con:flits 
held, that the act of seizure constituted a trespass and that 
the civil court had jurisdiction in the case. 
Quite obviously the Action franfaise decision suggests new 
and important considerations in the analysis of administrative 
trespass. Although the Tribunal des con:flits in principle ap­
proved an extension of the police powers in regard. to the 
freedom of the press, and by implication in regard to all civil 
liberties, it indicated at the same time the value of the tres­
pass doctrine as a means of checking administrative discretion. 
In this respect the decision vindicates Hauriou, who defended 
the doctrine of voie de fait as necessary to confine adminis­
trative activity within its constitutional domain.411 
" "What we ask you [the court] . . •  is that you confirm the existence of a 
police power to restrict, or paralyze temporarily, civil liberties which are 
guaranteed and regulated by law, be it the freedom of the press, or the freedom 
of assembly, whenever exceptional circumstances justify it. You should not dis­
arm the authority of the police by a decision to the contrary. But if, upon con­
firming this principle, you find that the circumstances in the present case were 
not such as to render legal a measure as general as the one taken, it is unim­
portant from the doctrinal point of view . . . .  " D. 1 935·3·25 at 3 1 :1 .  
40 See Pricis, nth ed., p. 26. Blaevoet (D. 1 938.x . Io6 at 1 14 :2)  says that 
"the recognition of administrative trespass is a means of protection against, and 
sometimes even of prevention of, arbitrariness." 
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Professor Waline, 46 in evaluating the decision, did not ac­
cept the final conclusions of the commissaire du gouverne­
ment in their entirety. The latter saw in the general nature 
of the scope 47 and purpose 48 of the impeached order the 
element of illegality which deprives an act of its adminis­
trative character. Thus the act could be denounced as a tres­
pass upon the freedom of the press, subject to redress by 
a civil court. There is nothing in the language of the Tri­
bunal directly suggesting an adoption of this construction, 
and Professor Waline arrived at a somewhat different in­
terpretation. 49 According to this commentator, the trespass 
arose from the fact that the seizure, "ordered in such a 
general manner," was not necessary for the maintenance of 
order and security. In other words, under the limitations 
established by the Saint-Just case,50 the circumstances did 
not justify the direct sanction resorted to by the prefect. This 
suggests that the decision must be taken to hold 51 ( I )  that 
under the circumstances, though not per se, the act of the 
prefect was illegal, ( 2)  that the act tended to violate a civil 
liberty, and (3)  that the invasion of the freedom of the press 
which actually resulted from the seizure of the newspaper 
was sufficiently serious to constitute a trespass. 
C. A THIRD ELEMENT OF TRESPASS-EXTENT OF INVASION 
The necessity of measuring the extent of illegal encroach­
ments upon civil liberties and property rights for the purpose 
of determining the presence of a voie de fait had never been 
'" Note in D. 1 935·3·2.5 at 2.7.  
41 "To seize the newspaper in all places where held for sale in Paris and 
suburbs." [Italics supplied.] 
'" To seize certain property without exclusive regard to the immediate con-
cern of maintaining public order. 
411 D. 1 935·3·2.5 at 2.7. 
"" Supra, note 2.4. 
11 See Waline's note, D. 1 9 3 5·3·2.5· 
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emphasized prior to the Action franfaise decision. Further­
more, there is nothing in either the opinion or in the tenor 
of the decision in the case that points to this requirement. On 
the surface, the only outstanding fact in the Action franfaise 
case is that an invasion of the freedom of the press for the 
first time was treated as a trespass. Nevertheless, it is appar­
ent that the Tribunal des con:flits did not stigmatize the act of 
the prefect as a trespass because of the sole fact of invasion 
of a liberty, but rather because the invasion assumed the 
drastic form of a seizure. Viewed in the light of this quali­
fication, the precedents disclose a general tendency of the 
courts to apply the trespass doctrine only in case of serious 
violations. 52 So where property rights are involved, a dispos­
session 53 seems to be requisite, and this rather as to real prop­
erty than as to personalty. 54 Corresponding to dispossession 
•• Waline, ibid., thinks that the presence of a trespass may also depend upon 
the severity of the formal illegality of the act, citing as an illustration, Lacombe 
v. Perrier, D. I 8 76·3·5 I .  In that case the Tribunal des conflits, resolving a 
negative conflict, found a trespass because the mayor had violated a criminal 
statute by causing graves and corpses to be disturbed in locating the foundations 
for a church building . 
.. Cf. the introductory notes preceding the report of the decision of the 
Tribunal des conflits in Montlaur v. Balmigere, Maire de Tournissan (Rec. 
I 904.888  at 889) : "So long as the administrative stays on its own ground, does 
not invade private property, but reaches it from without only and does not 
put its hand upon it, the impairment of the owner's enjoyment, no matter how 
great, is not for judicial cognizance ; on the other hand, the judicial courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction if there is a trespass, i. e., if there is on the part 
of the state [personne publique] an encroachment, taking, seizure, or usurpa­
tion in respect to private real property whose protection is specially entrusted to 
those courts." 
•54 See the cases discussed above (p. I 6o) .  Note in particular Monpillie v. 
Gruet, supra, chap. VIII, note 7I (emphasized in Waline's note, D. I 9 3 5·3·zs ) ,  
where even the Cour de cassation denied the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts 
in a case involving the removal of noninspected meat from stores over the ob­
jection of the owners. There was procedural irregularity which in this country 
would have provoked at least an allegation of want of due process. However, 
the act was held to be administrative, very probably on the ground that the dis­
regard for procedure was comparatively slight. But again, it may be, as Waline 
seems to suggest, that the holding was influenced by the fact that only personal 
property was involved. Evidently the case of Bailly v. Carques, supra, note I 6, 
concerning a procedurally irregular military requisition of cattle and grain, 
is susceptible of analogous interpretation, and both cases can on the same ground 
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as the standard for determining trespass in regard to property 
rights, 55 are unlawful detention where persoaal liberty is in­
volved, 56 illegal deprivation of the use of property devoted 
to a cult where religious freedom is concerned, 57 and seizure 
or equivalent interferences 58 in the case of freedom of the 
press. 59 
D. VOlE DE FAIT DISTINGUISHED FROM FAUTE PERSONNELLE 
The Action franfaise case, in addition to contributing greatly 
to the clarification of the concept of administrative trespass, 
is authority for the important proposition that a voie de fait 
is not necessarily accompanied by a faute personnelle on the 
part of the administrative official. 60 In other words, the act 
be contrasted with the contrary holding in the Union Villeneuvoise case, supra, 
chap. IX, note 5I ,  where the Tribunal des conflits was concerned with the occu­
pation of an entire factory by the military. Cf. also City of Mende v. Roussel, 
supra, chap. IX, note 48, where the Cour de cassation found in favor of the 
jurisdiction of the civil court because of a trespass resulting from the destruc­
tion of a private water conduit ; and De Gaste v. Hospices, supra, note I 6, where, 
on the contrary, the Tribunal des conflits declared the administrative courts 
competent in a somewhat similar situation. There was neither a dispossession 
nor a trespass upon plaintiff's property ; furthermore, no property right in the 
bed of the watercourse but only a right to the water being at stake, compensa­
tion for any permanent damage sustained had to be sought in the Conseil de 
prefecture because it resulted from the construction of a public works. Law of 
28  Pluviose, year VIII (Feb. I 7, I 8oo) , art. 4· 
However, it should be observed that Waline himself seems to take a different 
view in his Manuel (I 936) . There he says (p. 56) : "The jurisdiction belongs 
to the civil courts in all cases of trespass, even though there is no dispossession." 
It would follow that in the foregoing cases where there was no dispossession, 
the jurisdiction of the administrative courts must be attributed to the absence of 
a sufficient degree of illegality. Cf. Matter of Fremy, Rec. I 933. I 1 59, uphold­
ing a Conseil de prefecture which had declined to take jurisdiction in a matter 
of "irregularly taking possession of private property" in connection with the 
construction of an electric power line . 
.. Waline, D. 1935·3·25· 
08 Cf. Labadie v. Gaillardon, supra, chap. IX, note 3 8. 
57 Cf. Cure de Realmont v. Mayor, supra, chap. IX, note 40. 
08 See Waline, D. 1935·3·25 at 2 8 :I .  
•• L'Action fran-;;aise v. Bonnefoy-Sibour, supra, note I .  
80 Jeze, Les principes giniraux du droit administratif, 3d ed. ( I 925),  p .  79, 
note 2, has taken the view that there can be no trespass without a personal 
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of an administrative official may be nonadministrative with­
out being personal. Thus, trespass by no means precludes 
good faith and need not involve the personal liability of the 
administrative agent. V oie de fait, therefore, has been ap­
propriately described as a notion objective, as distinguished 
from faute personnelle, which is a notion subjective.61 It is 
eminently the "impersonal" aspect of the trespass concept 
upon which attention must be focussed in appraising its value 
for comparative purposes. 
E. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRESPASS DOCTRINE 
As a first impression it might seem that the doctrine of 
administrative trespass bears but a remote relation to the 
degree of autonomy which under the French conception of 
the separation of powers the administrative department has 
enjoyed in the past. Taken at its face value, the oft-employed 
phrase "a trespass can never be an administrative act"62 ap­
parently means that the concept of voie de fait envisages only 
acts which are so palpably nonadministrative that the juris­
diction of the ordinary courts follows as a necessary conse­
quence. In other words, it may seem that the trespass doctrine 
contemplates only usurpations of the most obvious kind and 
as foreign to proper administrative activity as are fautes 
personnelles. However, the adjudicated cases at once reveal 
that administrative trespass is not a simple but a com­
plicated and multi-faceted concept. In its application, de­
grees of illegality and shades of invasion of constitutional 
fault of the public officer. See also Duguit, Traite (1 92.3) , Vol. 3, p. 7 1 5 ;  
Appleton, p .  2.33 .  But see Hauriou, Precis, xoth ed., p .  361 note, who recognized 
that "in the case of trespass there is frequently malfeasance on the part of the 
functionary," engaging his personal liability. See also the note by Blaevoet, 
D. 1 9 3 8.1 . 106 at 1 1 3 :X o  
"' Waline, D.  1 935·3·2.5 a t  2.7 : 1 ; Blaevoet, D.  1 93 8. x . x o6 at 1 1 3 :1 . 
.. See the opinion in L'Action fran(;aise v. Bonnefoy-Sibour, D. 1 935·3·2.5 
at 31 : x .  
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rights which are destructive of the administrative quality of 
an act have been distinguished. 
It may have been well enough to hold that an act is non­
administrative where an agency clearly overstepped the bor­
ders of the domain constitutionally belonging to the admin­
istrative department. However, the courts have stigmatized 
administrative acts as trespasses even though there was color 
of authority and a legitimate administrative objective pur­
sued in good faith. Moreover, acts clearly authorized and 
only procedurally irregular have been condemned in the 
same sense. It is evident, therefore, that the term "nonad­
ministrative" has been useful only as a convenient formula 
and has concealed the actual function of the trespass doctrine. 
Manifestly the trespass doctrine has served as a device to 
overcome the unwieldiness of the principle of the differenti­
ation of agencies. No sweeping modification of this funda­
mental precept was desired, but there was an obvious and 
stringent need for a means by which greater play could be 
given to concerns more pressing than historical considerations. 
In its operation the doctrine of administrative trespass 
proved sufficiently flexible to fill the need it was called upon 
to supply. Administrative acts affecting private rights were 
not indiscriminately exposed to the scrutiny of the civil courts. 
Machinery was available by which the administrative depart­
ment might seek to vindicate its action whenever it found it 
desirable to do so. Whenever redress for an alleged voie de 
fait was sought in the ordinary courts, the department could 
insist upon the administrative character of the act and could 
claim jurisdiction before the Tribunal des conflits. On the 
other hand, the alleged error could be tacitly conceded. Sim­
ilarly, where relief was sought in the administrative courts, 
these courts might either assume jurisdiction or they could, 
of their own accord, denounce the act as a trespass and refer 
the complainant to the judicial courts. 
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The manifold implications surrounding the trespass doc­
trine indicate that out of a seemingly simple rule of jurisdic­
tion grew a complex device permitting sporadic modifications 
of the principle of the differentiation of agencies and facilitat-
- .  ing the reconciliation of that principle with the "unwritten" 
rule of ordinary court protection for the constitutional rights 
and liberties of the people. 
CHAPTER XI 
Comparison and Conclusions 
IN the comparison of the French and American systems of reviewing administrative action, the final conclusions must depend upon the relative significance of the doc­
trines which circumscribe the review powers of the ordi­
nary courts of France and the doctrine of judicial review in 
the United States. It is unquestionably important that not­
withstanding the differentiation of agencies the ordinary 
courts of France have full power of interpretation in regard 
to administrative regulations and a substantial amount of 
control over their legality. Account must further be taken of 
the doctrine of the nonexistence of executory administrative 
orders which have been the outgrowth of usurped authority. 
Adding finally the full weight of the power of the civil 
courts to grant affirmative relief from flagrantly illegal ad­
ministrative acts, the striking similarity of the French and 
American systems becomes evident. In France, as in this 
country, administrative acts directly affecting persons or prop­
erty, in order to escape the scrutiny of the judicial courts, 
must be both constitutional and legal, and the administrative 
procedure must have conformed to prescribed forms. Thus 
the postulates of the rule of law and of due process of law 
in regard to personal liberty and property have been as com­
mon to the conception of justice in France as they are today 
in the United States. The unqualified inference, suggested 
by the Special Committee on Administrative Law of the 
American Bar Association, 1 that France has never had a pol­
icy of supremacy of the law must be rejected. The judicial 
courts of France have had at their command means of control 
1 63 Rep. A .  B. A.  (1938)  3 3 1  at 341 .  
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over administrative action comparable to judicial review in 
the United States. This power effectively reached admin­
istrative policies and was a strong bulwark against the ad­
vances of administrative absolutism. The evolution of the 
system was characteristic of French democracy, and the droit 
administratif of democratic France did not provide a pattern 
suitable for administrative absolutism. 
Judicial Review in the United States 
The manifest resemblance which, during the reign of the 
droit administratif, existed in the relation between the ad­
ministrative and judicial departments of the two countries 
can best be illustrated by pointing out the essential features 
of judicial review of administrative action in the United 
States. The complexity of the maze of procedural devices 
by which judicial relief from administrative action can or 
must be obtained 2 need only be mentioned incidentally in 
this connection. On the other hand, specific inquiry must be 
made as to the right to judicial relief which determines the 
fundamental nature of judicial review. The content of this 
right, which exists only in the presence of a legally protected 
interest3 adversely affected by administrative action, is of 
. course no greater than the power of the courts to intervene. 
The courts, in turn, have indicated the extent of their review 
powers, i. e., their jurisdiction over acts of administrative 
agencies in terms of constitutional limitations.4 Accordingly 
• See Stason, "Methods of Judicial Relief from Administrative Action," 24 
A. B. A .  J. ( 1 938)  274;  see also "Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies 
in New York," 33 Col. L. Rev. ( 1 933 )  1 05 ;  Isaacs, "Judicial Review of Ad­
ministrative Findings," 30  Yale L. J. ( 1 92 1 )  7 8 1 ; Freund, Administrative 
Powers over Persons and Property ( 1928) ,  p. 234 ff. ; Dickinson, Administra­
tive Justice and tlte Supremacy of the Law ( 1927) ,  p. 39 ff. 
• See Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, ( 1923)  263 
u. s. 143· 
• Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, ( 1 89o) 1 34 U. S. 
4 1 81 discussed by Dickinson, pp. 190-9H Freund, ThQ Police Power ( 1904) , 
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they cannot review, 5 except for the question of constitution­
ality, acts which are legislative or administrative and not ju­
dicial in nature, because in reviewing the policies embodied 
in such acts they would themselves exercise legislative or 
administrative functions.6 
Procedural Due Process 
The prerequisite that an administrative act must be "ju­
dicial" 7 in nature in order to be cognizable by the constitu­
tional courts is twofold in meaning. The very courts which 
derive from it their jurisdiction to review at other times re­
quire administrative agencies to employ judicial methods so 
as to afford constitutional due process of law.8 Thus juris­
diction to review, and consequently the right to judicial re­
lief, enlarges. For this right exists not only where ( I )  the 
pp. 3 9 1-393 ; Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, ( 1 9zo) 253 U. S. 
z87 ;  United States v. Los Angeles & S. L. R. Co., ( 1927)  z73  U. S. 299 ; 
Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., ( 1 930) z 8 1  U. S. 464 ; 
Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico v. Havemeyer, ( 1 936) z96 U. S. 
so6;  Hodges v. Public Service Commission, ( 1 9 3 1 )  I IO w. Va. 649· See also 
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., ( 1 855) 1 8  How. (59 
U. S.) z7z at z84. 
• Relief from administrative action in many cases calls for review of the 
injurious and impeached act upon a statutory appeal or direct attack through 
the common-law methods of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas corpus, 
and quo warranto. But the act complained of, if it is wholly void, can be 
collaterally attacked in an action for damages, application for equity injunction, 
or by way of defense to prosecution for an alleged violation. See Stason, Z4 
A. B. A. J. Z74 ff. 
° Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., ( 1 930) z 8 1  U. S. 464 
at 467, 469 {see chap. V, note 7, supra) . Cf. Hodges v. Public Service Commis­
sion, ( 1 9 3 1 )  1 1 0  W. Va. 649 at 655. The rule does not apply in the state 
courts, which in many instances have been given administrative review powers 
by statutes. However, if an appeal lies from the state court to the federal courts, 
the latter cannot take jurisdiction if the state court has acted legislatively or ad­
ministratively. See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., ( 1908) z 1 1  U. S. z 1 o ;  
Bacon v .  Rutland R .  Co., ( 1 9 14) Z J Z  u. s .  I J4. See chap. v, supra. 
• More commonly the function of the administrative agency in this case 
is referred to as quasi-judicial, both because it is not truly, not wholly, judicial, 
and because it cannot be judicial under the separation of powers. 
8 Cf. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, ( 1 890) 1 34 
u. s. 41 8.  
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primary object of the administrative act is adjudication,9 but 
equally where ( 2)  the method of pursuing an administrative 
or legislative 10 end (a) is judicial or (b) violates the due 
process requirement by failing to be judicial.11 Much de­
pends, therefore, upon the types of administrative activity12 
which the courts have actually treated as judicial and upon 
the extent to which they have insisted on procedural due 
process. 
The acts of administrative agencies are essentially adju­
·dicative if they are concerned with the determination of ex­
isting legal rights and duties. In this case the administrative 
tribunal virtually performs the function of a specialized 
court of justice, e. g., in making awards under workmen's 
compensation statutes, in condemnation proceedings, in ·ad­
j udicating claims against the government, in determining 
rights to pensions, patents, 13 or to land under government 
grants, or again in exclusion or deportation cases, particularly 
where the issue of citizenship is involved. However, the 
requisite judicial element is also considered to be present in 
various types of actions of nonjudicial tribunals which are 
directed toward clearly administrative ends.14 This is true, 
• E. g., the making of awards by workmen's compensation commissions. 
10 E. g., rate-making. 
n Cf. the similar English approach--Gordon, " 'Administrative' Tribunals 
and the Courts," 49 L. Q. Rev. ( 1933)  94 at 1 0 1 ,  note 1 5 :  "In other cases, the 
point is rather the implied obligation of a tribunal to adjudicate, so that if it 
acts without adjudicating it is liable in trespass for depriving the party of a 
hearing." P. I I 8 :  "The powers expressly given to a tribunal may be clearly 
legislative, but their exercise conditional on a state of facts, ascertainment of 
whose existence as clearly requires judicial powers. Then doubt may arise 
whether the tribunal has by implication the judicial power to adjudicate on 
this question, or whether the validity of its orders depends on the finding of a 
Court of law that the conditions were first fulfilled." See also Part II of the 
same article, 49 L. Q. Rev. 419  at 428 ff. 
lll I. e., activities entrusted to, and carried on by, administrative agencies. 
m It is interesting in this connection to follow the opinion in In re Barratt's 
Appeal, ( 1 899) 1 4  App. D. C. 255 at 2 5 7 ;  but cf. Federal Radio Commission 
v. General Electric Co., ( I93o) 2 8 1  U. S. 464 at 467. 
u Cf. chap. V, supra. 
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for instance, in regard to the revocation of licenses, abate­
ment of nuisances, removal of officers, and in the classic ca.Se 
of public utility rate-making. The courts have never indicated 
the exact meaning of the term "judicial" as applied to ad­
ministrative action; indeed, an attempt to do so is scarcely 
to be expected in view of the complex tasks with which ad­
ministrative agencies have been and may hereafter be charged. 
The extent of the right to, and the inherent purpose of, 
judicial review as conceived by the courts is further reflected 
in its scope. This scope varies according to the respective 
weight of the public and private interests which must be bal­
anced. Unless designed for the purpose of pure adjudication, 
administrative action unavoidably brings these interests into 
conflict, and the reviewing power of the courts-the probable 
extent of their intervention-may be measured by the in­
tensity of the conflict.15 Provided administrative action, so­
called, is of the adjudicative type and therefore predomi­
nantly judicial both as to object and form in that it is con­
cerned solely with the determination of correlated private 
rights and duties/6 the power to review attaches without 
hindrance.17 On the other hand, where giving effect to a gen­
eral legislative-administrative policy directly affects rights 
of persons or property, it is only the process/8 as distin-
"' As to the concurrent operation of the doctrines of administrative finality 
and of prior resort to administrative agencies, or exhaustion of administrative 
remedies in the interest of administrative expertness, see chap. V. See also 
United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., ( 1 93z) z84 U. S. 474 ; 
cf. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., ( 1 908) zu U. S. z 1 o ;  Palermo Land 
& Water Co. v. Railroad Commission, (D. C. Cal. 1 9 1 5) zz7 Fed. 708. And 
see the dissenting opinion in Crowell v. Benson, ( 1 9p) z85 U. S. zz at 65. 
"' As, for instance, in the case of awards in industrial accident cases and ad­
judication of claims against the government. In the second instance it is imma­
terial that one of the parties is the government, since the questions before the 
tribunal are of a purely private nature arising from contractual or quasi­
contractual relations. 
11 Cf. Borgnis v. Falk Co., ( 1 9u)  147 Wis. 3z7.  
28 The common use of the term "function" in this and similar connections 
is believed to be inaccurate and misleading. 
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guished from the object, which can be termed judicial. Con­
sequently in such instances judicial review is confined to the 
administrative mode of procedure. However, here the due 
process requirement has proved capable of being stressed to 
such an extent that review by the courts effectively reaches 
the administrative objective whenever it is deemed desir­
able to afford protection to large proprietary interests which 
may be at stake.19 
The Supremacy of Law 
The right to judicial review thus far appears primarily 
in the light of a guarantee of procedural due process. Broad 
as it may be because of the freedom of the courts to define 
due process in relation to specific needs, the right to court 
revision of administrative action is by no means limited to 
the scrutiny of procedural errors. Indeed, the area as well 
as the efficacy of judicial relief is greatly increased through 
the power to test the jurisdiction of administrative agencies 
whose acts are the subject of complaint. This power imple­
menting the postulate of the supremacy of the law is a com­
prehensive one. If administrative action exceeds constitu-
111 The cases involving public utility rates are outstanding illustrations, par­
ticularly because the issue of confiscation, when raised, must be finally de­
termined by the courts in order to afford due process. See the famous case of 
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, (1 920) 253 U. S. 287. Rate­
making in the United States has variously been held to be a legislative or ju­
dicial "function.'' This is obviously due to the failure to distinguish between 
ultimate objective and method of procedure. In Village of Saratoga Springs v. 
Saratoga Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., (1908) 1 9 1  N. Y. 1 23, the Court of 
Appeals of New York was clearly aware of the distinction, though, strangely 
enough, it seems to have escaped the same court in People ex rel. Central Park, 
N. & E. River R. Co. v. Willcox, ( 1 909) 194 N. Y. 383 .  
Protection of  civil liberties i s  exemplified by the attitude of  the courts in 
matters of exclusion and deportation of persons alleging citizenship. In ex­
clusion cases a fair hearing before the administrative authorities is sufficient. 
United States v. Ju Toy, (1 905) 1 9 8  U. S. 253 ; Chin Yow v. United States, 
( 1 908) 208 U. S. 8. But in case of deportation, due process seems to require that 
the administrative finding be subject to redetermination in the courts. Ng Fung 
Ho v. White, ( 1 922) 259 U. S. 276. 
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tiona! or statutory limitations, the courts, because of the 
usurpation, can redress potential and actual injuries through 
preventive or restitutional relief, without reviewing the act. 
Nor is the power of the courts to intervene in this case re­
stricted to acts which are judicial in nature. In regard to the 
latter, jurisdictional grounds for relief can be tested upon 
direct attack.20 However, the available collateral methods 
of attack, particularly applications for injunctions/1 allow 
judicial inquiry into jurisdictional defects in a much more 
general sense. The possible extent of judicial protection in case 
of usurpation or excess of power depends entirely upon the 
content given by the courts to the term "jurisdiction."22 
The flexible limits of due process of law and of jurisdiction 
embrace a large area within which the right to judicial relief 
in the United States can be asserted against illegal and arbi­
trary administrative action.23 This remains so even in the 
face of the recent declaration of the United States Supreme 
Court that "the range of issues open to review is narrow," 
and that "Only questions affecting constitutional power, 
statutory authority and the basic prerequisites of proof can 
be raised." 24 
In the comparison of ordinary court control of adminis­
trative action in the destroyed French democracy and the 
United States, the similarities of the two systems should 
"" Certiorari or statutory appeal if appropriately worded. 
"' The remedy of injunction is of especial importance in the federal courts, 
which do not have power to grant common-law certiorari. 
22 How it may affect the scope of review is well illustrated by the doctrine of 
jurisdictional facts, chap. V, p. 70. Crowell v. Benson, ( 1 932) 285  U. S. 2 2 ;  
cf. Borgnis v. Falk Co., ( 1 9 1 1 )  147  Wis. 327· 
28 Cf. Albertsworth, "Judicial Review of Administrative Action by the Fed­
eral Supreme Court," 35  Harv. L. Rev. ( 1 922) 1 27, suggesting in the con­
clusions that review may be narrowed ( 1 )  to cases of the violation of the 
minimum of due process of law, and (2) to action occurring "outside the 
sphere of jurisdiction." 
"' Rochester Telephone Corp. v. United States, ( 1 939) 307 U. S. 1 2 5  at 
r 39-140· 
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not be permitted to eclipse obvious dissimilarities. Never­
theless it may at once be observed that the latter are differ­
ences in degree and method rather than in principle. Un­
doubtedly the power of the ordinary courts of France in 
regard to administrative action was less general and less 
broad than the corresponding power of the American courts. 
In France this power was always subject to be tested and its 
scope to be redetermined in the Tribunal des conflits, while 
in the United States courts are guided by self-imposed limi­
tations under elastic constitutional precepts. In this respect 
the French system has had the advantage of machinery spe­
cially designed for the weighing of conflicting public and 
private interests by an impartial umpire. Procedurally, the 
methods of securing relief through the judicial courts under 
- the French system were limited to collateral attacks. 
Executory administrative orders could be disregarded by 
the courts if clearly ultra vires, while redress for injuries 
sustained was available through actions for damages and 
restitution or injunctions against continuing administrative 
· trespass. Direct attacks upon administrative acts in the ordi­
nary courts of France were precluded because of the peculiar 
interpretation of the separation of powers. 
Bearing in mind that administrative law developments in 
the United States and in former France have been over­
shadowed throughout by the respective conceptions and in­
terpretations of the separation of powers, one of the recent 
demands voiced by the American Bar Association deserves 
analysis and rectification within these conclusions. In 1 936  
the Special Committee on Administrative Law of  the Associa­
tion, championing the separation of powers doctrine,25 ob­
jected vehemently to the so-called commingling of powers 
in administrative agencies. Relying upon language of 
20 6r  Rep. A. B. A. ( r 936) 720 at 725.  See also Ballantine, "Administrative 
Agencies and the Law," 24 A.  B. A .  J. ( r 938)  r o9 at I I I .  
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O'Donoghue v. United State.s-,26 a Supreme Court decision, 
the Committee insisted that "it is precisely this forbidden 
commingling of the essentially different powers of govern­
ment in the same hands that is today the identifying badge 
of an administrative agency."27 However, it should be noted 
that the Supreme Court in that case had before it the questions 
of "permanent tenure of office and the undiminishable char­
acter of the compensation of judges."28 Relating the issue 
to the separation of powers, the court made reference to "oc­
casional conferring upon a given department [of] 
certain functions, which, by their nature, would otherwise 
fall within the general scope of the powers of another."29 
The particular instance envisaged was the enstrusting by 
Congress to the District Court of the District of Columbia 30 
of certain administrative functions that did not require the 
district court to act simultaneously as administrator and judge. 
The effect of the act of Congress on the contrary was that the 
court might act as the one in a given matter, and as the other 
in a different and unrelated cause. The evil thus referred to 
by the Supreme Court was not at all the same as the one em­
phasized by the American Bar Association Committee. For 
the latter complained about the commingling of "powers" in 
an administrative agency for purely administrative ends, that 
is, the exercise of differentiated "powers" for the accom­
plishment of a single administrative objective. Therefore the 
Committee's objection to the commingling of powers is open 
to criticism if it is given the general interpretation of which 
it is certainly susceptible . 
.. ( 193 3 )  2 89 u. s. s x 6  at 530. 
"" 61 Rep. A .  B. A. at 727. [Italics supplied.] 
28 O'Donoghue v. United States, (x 933)  289 U. S. 5 1 6  at 529-530 • 
.. Ibid., 289 U. S. at 530. 
80 See Katz, "Federal Legislative Courts," 43 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1 930) 894 ;  
supra, chap. V. 
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Except in the case of official action only nominally admin­
istrative and in fact judicial in nature,31 original adminis­
/{trative action, i.e., the administrative process, is necessarily , 
complex. It has, unavoidably, qualities closely resembling 
the traditional legislative and judicial processes. But, are 
these qualities "functions" or "powers"? Are they not merely 
different aspects of one of the essential forms of govern­
mental activity, so that any permanent dissection must in­
evitably disintegrate and cripple that activity? Perhaps the 
viewpoint taken by a French writer is helpful in this con­
nection. Hauriou,32 distinguishing the acts of the adminis­
tration active from those of the juridiction administrative, 
has said that private persons, even though their rights may 
·{pe affected, are third parties as regards original action by 
administrative agencies. Expressed in terms more familiar 
j to the American lawyer, original administrative action that 
! (""collides with private rights does not for this reason alone 
'· ..  present a "case or 'controversy."33 Consequently an admin­
istrative agency engaged in fact-finding for the purpose of 
determining a course of action ultimately affecting private 
interests does not exercise "judicial functions or powers."34 
Its action, in certain phases, indeed resembles or must con­
form to the methods customarily employed by judicial bodies :, 
however there is no usurpation of powers which should be 
restored to their constitutional recipient.35 The individual 
81 For instance, the action of a workmen's compensation tribunal or the 
judicially conducted review by an "administrative court" such as the Board 
of Tax Appeals, Court of Claims or Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 
12 See Hauriou, Precis de droit administratif, Ioth ed. ( I 9 Z I ) ,  pp. 36-3 7, 
J6 I ,  363. Cf. Jeze, Les principes generaux du droit administratif, 3d ed. ( I 925) ,  
pp. 7 ,  25 ff., 48 ff., making the distinction between actes juridiques and actes 
juridictionnels. 
83 See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., ( I 908) 2 I I U. S. 2 I o at 22  7-22 8 ;  
Upshur County v. Rich, ( I  89o) 1 35 U. S. 467 ;  Postum Cereal Co. v. California 
Fig Nut Co., ( I 927)  2 72  U. S. 693. 
"' Cf. People ex rei. Steward v. Board of Railroad Commissioners, ( I 899) 
I 6o N. Y. 202 at 206-7. 
86 Cf. Norwalk Street Railway Company's Appeal, (1 897)  69 Conn. 5 76 at 
594-595· 
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phases of action are but integral parts of the administrative 
process ; the fact that they follow a pattern common to other 
governmental activities does not automatically convert them 
into functions constitutionally belonging to another depart­
ment. Therefore, as a necessary consequence of the separa­
tion of powers these so-called judicial functions could not be 
imposed upon the courts.36 Nevertheless, the danger of "ad­
ministrative absolutism" is remote. For, if the composite ad­
ministrative act is in any sense or phase illegal, judicial re­
view and relief will effectively protect adversely affected 
private interests. 
These considerations are important because of their bear­
ing upon administrative law reforms proposed in the United 
States. Clearly, the administrative process is essential to 
modern government and must not be disintegrated. Where 
safeguards are needed to preserve our constitutional form of 
government they should first be provided in the adminis­
trative process itself. In other words, the administrative proc­
ess must be constructed so as to conform uniformly to the 
constitutional due process requirements. The formulation of 
satisfactory procedure for the guidance of properly manned 
administrative agencies is the most important step towards 
judicious rather than judicial administration. Th<;! large ex­
tent to which judicial vetoes of administrative acts have sig­
nified an insistence upon due process has actually resulted in 
shifting the focus of interest from judicial review and its 
scope to administrative procedure.37 However, it must not be 
assumed that the institution of judicial review of the com­
pleted administrative act may thus lose importance. The 
80 Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., ( 1930) 2 8 1  U. S. 464; 
(see chap. V, note ·7, supra) . Cf. Hodges v. Public Service Commission, ( 193 1 )  
1 1 0 W. Va. 649 ; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., (1 855) 
18 How. (59 U. S.) 272 at 284; Fuchs, "Concepts and Policies in Anglo­
American Administrative Law Theory," 47  Yale L. J. ( 1 9 3 8 )  5 3 8  at 553 ; 
61 Rep. A. B. A .  at 728 ; chap. V, supra. 
:n See the monographs prepared by the Attorney General's Committee on Ad­
ministrative Procedure. 
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scope may indeed contract38 and administrative activity may 
flow more freely. But judicial protection of constitutional 
rights and liberties must continue as an indispensable part of 
our existing form of government. 
The comparison of the French and American adminis­
trative systems can be summed up with a concluding observa­
tion which current events have endowed with unforeseen 
significance. Not only in this country, but also under the 
droit administratif, as it has evolved, administrative action 
directly encroaching upon private rights and liberties was 
normally subject to ordinary court review and control. In its 
final setting the function of the French administrative courts 
- was to accord expert treatment to intrinsically administrative 
problems rather than to subtract from the powers customarily 
belonging to the judicial courts. 
Thus, in order that the circle may close, this inquiry must 
turn once more to the separation of powers. Both in the 
United States and in France a century and a half ago the 
establishment of a democratic form of government occurred 
under the auspices of the separation of the departments of 
government. However, the events following in the wake 
of widely diverging interpretations show that the precept 
was too vague to be depended upon for the preservation of 
the system it had helped to create. Each system developed 
within itself and of its own strength the far more reliable de­
vice known as judicial review. It is not difficult in this country 
88 The proposal in the new Administrative Law Bill, S. 9 1 5, H. R. 4236, 
76th Cong., 1 st sess. ( 1 939) ,  favoring a considerable extension of judicial 
review of administrative orders and decisions undoubtedly exaggerates the func­
tion of judicial review. Section s (a) of the bill provides seven grounds upon 
which decisions may be set aside. Briefly stated, they are : ( 1 ) erroneous findings 
of fact, ( 2) insufficient evidence, ( 3 )'> absence of facts to support the decisions, 
(4) lack of due process, (5) lack of jurisdiction, (6) unconstitutionality and 
illegality under federal laws, and ( 7) other illegality. 
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to mistake the shadow for the substance, since the separation 
of powers as originally conceived placed no serious obstacle in 
the path of judicial control over administrative action. How­
ever, in France, where its corollary, the differentiation of 
agencies, had guaranteed autonomy to the administrative de­
partment, the struggle of "judicial review" to regain and 
maintain its place throws into high relief the reasons for such 
review, that is, the preservation of democratic institutions and 
the protection of civil liberties and private enterprise. 
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Supplement {Fuzier-Herman),  Paris, x 886-. 
Repertoire methodique et alphabetique de legislation, 
de doctrine et de jurisprudence, and Supplement ( Dal­
loz), Paris, 1 845-1 897· 
Repertoire pratique de legislation 
jurisprudence, and Supplement 
1 9 1 0-. 
Codes and collections of statutes: 
de doctrine et de 
(Dalloz) ,  Paris, 
Code administratif (Petite collection Dalloz),  Paris, 
(I 932 ? ]-1936. 
Code civil, annote, with Supplement (Fuzier­
Herman) .  
Code d'instruction criminelle et code penal (annotated, 
Petits codes Carpentier) , Paris, 1 92 7 .  
Collection compU:te des lois, decrets, etc. (Duvergier), 
Paris, I 824-. 
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Collections of. cases: 
Dalloz, Recueil hebdomadaire de jurisprudence, Paris, 
I 924-· 
[Annual volumes (since I 924) of the weekly 
reports of decisions not published in the Recueil 
periodique. (The decisions are accompanied by 
brief remarks.) ] 
A case cited (e.g.) D. H. I 926.427, indi­
cates the report in this collection (Dalloz 
hebdomadaire) by year and page number. 
Dalloz, Recueil periodique et critique de jurisprudence, 
de legislation et de doctrine, Paris, 
I 845-· 
[The annual volumes are divided into four 
(through I 9 I 5 five) parts. Part I contains de­
cisions of the Cour de cassation ; part 2, deci­
sions of the courts of appeal and lower courts ; 
part 3, decisions of the Counseil d'Etat and the 
Tribunal des confl.its. These are selective reports 
of decisions and are annotated and frequently 
accompanied by signed comments and notes. 
Part 4 is reserved for the report of laws and 
statutes enacted during the year, supplemented 
with the pertinent legislative reports and de­
bates. (Part 5 contained summaries of less im­
portant decisions of various tribunals.) ] 
Cases reported in this collection are cited 
(e.g.) D. I 929·3· I44, i.e. Dalloz, I 929 vol­
ume, part '3, page I44· 
Sirey, Recueil general des lois et des arrets (Journal du 
palais) 
[Annual volumes divided into four parts con­
taining (I) decisions of the Cour de cassation, 
(II) decisions of the courts of appeal and lower 
courts, (III) decisions of administrative courts 
and the Tribunal des confl.its, (IV) decisions 
of foreign courts. (Part IV was added in I927, 
and prior to I 8 8 I parts II and III combined 
formed part II of each volume.) The selected 
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decisions which are annotated and in many 
instances accompanied by signed notes and com­
ments are followed by laws and statutes in 
chronological order of enactment.] 
Citations of cases in this collection are pre­
ceded by S. (Sirey) and give the number (year) 
of the volume, of the part and page, e.g., S. 
1 934·2·77· 
Gazette du Palais, Paris, 1 88 1-. 
[Annual or semi-annual volumes of deci­
sions (approximating chronological order) of 
the various judicial and administrative courts, 
with brief notes ; followed by laws and statutes 
as enacted. The pages of each volume are num­
bered consecutively. ]  
Cases in this collection are cited, e.g., Gaz. 
Pal. 1 935· 1 . 781 ,  thus indicating page 781  of 
the first semi-annual volume of 1 935· 
Recueil des arrets du Conseil d'Etat--des decisions du 
Tribunal des conflits (etc.), Paris, 
1 82 1-. 
[Annual volumes containing the decisions 
of administrative courts and the Tribunal des 
conflits. ]  
Cases in these reports are identified by year 
and page number, e.g., Rec. 1 898.573· 
[NoTE : Many of the more important decisions are reported in more 
than one of the foregoing collections. ]  
Revue du droit public e t  de  la science politique, Paris, 
1 894-· 
[A quarterly review in which leading articles 
concerning questions of public law are currently 
published, as well as abstracts of the important 
decisions and the notes accompanying them.]  
Materials in  the review (abbreviated R.  D. 
P.) are cited by indicating number of yearly 
volume, year, and page, e.g., 46 R. D. P. 
( 1929) 157· 
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III. MisCELLANEous TExTs AND ARTICLEs oN FoREIGN LAw 
CITED :  
Texts: 
Andersen, Poul, Ungultige Verwaltungsakte, translated into 
German from the Danish by Walther Pappenheim, 
Berlin, I 92 7 .  
Bernatzik, Edmund, Rechtsprechung und materielle Rechts­
kraft, Vienna, I 886. 
Ghose, N., Comparative Administrative Law; Tagore Law 
Lectures, 1 9 1 8, Calcutta and London, I 9 I9. 
Jellinek, Georg, Allgemeine Staatslehre, -3d ed., Berlin, I 929. 
---Gesetz und Verordnung, Freiburg, i. B., I 887.  
J ellinek, Walter, Verwaltungsrecht, 2d ed., Berlin, I 929. 
[Enzyklopadie der Rechts- und Staatswissenschaft, No. 
XXV.] 
Kelsen, Hans, Hauptprobleme der Staatsrechtslehre, 2d ed., 
Tiibingen, I 92 3· 
Kormann, Karl, System der rechtsgeschiiftlichen Staatsakte, 
Berlin, I 9 I o. 
Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Civil Government, re­
printed in Boston, I 77 3·  
---Two Treatises of Government, London, 1698. 
Mayer, Otto, Deutsches V erwaltungsrecht, 2d ed., Munich & 
Leipzig, I 9 I 4  (2 vols.) .  [Vol. VI of Binding, Karl, 
Systematisches Handbuch der Deutschen Rechtswissen­
schaft] . 
Stein, F., Grenzen und Beziehungen zwischen !ustiz and Ver­
waltung, Tiibingen, I 9 I2 .  
Articles: 
Gordon, D. M. "Administrative Tribunals and the Courts," 
49 L. Q. Rev. ( I 933)  94, 4 I 9· 
Jellinek, Georg, "Eine neue Theorie iiber die Lehre Montes­
quieu's von d�? Staatsgewalten," 30 Zeitschrift fur das 
Private-und Offenliche Recht der Gegenwart, ( 1903) 
I .  
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IV. TEXTS AND ARTICLES ON AMERICAN LAW CITED: 
Texts: 
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Dickinson, John, Administrative Justice and the Supremacy of 
the Law in the United States, Cambridge, Mass., I927.  
Erlick, E. M.,  La separation des pouvoirs et la convention fid­
erale de I 78], Paris, I 926. 
Federalist, The [written in 1 78 8 ;  same chapter numberings 
in all editions] . 
Freund, Ernst, Administrative Powers over Persons and Prop­
erty, Chicago, 1 928. 
---The Police Power, Chicago, I 904-. 
Landis, James M., The Administrative Process, New Haven, 
I938 .
. 
Articles: 
"Administrative Action as a Prerequisite of Judicial Relief," 
35 Col. L. Rev. ( I 93 5 )  230. 
Albertsworth, E. F., "Judicial Review of Administrative Ac­
tion by the Federal Supreme Court," 35  Harv. L. Rev. 
( I92 I )  I 2] .  
Ballantine, Arthur A., "Administrative Agencies and the Law," 
24 A. B. A. J. ( I938) I 09. 
Berger, Raoul, "Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies," 48 
Yale L. l. ( I 939) 98 1 .  ' 
Beutel, Frederick K., "Valuation as a Requirement of Due 
Process of Law in Rate Cases," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 
( I930) I 249· 
Borchard, Edwin M., "Declaratory Judgments in Administra­
tive Law," I I N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. ( I  933) I 39· 
[Note] 39 Col. L. Rev. ( I 939) 693. 
Cooper, Robert M. "Administrative Justice and the Role of 
Discretion," 47  Yale L. J. ( I 938)  5 7 7· 
Dickinson, John, "Crowell v. Benson : Judicial Review of 
Administrative Determinations of Questions of 'Con­
stitutional Fact,' " So U. Pa. L. Rev. ( I 932)  I 055 · 
Fairlie, John A., "The Separation of Powers,'' 2 I Mich. L. 
Rev. ( I 923)  393· 
Fuchs, Ralph F., "Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American 
Administrative Law Theory,'' 47  Yale L. J. ( I938) 
538. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Isaacs, Nathan, "Judicial Review of Administrative Findings," 
30 Yale L. J. ( 192 1 )  78 1 .  
Jacoby, Sidney B., "Delegation of  Powers and Judicial Re­
view : A Study in Comparative Law," 36 Col. L. Rev. 
( 1 936) 87 1 .  
Jaffe, Louis L., "Invective and Investigation in Administra­
tive Law," 52 Harv. L. Rev. ( 1 939) 1 201 .  
Jaretzki, Alfred, Jr., "The Administrative Law Bill : Unsound 
and Unworkable," 2 La. L. Rev. ( 1 940) 294· 
Jennings, E. G., "Tort Liability of Administrative Officers," 
2 1  Minn. L. Rev. ( 1 936) 263. 
"Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies in New York," 
33 Col. L. Rev. ( 1 933) 105. 
Katz, W. G., "Federal Legislative Courts," 43 Harv. L. Rev. 
( 1 930) 894· 
Kirchwey, Karl W., "The Interstate Commerce Commission 
and the Judicial Enforcement of the Act to Regulate 
Commerce," 14  Col. L. Rev. ( 1 9 14) 2 1 1 . 
Landis, James M., "Administrative Policies and the Courts," 
47 Yale L. l. ( 1 938) 5 1 9. 
McAllister, Breck P., "Administrative Adjudication and Judi­
cial Review," 34 Ill. L. Rev. ( 1 940) 68o. 
McGuire, 0. R., "The American Bar Association's Adminis­
trative Law Bill," I La. L. Rev. ( 1 939) 550. 
Parker, Edmund M., "State and Official Liability," 1 9  Harv. 
L.  Rev. ( 1 906) 335· 
"A Redefinition of Judicial Review of Administrative Orders," 
48 Yale L. l. ( 1 939) 1 256. 
Sharp, Malcolm P ., "The Classical American Doctrine of 'The 
Separation of Powers'," 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. ( 1 935) 
385. 
Special Committee on Administrative Law, American Bar As­
sociation Reports, vol. 6 1  ( 1 936) , p. 720 ; vol. 62 
( 1937),  p. 789 ; vol. 63 ( 1 938), p. 33 1 ;  Advance 
Program ( 1 938),  p. 1 34· 
Stason, E. Blythe, "Methods of Judicial Relief from Adminis­
trative Action," 24 A. B. A. l. ( 1 938) 274· 
Symposium, "American Bar Association's Administrative Law 
Bill," 34 Ill. L.  Rev. ( 1 940) 641 .  
I n d e x  
Abuse of power, I I6-I I S. 
Actes de gestion, see Acts of manage­
ment. 
Actes de puiuance publique or actes 
d'autorite, see Authoritative acts. 
Acts of management and authorita­
tive acts, distinction, 3 9; j urisdic­
tional implications, 40, 4 I , 5 3-
54-> 6 I .  
A dministration active, distinguished 
from juridiction administrative 
(administrative courts) ,  20, 2 I-
2 2 ;  acts of, censure through an­
nulment, 34· 
Administrative absolutism, j udicial 
safeguards in France, I 77-I 7S ; 
protection against, does not re­
quire disintegration of administra­
tive process, I S  7. 
Administrative action, effect of de­
lay, 3 7 ; object of, distinguished 
from method, I 79--"I So, I S  I­
I S  2 ;  when deemed "judicial," 
I So-I S I .  See also Administra­
tive process; "Judicial." 
Administrative acts, nonreviewabil­
ity in America, basis, 6 s-6 7 ;  
of general application, 9 3 ; of in­
dividual application ; 93 ; effect of 
illegality, I 31}-:I 4 I ; "nonexist­
ent," I 40 ; what are, 66, So-S 3,  
1 42 .  
Administrative appeals, 3 3 ;  provi­
sion in Walter-Logan Bill, 7 3 ·  
See also Recourse for excess of 
power. 
Administrative autonomy, area of in  
America, 6 S-74 ; role of  judiciary 
in relation to, 73-74. 
Administrative contracts, see Con­
tracts. 
Administrative courts, French, dis­
pute whether control of admin­
istrative acts should be given to 
ordinary courts, 1 5-16, I 0 2 ;  
general, limited and special juris­
diction, I 6- I 8 ;  in America, pro­
posed by Logan Bill, 72-73 ; 
French, suppression of, proposed, 
I O Z ;  have no injunctive powers, 
I 6 3 ;  essential fu!lction, I S  8. 
See also Conseil d'Etat ; Jurisdic­
tion. 
Administrative decisions, see De­
cisions executoires. 
Administrative discretion, check 
upon, see Administrative trespass, 
doctrine. 
Administrative error (fault, mis­
take) ,  see F aute de service. 
Administrative execution, illegal, a 
form of trespass, I 6 z ; subject to 
redress in ordinary courts in 
France, I 6z-1 63 ; injunction 
against, I 6 3 ; j udicial authoriza­
tion, when required, I 64 ;  j udi­
cial authorization, when not 
required, 1 64-I 6 9 ;  in case of ab­
sence of statutory sanctions, I 64-
I 6S ; in case of emergency, I 6z, 
I 68-I 6g. 
Administrative expertness, essential 
motive for creation of French 
administrative courts, I S-I6, 
I S S ;  bearing on distribution of 
j urisdiction, 4 1 ,  5 1 , 6z ; basis 
of j udicial noninterference in 
America, 66-6 7 ;  discretion of 
American courts to respect or dis­
regard, 7 1 .  
Administrative finality, American 
doctrine, 69-7 1 ,  1 S 1 ; effect, 7 3 ·  
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Administrative functions, constitu­
tional courts may not perform, 
6 3-64. 
"Administrative guarantee" of of­
ficers, 96-1 0 1 ; effect on principle 
of differentiation of agencies, 97 ; 
scope, 98, I OQ- I O I ,  1 08 ; sanc­
tions, 99; operative only as to 
acts "related to function," 
I Oo-I O I ; repeal, 1 0 1- I O S .  See 
also Administrative officers. 
Administrative Law Bill, see 
Walter-Logan Bill. 
Administrative law reforms, 7 2-74 ; 
must take account of discretionary 
powers of courts, 7 2-73 ; pro­
posed by Logan Bill, 7 2 ;  pro­
posed by Walter-Logan Bill, 7 3 ; 
must envisage constitutional ad­
ministrative procedure, I 8 7. 
Administrative officers, redress for 
delictual acts, 93-94 ; prohibi­
tion of actions against, in France, 
94 ; personal liability, 94-96 ; 
necessity of protection, against 
intimidation, 9S, 97-98 ; crim­
inal liability, 96 ; abuse of actions 
against, checked, 96 ; constitu­
tional guarantee, 96-1 0 1 ;  repeal 
of guarantee, I O I-IOS ; effect of 
repeal of guarantee, 1 o S ;  substi­
tution of "judicial" for admin­
istrative guarantee, l O S-I 1 0. 
See also "Administrative guaran­
tee" ; F aute personnel/e. 
Administrative personnel, necessity 
for adequate training, 7 4· 
Administrative process, the, is neces­
sarily complex, 1 86 ;  must not be 
disintegrated, 1 86-1 8 7 ;  resem­
blance to other governmental ac­
tivities, not a usurpation of "func­
tions," 1 8 7. 
Administrative questions, what are, 
6s,  66. See also Constitutional 
courts. 
Administrative regulations, what are, 
77-78 ;  powers of French courts 
relative to, 78,  86-89, 90, 1 7 7 ;  
l'exception d'iltegalite relative to, 
78-80, 8 2 ;  legislative character, 
disputed, 8o-8 3 ; administrative 
quality, 8 2 ;  j udicial declaration of 
illegality, not an annulment, 8 4, 
93, effect, 8 s, enforcement, 8 s ;  
interpretation and invalidation, 
87-8 8 ;  affecting civil liberties 
and property rights, 8 9 ;  legality, 
a question prejudicielle, 8 9 ;  j u­
dicial control in America, 90 ; 
similarity of j udicial control in 
France and America, 90 ; pro­
visions in Food, Drug and Cos­
metic Act, concerning review, 
91-92. 
Administrative systems, French and 
American, similarities, 62-64, 77, 
90, 1 77-1 78, 1 8 8 .  
Administrative trespass, defined, 
1 4 1 ,  I SO-I 5 4 ;  a criterion of 
jurisdiction, 1 42, 1 47-1 48 ; util­
ity of concept, I 48-1 50, I S 3 ;  
elasticity of concept, 1 49--1 50, 
1 7 5 ; distinct from faute person­
neUe, 1 49, 1 7 3-1 74;  reasons for 
contemporary interest, 1 5 0 ;  un­
constitutionality and illegality, 
elements, I 5 1  ; procedural ir­
regularity, I SQ-1 5 3 >  I 7S ;  vio­
lation of rights and liberties, 1 5 4 ;  
degree of invasion o f  rights and 
liberties, 1 54, I 7 1 -1 73 ;  illegal 
administrative enforcement, 1 62, 
1 64, 1 69--1 70 ;  doctrine of, a 
check on administrative discretion, 
1 70, 1 7  I ;  dispossession, I 7 2 ;  un­
lawful detention, 1 73 ;  interfer­
ence with religious freedom, I 7 3 ;  
interference with freedom of the 
press, I 73 ; concept, complicated 
nature, I ]4-I 76 ; function of doc­
trine, I 7 5- I 76 ; operation of doc­
trine, I 7 5 .  See also Civil liberties 
and property rights. 
Alembert, d', J. L. R., on Montes-
INDEX 201 
quieu's conception of two govern­
mental powers, s-6. 
American Bar Association, Special 
Committee on Administrative 
Law, misconceives French system 
of administrative justice, 20 ; on 
strict interpretation of the separa­
tion of powers, 2 3-24;  demand­
ing segregation of "j udicial func­
tions" of administrative agencies, 
2 4 ;  classification of "j udicial 
functions" of administrative agen­
cies, 6 7 ;  negative inference con­
cerning the supremacy of the law 
in France, rej ected, I 7 7 i  objec­
tion against "commingling of 
powers," I 84-I 8 5 ;  critique of 
objection, I 8 5-I 87.  
A ncien regime, no immediate dis­
card of institutions, 94· 
Annulment of administrative acts, 
see Recourse for excess of power. 
Appleton, J., defining public service, 
4 I ; on l'exception d'illegalite, 
So ;  on interpretation of the sepa­
ration of powers, 8 6 ;  defining 
faute personnelle, 1 2  s-1 26 ; on 
j urisdiction in case of faute per­
sonnette, 1 26, I 2 7 ;  on j udicial 
protection of constitutional liber­
ties and property, I 3 5 .  
Arrest, illegal, I 43 ·  See also Ad­
ministrative trespass. 
Assemblie constituante, Montes­
quieu's theory debated in, I 2.  
Aucoc, L., on the need for a central 
administrative court, I 5 ;  on ordi­
nary j urisdiction over questions of 
civil and property rights, I H­
I 3 5 ·  
Authoritative acts, distinguished 
from acts of management, 3 9-40. 
See also Acts of management. 
Authorization of actions against ad­
ministrative officers, see Adminis­
trative officers. 
Berthelemy, H., disapproving exten­
sion of administrative jurisdiction, 
in damage actions, 48-49, in ac­
tions on contract, 5 4 ;  on repeal 
of "administrative guarantee," 
I I O ;  repudiating doctrine of ad­
ministrative sanctions, I66-I67, 
I 69. 
Bill of rights, in French constitu­
tion, 95,  96. 
Blaevoet, Ch., reconsidering former 
repudiation of doctrine of admin­
istrative trespass, I 48 ; on doc­
trine of administrative trespass as 
a protection against arbitrary ac­
tion, I 70. 
Bonnard, R., defining administrative 
trespass, I 5 I-I 5 2 .  
"Case or controversy," 66, 9I ; orig­
inal administrative action affect­
ing private rights not a, I 86. 
Civil liberties and property rights, 
doctrine of j udicial protection in 
France, 89, I 3 3- I 3 7> I 8 8 ;  ordi­
nary jurisdiction where involved, 
statutory, I 3 5 ,  I 3 6 ;  doctrine of 
j udicial protection, reasons ad­
vanced against, 1 3  6-I 3 7 ; in­
vasion of, I 54, I 7 I- I 7 3 i doc­
trine of j udicial protection rec­
onciled with differentiation of 
agencies, I 76. See also Adminis­
trative trespass. 
Collateral attack on administrative 
acts, through actions against ad­
ministrative officers, I 08, I I I ,  
I 79;  did not materialize i n  
France, I I 2 ,  I 3 I ; through ac­
tions against officers in America, 
I 3 I ; as test of administrative 
jurisdiction, I 79, I 8 3 ; only 
method of obtaining ordinary 
court relief in France, I 84. 
"Commingling of powers," see 
American Bar Association. 
Commissaire du gou'l!ernement, I 8 ;  
importance of consulting conclu­
sions, 43· 
Commission ,du contentieux, see 
Conseil d'Etat, j udicial section. 
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Conclusions, see Cominissaire du 
gouvernement. 
Conflict, jurisdictional, see Conftit. 
Conftit, implementation of differen­
tiation of agencies, 2 5-2 7 ; uni­
lateral power of administrative 
to assert, 2 5-26 ; positif, negatif, 
de decision, distinguished, 2 7 ;  
statutory exclusion in matters of 
personal liberty, I 36, J4.2. See 
also Trib,unal des conftits. 
Conseil d'Etat, original character, 
q .-I 5,  4 9 ;  expansion of j urisdic­
tion, I 5 ; establishment as an in­
dependent court, I 6, 3 2 ;  desig­
nates both administrative body 
and its j udicial section, I 7 ;  organ­
ization and functioning, I 7-I 8 ;  
consent to actions against adminis­
trative officers, 96-97. (See also 
Jurisdiction ; Recourse for excess 
of power) . 
Conseil du roi, 9, 3 2 .  
Conseils de prefecture, jurisdiction, 
I 6, I 8 ; organization, I 8 .  
Constitutional courts, American, 
may not determine administrative 
questions, 63-64, 7 2, I 78-I 79, 
I 8 7 ;  rules of self-limitation, 68, 
I 78-I 79 ;  protective function, 
I 3 3, I 3 7. See also Judicial re­
VIew. 
Constitutional facts, doctrine of, 69-
7 1 .  
Constitutionality of administrative 
acts, I 5 I, I 7 7, I 8 2-I  8 3 .  See also 
Administrative trespass ; Usurpa­
tion of power. 
Constitutionality of laws, French 
courts without power to deter­
mine, 8 3 .  
Constitutional limitations on review 
powers of American courts, I 7 8-
I 79• 
C ontentieux de l' annulation, 3 I. See 
also Recourse for excess of power. 
Contentieux de la repression, 3 1 .  
Contentieux de !'interpretation, 3 I .  
Contentieux de plet'ne juridiction, 
3 I .  See also Ordinary recourse. 
Contracts, jurisdiction in case of 
contracts pertaining to public serv­
ice, 5 I ,  5 6 ;  when "administra­
tive," 5 3 ;  when made by central 
government, 5 3 , 5 5  ; predeter­
mination of j urisdiction by special 
clauses, 56. See also Jurisdiction. 
Cormenin, L. M., de, on administra­
tive protection of officers, 99-IOO. 
Cour de cassation, 26, 43, 79, 86, 
88, I03, I 04· 
Court control of administrative acts, 
see Administrative courts ; Judicial 
review; Jurisdiction. 
Curia regis, 9· 
Damage to land, I 4 5 ·  See also Ad­
ministrative trespass. 
Damages, actions for, against admin­
istrative officers, see Administra­
tive officers ; Collateral attack. 
Dareste, P., on judicial protection 
of civil liberties and property, I 34, 
I 3 5 ·  
Decisions executoires, annulment 
upon recourse for excess of power, 
3 6 ;  defined, 3 6 ;  requirement of 
notice, 3 6 ;  requirement of pro­
ceeding by way of, sanctions, 3 7· 
Declaratory judgments, determina­
tion of questions prejudicielles in 
France, 8 9 ;  on validity of regula­
tions, proposed in America, 9 I .  
Delegation of legislative power, 
theory of, rejected in France, So ; 
j udicial invalidation of in Amer­
ica, 90. 
Differentiation of agencies, admin­
istrative and j udicial, in France, 
a corollary of the separation of 
powers, I 2 ;  object, I 2-I 3 ;  con­
stitutional and statutory pro­
visions, 1 3-I 4 ;  strict interpreta­
tion held not practicable, I 9 ;  at­
tenuation of principle, 20-2 I ,  2 3, 
39; sanctions of principle, 2 5-27, 
8 9 ;  administrative expertness a 
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factor in interpretation, 4 I ; non­
statutory exceptions to principle, 
7 7 ;  statutory exceptions to prin­
ciple in case of reg.ulations, 7 8-
80 ; interpretation in regard to 
j udicial control of administrative 
regulations, So, 88, I 7 7 ;  inter­
pretation in regard to jurisdiction 
over public officers, 94 ; effect of 
repeal of "administrative guaran­
tee" of officers, I o 2 ; re-affirmation 
of principle, 105-I 07, I I I , I I 8 ;  
faute personnelle doctrine not a 
limitation, I 30, I 3 I ; conflict 
with doctrine of j udicial protec­
tion of civil liberties and prop­
erty, 8 9, I 3 3-I 3 7, 1 3 8 ;  prin­
ciple deemed not violated by ordi­
nary court review of "non­
administrative" acts, I 4 I ,  I 4 3 ;  
violation of principle by unau­
thorized application of adminis­
trative sanctions, I 64 ; circumven­
tion of principle by doctrine of 
administrative trespass, I 7 5 ,  I 76. 
See also Separation of powers. 
Direct attack on administrative acts, 
3 I ,  I 8 3. See also Judicial review; 
Recourse for excess of power. 
Dispossession, I 67-I 68, I 7 2-I 73 ·  
See also Administrative trespass. 
Droit administratif, see Administra­
tive systems, French. 
Ducrocq, Th., on Montesquieu's 
conception of the separation of 
powers, 7 ;  on duty of courts to 
verify legality of administrative 
regulations, 7 8 ;  on judicial pro­
tectorate over property rights and 
liberties, I 3 4· 
"Due process of law," I 3 3 ;  com­
mon to both American and French 
conception of j ustice, I 7 7 ;  re­
quirement of procedural due proc­
ess, I 7<J- I 8 2, I 8 7. 
Duguit, 1., on the two-fold nature 
of administrative regulations, 8 I ; 
on l'exception d'illegalite, 8 2 ;  on 
effect of superior order on per­
sonal liability of officers, I 2 3-
I 24;  defining faute personnelle, 
I 24-1 2 5 ;  on jurisdiction in case 
of faute incluse, 1 2  5 .  
Emergency, see Administrative ex­
ecution. 
Encroachment on private property, 
I 46. See also Administrative tres­
pass. 
Evocation, withdrawal of jurisdic­
tion from courts, I I ,  25,  95· 
Exception d'illegalite, 78-So. See 
also Administrative regulations. 
Exces de pouvoir, see Excess of 
power. 
Excess of power, what constitutes, 
3 4 ;  recourse, see Recourse for ex­
cess of power. 
Exhaustion of administrative reme­
dies, not a prerequisite to recourse 
for excess of power, 3 5 ; Amer­
ican doctrine, 68-69, I 8 I ;  pur­
pose of doctrine, 68 ; distinguished 
from "prior resort" doctrine, 68. 
Expropriation, I 67-I 68. 
F aute de service, and faute person­
neUe, distinction, 47, IOO. 
F aute detachable, see F aute person-
neUe. 
F aute incluse, see F aute personnelle. 
F aute lour de, see F aute personnelle. 
F aute personnelle, distinguished 
from faute de service, 47, IOO, 
I I 2 ;  deprives official act of ad­
ministrative quality, 48 ; juris­
dictional implications, I I 2, I I 3 ;  
liability of administrative officers, 
I I 3 ; definition, I I 4 ;  negligence, 
when faute personnelle, I I 5-I I 6, 
I 2 7, I 2 9, I 3 I ;  abuse of power, 
I I  6-I I  8 ;  bad faith, I I 9, 1 26 ;  
faute lour de, I 2o-I 2 I ,  I 2 6 ;  "de­
tachable," distinguished from "in­
closed," I 24, I 2 5 ; "intellectually 
descernible," I 2 5 ,  I 2 6 ;  illegal 
act of enforcement not per se 
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faute per sonnette, 1 26 ;  "third de­
gree," I 2 8 ;  inaction, I 30;  doc­
trine has not broadened ordinary 
court control over administrative 
acts, I 30 ; culpable intent chief 
element of concept, I 3o-I 3 I ,  
1 57 ;  distinct from trespass, 145,  
1 57· 1 73-1 ]4. 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, pro­
visions for j udicial review of regu­
lations, 91-92. 
Freedom of the press, illegality of 
restrictive regulation, 79; curtail­
ment of, deemed administrative 
error, 1 I 8 ;  violation of, held a 
trespass, 1 4·7• 1 5 5-1 56, 1 7 2-
1 73 ; violation of, by administra­
tive seizure (of newspaper) , 1 56, 
I 70 (of printed matter and print­
ing equipment) ,  1 57-1 58.  
"Fundamental rights," protection by 
constitutional courts, I 3 3 .  
Hauriou, M., o n  decision executoire, 
3 6 ;  on gestion publique, 42 ; on 
rule of j urisdiction in matters of 
public service, 48 ; on jurisdiction 
in matters of contract, 5 6 ;  on the 
"supremacy of the law," 8 3 ; on 
protection of administrative of­
ficers, 98 ; on repeal of "adminis­
trative guarantee," 103 ; defining 
administrative trespass, I 5o-1 5 I ;  
on administrative rule-making 
power and procedure, I 5 1 ;  on 
administrative execution, 1 66, 
I 67 ;  on function of trespass doc­
trine, 1 70 ; on original adminis­
trative action, 1 86. 
Illegality of administrative acts, basis 
of ordinary j urisdiction in France, 
77, 96 ; degrees, 1 3 8, I 3 9 ;  does 
not automatically render act 
"non-administrative," I 38-1 39, 
1 74-I 75 ; an element of tres­
pass, 1 47-148, 1 50-1 5 3 ·  See also 
Administrative regulations ; Ad-
ministrative trespass ; Usurpation 
of power. 
Inj unction, against illegal adminis­
trative execution in France, 163 ; 
not available in administrative 
courts, I 63, I 6 5 ;  in America, a 
method of collaterally testing ad­
ministrative j urisdiction, I 8 3 .  
Intendants, 9· 
Interest, adversely affected, basis for 
recourse for excess of power, 3 3 ;  
reasons for requiring, 34· 
Interference, j udicial, with ad­
ministrative action, in France, 
I o-I I ; in America, 2 3-24. See 
also Parlements. 
Jacquelin, R., on effect of repeal of 
"administrative guarantee," I02, 
I 07, I 09 ; repudiating doctrine 
of ordinary j urisdiction for pro­
tection of civil liberties and prop­
erty, I 34· 
Jeze, G., on prestige of French 
civil courts, 49 ; defining faute 
personnelle, I I 9-I 20. 
"Judicial," term, used to differenti­
ate administrative court review 
and administrative review, 20 ; 
meaning relative to administra­
tive action, I 79-I So, I 8 I .  
Judicial control, see Court control. 
Judicial power, Montesquieu's con­
ception, 8 ; Montesquieu's con­
ception favorable to aims of 
French Revolution, 8, I 3 ; Amer­
ican constitutional conception, 
2 2-23, 62-64 ; American doc­
trines of limitation upon, 63-69; 
normal scope, revival of interest 
in France, I 3 8. 
Judicial relief from administrative 
action, see Judicial review. 
Judicial review, of administrative 
regulations, 8 8-9 2 ; of adminis­
trative acts, comparable with rules 
governing review powers of 
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French civil courts, I 77-I 83, 
I8 8; procedural devices in Amer­
ice, I 78, I 79• I S  3 ;  right to, con­
tent, I 78-I 79, I 8 2 ;  limited by 
"j udicial" nature of act, I 78-
I 79, I 8 I ;  scope, defined by pur­
pose, I 8 I ; determined by inter­
pretation of "due process" and 
"jurisdiction," I 8 2-I 8 3 ; and 
the "supremacy of the law," I 8 2 ; 
· American and French methods, 
differ in degree only, I 84;  ad­
vantage of French system, I 84;  in 
the sense of protection of consti­
tutional rights, essential to Amer­
ican form of government, I 88 ; 
indispensable to preservation of 
democratic institutions, I 88-I 89. 
Juridiction administrative, distinct 
from administration active, 20, 
2 I-22. 
Jurisdiction, exclusive, of Conseil 
d'Etat to annul administrative 
acts, 3 I-3 3 ;  in case of ordinary 
recourse, 39-42 ; in case of actions 
for damages, 42-50 ; in case of 
actions on contract, 5o-5 6 ;  in 
case of "administrative" contracts, 
5 3-5 5 ;  distribution among 
French courts, controlled by 
familiar ideas, 62;  factors com­
plicating, where administrative 
regulations involved, in France, 
8o-8 3 ; of American courts over 
regulations, 9o-92 ; of French 
courts over actions against of­
ficers, 94, 98 ; in case of faute 
personnelle, I I 2 ;  in case of tres­
pass, I 22-1 23, I4I· I43 ; of 
French civil courts in matters of 
constitutional rights and property, 
I 3 3-I 3 7 ;  statutory, declaratory 
nature, in case of liberties and 
property, I 36 ; in case of illegal 
administrative acts, I 3 8-q :o, 
I 7 7 ;  in case of "non-administra­
tive" acts, 141 ,  I 42-I43, I 47-
I 48, I 74-I 7 5 ; in case of illegal 
acts of execution, I 62-I63 ; of 
American courts to review admin­
istrative acts, I 78-I 83.  
Jurisdictional concepts, purpose of 
formulation in France, 6 I-62. 
Jurisdictional conflicts, see Conftit; 
Tribunal des conflits. 
Jurisdictional facts, American doc-
trine, 69-7 I .  
Justice deleguee, I 5-I6. 
Justice retenue, I I ,  I 5, 3 2. 
Laferriere, E., on jurisdiction in 
case of ordinary recourse, 40, 52 ; 
on "administrative guarantee," 
I OO, I O I ; defining faute person­
neUe, I I 4 ;  concerning violations 
of the freedom of the press, I I  8 ; 
on j udicial protectorate over con­
stitutional rights and liberties, 
I 3 5, I 4 7 i  on illegality of admin­
istrative acts, 1 38-I 3 9 ;  on usur­
pation of power, I 3 9-I40. 
Laroque, P., repudiating doctrine of 
administrative trespass, I 48. 
Law schools, necessity of integrating 
public law curriculum, 74· 
Legality of administrative acts, see 
Declaratory j udgments. 
Legislative courts, federal, may per­
form nonj udicial functions, 64, 
7 2 ;  proposed "consolidation," 72. 
Lettre de jussion, see Registration of 
royal ordinances. 
Liability of administrative officers, a 
j urisdictional problem in France, 
94, I I 2 ;  established by Bill of 
Rights, 9 5-96 ; effect of "admin­
istrative guarantee" of officers, 97 ; 
complemented by state liability, 
I I l-I 1 2, I 3 I ; effect of superior 
order, 1 2 3 ;  not involved in case 
of trespass, I 7 4· 
Lit de justice, I I . See also Registra­
tion of royal ordinances. 
Locke, J., on the separation of pow­
ers, 5 ·  
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Logan Bill, federal administrative 
courts proposed, 72. 
Maitres des requetes, I 7, 4-3· 
Mandamus, precluded in France by 
differentiation of agencies, 3 7· 
See also Judicial review, methods 
of. 
Marches de fournitures, 53 ,  5 5 · See 
also Contracts. 
Military requisition, irregular, I 4-5 ·  
Ministre-juge, doctrine of, I 6. 
Mirabeau, H. G. R., comte de, I .  
Montesquieu, Ch. L. de S., baron de, 
conception of separation of powers 
re-examined, 4--8 ; reception of 
doctrine, in America and France, 
5 ;  recognized only two govern­
mental "powers," 6 ;  first to 
postulate distribution of govern­
mental powers, 7 ;  did not recog­
nize a coordinate j udicial power, 
6-8. 
Moreau, F., on interpretation of the 
differentiation of agencies, 84--
8 5 .  
"Negative order" doctrine, 6 5-66 ; 
repudiation of, as a criterion of re­
viewability of administrative acts, 
65 .  
Negligence, see Faute personnelle. 
"Nonadministrative" nature of acts, 
a jurisdictional formula in France, 
I 3 8, 14- 1 ,  I4-2-I4-3> I 4-7-I4-8, 
I 5 8, I 63,  I 74-> I 75 ·  
"Nonexistent" acts, 1 4-0-14-1,  1 77· 
See also Administrative acts. 
Notice, 36.  See also Decisions ex­
ecutoires. 
Notice and hearing, see Procedural 
irregularity. 
Officers, see Administrative officers. 
Ordinary courts, French, assertion of 
j urisdiction over administrative 
acts, 77, 88.  See also Jurisdiction. 
Ordinary recourse against adminis­
trative acts, in France, requisites, 
38 .  
Parallel recourse, what is, 3 5 .  See 
also Recourse for excess of power. 
Parlements, powers, 9; interference 
with executive by, <)-I I .  
Personal error (fault, mistake) ,  see 
F aute personnelle. 
Personal liability, see Liability of 
administrative officers. 
Personal liberty, administrative in­
terference, 14-3,  I 73·  
Police power, exercise of in conflict 
with civil liberties, not trespass 
per se, 1 5<)-1 6 1 ,  1 70, 172 .  
Prior resort t o  administrative action, 
68-69 ; distinguished from "ex­
haustion" doctrine, 68. 
Private interests, protection not in 
issue at inception of French ad­
ministrative system, 1 4-. 
Procedural due process, see "Due 
process of law" ; Judicial review. 
Procedural irregularity, a form of 
administrative trespass, I 50-1 53 ,  
1 75 ·  
Property rights, see Civil liberties 
and property rights. 
Public liberties, what are, 1 54-· 
Public service, j urisdictional impli­
cations of concept, 4-0-4-2, 59, 61 ; 
definition, 4-1 ; applied to damage 
actions, 4-2-5 o ;  applied to con­
tract actions, so-5 6 ;  distinction 
of commercial and non-commer­
cial, 56-6o. 
Quasi-judicial action, see "Judicial." 
Questions prejudicielles, doctrine 
of, differentiation of agencies, 
sanction, 89, 14-5, 148-1 50. See 
also Declaratory judgments. 
Rechtsuberzeugung, j udicial protec­
tion of liberties and property, in 
France, 1 3 7· 
Recours de pleine juridiction, see 
Ordinary recourse. 
Recours gracieux, 3 3 ·  
Recours hierarchique, 3 3 .  See also 
Administrative appeals. 
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Recours paraltele, see Parallel re­
course. 
Recours pour exces de pouvoz'r, see 
Recourse for excess of power. 
Recourse for excess of power, ex­
clusive j urisdiction of Conseil 
d'Etat to receive, 3 1 , p, 3 6 ;  
significance, 3 1-3 3 ;  evolution, 
3 2-3 3 ; nature of remedy, 3 3-3 5 ;  
originally an administrative ap­
peal, 3 3 ; j udicial aspect, 3 3,  3 7, 
49 ; grounds, 34; is a proceeding 
in rem, 34;  informal and inexpen­
sive, 3 5 ; not available if parallel 
recourse open, 3 5 ; "executory de­
cisions" subject to, 3 6 ;  does not 
normally arrest administrative ac­
tion, 3 7 ;  evasion of by adminis­
trative, 3 7. 
Rejere, see lnj unction. 
Registration of royal ordinances, 
power of parlements to refuse, of 
Crown to compel, I Q-1 1 .  
Regulations, see Administrative reg­
ulations. 
Religious freedom, administrative 
interference, I 44, I 7 3. See also 
Administrative trespass. 
Remonstrance, see Registration of 
royal ordinances. 
Sanctions, administrative, See Ad­
ministrative execution. 
Section du contentieux, I 5 ·  See also 
Conseil d'Etat, judicial section. 
Segregation of j udicial functions, see 
American Bar Association. 
Seizure, administrative, see Admin­
istrative trespass. 
Separation des autorites administra­
twe et judiciaire, I 2. See also Dif­
ferentiation of agencies. 
Separation of powers, historic po­
litical meaning of doctrine, signif­
icance, 3-4, 23 ; function, 8, 1 2, 
22, 23 ,  2 8 ;  adoption in France, 
two-fold object, I 3-I4;  elasticity 
of doctrine, I 9 ;  difference in 
American and French conceptions 
of Montesquieu's theory, 2 I-23, 
62-63, 90 ; changing content of 
doctrine, 23-24 ; implementation 
of, 2 s-2 7 ;  interpretation by 
United States Supreme Court, 63-
68 ; instrumental in establishment 
of American and French demo­
cratic governments, I 88. See also 
Differentiation of agencies ; Mon-
tesquieu. . 
Service public, see Public service. 
State liability, adoption in France, 
I I I ;  basis, I I I-I I 2 ;  advantage, 
I I 2. 
Supersedeas, 3 7. 
"Supremacy of the law," the, I 3 3 ;  
postulate common to American 
and French administrative sys­
tems, I ] ] ;  American Bar Associa­
tion, inference, concerning, re­
jected, I 7 7 ;  implementation with 
judicial review, I 82. 
Torts, see Administrative officers ; 
Faute de service; Faute person­
neUe. 
Trespass, see Administrative trespass. 
Tribunal des conflits, organization 
and function, 26 ; establishment, 
IOS ; respect enjoyed, I 08. 
Usurpation of power, what consti­
tutes, I 3<J-I4 I ;  distinct from 
excess of power, I 40 ; a form of 
trespass, I 5o. 
V oie de fait, see Administrative tres­
pass. 
W aline, M., defining administrative 
trespass, I 5 4 ;  defining "public 
liberties," I 5 4 ;  on administrative 
execution, I 62, I ]I .  
Walter-Logan Bill, provisions for 
intra-agency review, 73 ; pro­
posals concerning review of ad­
ministrative regulations, 9o-9I ; 
proposals concerning j udicial re­
view, I 88. 
